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- Carnap, Aufbau, first reading assignment: Explain both
the similarities and the differences between the two aspects of an
axiomatized theory, as explained by Carnap in §2: the ``deductive
system'' and the ``constructional system.'' Explain further what
Carnap means by ``reduction'' and ``construction,'' and what the
equivalents would be in a deductive system. From the fact that
Carnap is engaged in setting up a constructional system, rather than
a deductive system, what can be ruled out as the purpose of the
book?
- Carnap, Aufbau, second reading assignment: According to
Carnap, what is the connection between the following three ideas:
(1) not every name makes sense as an argument to every propositional
function (for example, ``Julius Caesar is prime'' is neither true
nor false); (2) not every object is of the same ``type''; (3)
objects of higher type are ``logical complexes'' of objects of lower
type? Why is he forced to claim that ordinary language is full of a
special kind of ambiguity--type-ambiguity--to make this work?
- Carnap, Aufbau, third reading assignment: In §102
(p. 160), Carnap says that the point of construction theory is
``rational reconstruction of a process of cognition whose results
are already known.'' Explain what this means and why it is important
that he says it. In what sense does construction theory serve to
justify science, and in what sense does it not? Why is it important
that rational reconstruction involves ``fictions'' (see §100)?
(Can we use construction theory to check if scientific statements
are true?)
- Carnap, Aufbau, fourth reading assignment: What,
according to Carnap, is the difference between a scientific question
and a metaphysical question? (Discuss the example of the Trojan war,
§175, p. 281.) What is wrong with a metaphysical question and why?
Given that the constructional system is so incomplete, how can we
spot metaphysical questions and metaphysical concepts? Explain both
why this seems to be a problem for Carnap and why it actually
isn't. Give an example of a question we can be sure now is
metaphysical (according to Carnap), and explain how we can tell.
- Carnap/Neurath, protocol sentences debate: Explain what Carnap
means by a ``protocol sentence'' in The Unity of
Science. Why does Neurath think there cannot be ``protocol
sentences'' in this sense? What does he propose instead? That is:
what does he think the language of science should be like, and how
does he think scientific testing can work, if there are no protocol
sentences? (Again: explain both why this looks like a
serious problem for Neurath and how he would respond.)
- Carnap/Putnam, ``Methodological Character'' and ``What Theories
are Not'': Explain the role of the ``Observation Language'' in the
``Methodological Character'' paper and how Putnam's attack on
``observation terms'' seems to make that impossible. Isn't Carnap
free to propose whatever Observation Language he wants? Why won't
Putnam allow that?
- Quine, ``Epistemology Naturalized'': Discuss Quine's explanation
of Carnap's project by comparing it to (a) what Carnap says about
``reduction''; (b) what he says about ``rational reconstruction'';
and (c) what he says about ``choice of basis.'' How does (a) back up
what Quine says about the relationship between Carnap's project and
Hume's? How do (b) and (c) cause problems for Quine?
- Quine, ``Epistemology Naturalized'' (another question): Quine
says (on p. 81) that we should not reject ``the verification theory
of meaning,'' even though the verificationist project of the Aufbau fails. Why does he say that the theory must be true in
some form? Is this a reason that Carnap would give? Why or why not?
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Up: Phil. 125exam1, Autumn 06
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Abe Stone
2006-11-21