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Film and psychoanalysis
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Psychoanalysis and the cinema were born at the end of the nineteenth century. They share a common historical, social, and cultural background shaped by the forces of modernity. Theorists commonly explore how psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on the importance of desire in the life of the individual, has influenced the cinema. But the reverse is also true: the cinema may well have influenced psychoanalysis. Not only did Freud draw on cinematic terms to describe his theories, as in ‘screen memories’, but a number of his key ideas were developed in visual terms—particularly the theory of castration, which is dependent upon the shock registered by a close-up image of the female genitals. Further, as Freud (who loved Sherlock Holmes) was aware, his case histories unfold very much like popular mystery novels of the kind that were also adopted by the cinema from its inception.

The history of psychoanalytic film criticism is extremely complex—partly because it is long and uneven, partly because the theories are difficult, and partly because the evolution of psychoanalytic film theory after the 1970s cannot be understood without recourse to developments in separate, but related areas, such as Althusser’s theory of ideology, semiotics, and feminist film theory. In the 1970s psychoanalysis became the key discipline called upon to explain a series of diverse concepts, from the way the cinema functioned as an apparatus to the nature of the spectator relationship. Despite a critical reaction against psychoanalysis, in some quarters, in the 1980s and 1990s, it exerted such a profound influence that the nature and direction of film theory and criticism has been changed in irrevocable and fundamental ways.

Pre-1970s psychoanalytic film theory

One of the first artistic movements to draw on psychoanalysis was the Surrealist movement of the 1920s and 1930s. In their quest for new modes of experience that transgressed the boundaries between dream and reality, the Surrealists exulted the potential of the cinema. They were deeply influenced by Freud’s theory of dreams and his concept of the unconscious. To them, the cinema, with its special techniques such as the dissolve, superimposition, and slow motion, correspond to the nature of dreaming.

André Breton, the founder of the movement, saw cinema as a way of entering the marvellous, that realm of love and liberation. Recent studies by writers such as Hal Foster (1993) argue that Surrealism was also bound up with darker forces—explicated by Freud—such as the death drive, the compulsion to repeat, and the uncanny. Certainly, the films of the greatest exponent of cinematic Surrealism, Luis Buñuel (Un chien andalou, France, 1928; The Exterminating Angel, Mexico, 1962; and That Obscure Object of Desire, France, 1977), explore the unconscious from this perspective.

Not all theorists used Freud. Others drew on the ideas of Carl Gustav Jung, and particularly his theory of archetypes, to understand film. The archetype is an idea or image that has been central to human existence and inherited psychically from the species by the individual. Archetypes include: the shadow or the underside of consciousness; the anima, that is the feminine aspect in men; and the animus, or the masculine aspect in women. But generally, Jungian theory has never been widely applied to the cinema. Apart from Clark Branson’s Howard Hawks: A Jungian Study (1987) and John Izod’s The Films of Nicolas Roeg: Myth and Mind (1992), critical works consist mainly of articles, by authors such as Albert Bender (1979), Royal S. Brown (1980), and Don Fredericksen (1980), which analyse archetypes in the film text. Writers of the 1970s who turned to Freud and Lacan—the two most influential psychoanalysts—were critical, however, of what they perceived to be an underlying essentialism in Jungian theory, that is a tendency to explain subjectivity in unchanging, universal terms.

Many of Freud’s theories have been used in film theory: the unconscious; the return of the repressed; Oedipal drama; narcissism; castration; and hysteria. Possibly his most important contributions were his accounts of the unconscious, subjectivity, and sexuality. According to Freud, large parts of human thought remain unconscious; that is, the subject does not know about the content of certain troubling ideas and often much effort is needed to make them conscious. Undesirable thoughts will be repressed or kept from consciousness by the ego under the command of the super-ego, or conscience. In Freud’s law, repression is the key to understanding the neuroses. Repressed thoughts can manifest themselves in dreams, nightmares, slips of the tongue, and forms of artistic activity. These ideas have also influenced film study and some psychoanalytic critics explore the ‘unconscious’ of the film text—referred to as
the 'subtext' - analysing it for repressed contents, perverse utterances, and evidence of the workings of desire.

Freud’s notion of the formation of subjectivity is more complex. Two concepts are central: division and sexuality. The infantile ego is a divided entity. The ego refers to the child’s sense of self; however, because the child, in its narcissistic phase, also takes itself, invests in itself, as the object of its own libidinal drives, the ego is both subject and object. The narcissistic ego is formed in its relationship to others. One of the earliest works influenced by Freud’s theory of the double was Otto’s Rank’s 1925 classic *The Double* which was directly influenced by a famous movie of the day, *The Student of Prague* (Germany, 1913). In his later rewriting of Freud, Lacan took Freud’s notion of the divided self as the basis of his theory of the formation of subjectivity in the mirror phase (see below), which was to exert a profound influence on film theory in the 1970s.

Sexuality becomes crucial during the child’s Oedipus complex. Initially, the child exists in a two-way, or dyadic, relationship with the mother. But eventually, the child must leave the maternal haven and enter the domain of law and language. As a result of the appearance of a third figure - the father - in the child’s life, the child gives up its love-desire for the mother. The dyadic relationship becomes triadic. This is the moment of the Oedipal crisis. The boy represses his feelings for the mother because he fears the father will punish him, possibly even castrate him - that is, make him like his mother, whom he now realizes is not phallic. Prior to this moment the boy imagined the mother was just like himself. On the understanding that one day he will inherit a woman of his own, the boy represses his desire for the mother. This is what Freud describes as the moment of ‘primal repression’; it ushers in the formation of the unconscious.

The girl gives up her love for the mother, not because she fears castration (she has nothing to lose) but because she blames the mother for not giving her a penis-phallus. She realizes that only those who possess the phallus have power. Henceforth, she transfers her love to her father, and later to the man she will marry. But, as with the boy, her repressed desire can, at any time, surface, bringing with it a problematic relationship with the mother. The individual who is unable to come to terms with his or her proper gender role (activity for boys, passivity for girls) may become an hysteric; that is, repressed desires will manifest themselves as bodily or mental symptoms such as paralysis or amnesia. Alfred Hitchcock’s *Psycho* (USA, 1960) and *Marnie* (USA, 1964) present powerful examples of what might happen to the boy and girl respectively if they fail to resolve the Oedipus complex.

Freud’s theories were discussed most systematically in relation to the cinema after the post-structuralist revolution in theory during the 1970s. In particular, writers applied the Oedipal trajectory to the narrative structures of classical film texts. They pointed to the fact that all narratives appeared to exhibit an Oedipal trajectory; that is, the (male) hero was confronted with a crisis in which he had to assert himself over another man (often a father figure) in order to achieve social recognition and win the woman. In this way, film was seen to represent the workings of patriarchal ideology.

In an early two-part article, ‘Monsters from the ID’ (1970, 1971), which pre-dates the influences of poststructuralist criticism, Margaret Tarratt analysed the science fiction film. She argued that previous writers, apart from French critics, all view science fiction films as ‘reflections of society’s anxiety about its increasing technological prowess and its responsibility to control the gigantic forces of destruction it possesses’ (Tarratt 1970: 38). Her aim was to demonstrate that the genre was ‘deeply involved with concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis and seen in many cases to derive their structure from it’ (38). In particular, science fiction explores the individual’s repressed sexual desires, viewed as incompatible with civilized morality. Utilizing Freud’s argument that whatever is repressed will return, Tarratt discusses Oedipal desire, castration anxiety, and violent sadistic male desire.

**1970s psychoanalytic theory and after**

One of the major differences between pre- and post-1970s psychoanalytic theory was that the latter saw the cinema as an institution or an apparatus. Whereas early approaches, such as those of Tarratt, concentrated on the film text in relation to its hidden or repressed meanings, 1970s theory, as formulated by Jean-Louis Baudry, Christian Metz, and Laura Mulvey, emphasized the crucial importance of the cinema as an apparatus and as a signifying practice of ideology, the viewer-screen relationship, and the way in which the viewer was ‘constructed’ as transcendental during the spectatorial process.

Psychoanalytic film theory from the 1970s to the 1990s has travelled in at least four different, but related, directions. These should not be seen as linear progressions as they frequently overlap:

The first stage was influenced by apparatus theory as proposed by Baudry and Metz. In an attempt to avoid the totalizing imperative of the structuralist approach, they drew on psychoanalysis as a way of widening their theoretical base.
The second development was instituted by the feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey, who contested aspects of the work of Baudry and Metz by rebutting the naturalization of the filmic protagonist as an Oedipal hero, and the view of the screen-spectator relationship as a one-way process.

The third stage involved a number of feminist responses to Mulvey’s work. These did not all follow the same direction. In general, they included critical studies of the female Oedipal trajectory, masculinity and masochism, fantasy theory and spectatorship, and woman as active, sadistic monster.

The fourth stage involves theorists who use psychoanalytic theory in conjunction with other critical approaches to the cinema as in post-colonial theory, queer theory, and body theory.

Apparatus theory: Baudry and Metz

The notion of the cinema as an institution or apparatus is central to 1970s theory. However, it is crucial to understand that Baudry, Metz, and Mulvey did not simply mean that the cinema was like a machine. As Metz explained, ‘The cinematic institution is not just the cinema industry… it is also the mental machinery - another industry - which spectators “accustomed to the cinema” have internalized historically and which has adapted them to the consumption of films’ (1975/1982: 2). Thus the term ‘cinematic apparatus’ refers to both an industrial machine as well as a mental or psychic apparatus.

Jean-Louis Baudry was the first to draw on psychoanalytic theory to analyse the cinema as an institution. According to D. N. Rodowick, one ‘cannot overestimate the impact of Baudry’s work in this period’ (1988: 89). Baudry’s pioneering ideas were later developed by Metz, who, although critical of aspects of Baudry’s theories, was in agreement with his main arguments.

Baudry explored his ideas about the cinematic apparatus in two key essays. In the first, ‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’ (1970), he argued that the cinema is ideological in that it creates an ideal, transcendental viewing subject. By this he meant that the cinema places the spectator, the ‘eye-subject’ (1986a: 290), at the centre of vision. Identification with the camera-projector, the seamless flow of images, narratives which restore equilibrium—all of these things give the spectator a sense of unity and control. The apparatus ensures ‘the setting up of the "subject" as the active centre and origin of meaning’ (1986a: 286). Further, according to Baudry, by hiding the way in which it creates an impression of realism, the cinema enables the viewer to feel that events are simply unfolding – effortlessly - before his eyes. The ‘reality effect’ also helps to create, a viewer who is at the centre of representation.

To explain the processes of identification at work in the viewing context. Baudry turned increasingly to the theories of Jacques Lacan. Baudry argued that the screen-spectator relationship activates a return to the Lacanian Imaginary, the period when the child experiences its first sense of a unified self during the mirror stage. The arrangement of the different elements - projector, darkened hall, screen - in addition to reproducing in a striking way the mise-en-scène of Plato’s cave… reconstructs the situation necessary to the release of the ‘mirror stage’ discovered by Lacan’ (1986a: 294).

According to Lacan, there are three orders in the history of human development: the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. It is this area of Lacanian theory, particularly the Imaginary and the Symbolic, that is central to 1970s film theory. Drawing on Freud’s theories of narcissism and the divided subject, Lacan proposed his theory of subjectivity. The mirror stage, which occurs during the period of the Imaginary, refers to that moment when the infant first experiences the joy of seeing itself as complete, and imagines itself to be more adult, more fully formed, perfect, than it really is. The self is constructed in a moment of recognition and misrecognition. Thus, the self is split.

Similarly, the spectator in the cinema identifies with the larger-than-life, or idealized, characters on the screen. Thus, as Mulvey (1975) later argued, the viewing experience, in which the spectator identifies with the glamorous star, is not unlike a re-enactment of the moment when the child acquires its first sense of selfhood or subjectivity through identification with an ideal self. But, as Lacan pointed out, this is also a moment of misrecognition - the child is not really a fully formed subject. He will only see himself in this idealized way when his image is reflected back through the eyes of others. Thus, identity is always dependent on mediation.

For the moment, the spectator in the cinema is transported back to a time when he or she experienced a sense of transcendence. But in reality, the spectator is not the point of origin, the centre of representation. Baudry argued that the comforting sense of a unified self which the viewing experience re-enacts does not emanate from the spectator but is constructed by the apparatus. Thus, the cinematic institution is com-
licit with ideology - and other institutions such as State and Church - whose aim is to instill in the subject a misrecognition of itself as transcendental.

In his 1975 essay 'The Apparatus', Baudry drew further parallels between Plato's cave and the cinematic apparatus. The spectators in both are in a state of 'immobility', 'shackled to the screen', staring at 'images and shadows of reality' that are not real but 'a simulacrum of it' (1986b: 303-4). Like spectators in the cinema, they mistake the shadowy figures for the real thing. According to Baudry, what Plato's prisoners-human beings desire - and what the cinema offers - is a return to a kind of psychic unity in which the boundary between subject and object is obliterated.

Baudry then drew connections between Plato's cave, the cinematic apparatus, and the 'maternal womb' (1986b: 306). He argued that 'the cinematographic apparatus brings about a state of artificial regression' which leads the spectator 'back to an anterior phase of his development'. The subject's desire to return to this phase is 'an early state of development with its own forms of satisfaction which may play a determining role in his desire for cinema and the pleasure he finds in it' (1986b: 313). What Baudry had in mind by this 'anterior phase' was an 'archaic moment of fusion' prior to the Lacanian mirror stage, 'a mode of identification, which has to do with the lack of differentiation between the subject and his environment, a dream-scene model which we find in the baby/breast relationship' (1986b: 313).

After discussing the actual differences between dream and the cinema, Baudry suggested that another wish lies behind the cinema - complementary to the one at work in Plato's cave. Without necessarily being aware of it, the subject is led to construct machines like the cinema which 'represent his own overall functioning to him... unaware of the fact that he is representing to himself the very scene of the unconscious where he is' (1986b: 316-17).

In 1975 Christian Metz published Psychoanalysis and Cinema The Imaginary Signifier (translated in 1982), which was the first systematic book-length attempt to apply psychoanalytic theory to the cinema. Like Baudry, Metz also supported the analogy between screen and mirror and held that the spectator was positioned by the cinema machine in a moment that reactivated the pre-Oedipal moment of identification - that is, the moment of imaginary unity in which the infant first perceives itself as complete.

However, Metz also argued that the cinema-mirror analogy was flawed. Whereas a mirror reflects back the spectator's own image, the cinema does not. Metz also pointed out that, whereas the cinema is essentially a symbolic system, a signifying practice that mediates between the spectator and the outside world, the theory of the mirror stage refers to the pre-symbolic, the period when the infant is without language.

Nevertheless, Metz advocated the crucial importance of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory for the cinema and stressed the need to theorize the screen-spectator relationship-not just in the context of the Imaginary, but also in relation to the Symbolic. To address this issue, Metz introduced the notion of voyeurism. He argued that the viewing process is voyeuristic in that there is always a distance maintained, in the cinema, between the viewing subject and its object. The cinematic scene cannot return the spectator's gaze.

Metz also introduced a further notion which became the subtitle of his book: the Imaginary signifier. The cinema, he argued, makes present what is absent. The screen might offer images that suggest completeness, but this is purely imaginary. Because the spectator is aware that the offer of unity is only imaginary, he is forced to deal with a sense of lack that is an inescapable part of the viewing process.

Metz drew an analogy between this process and the experience of the (male) child in the mirror phase. (Metz assumes the spectator is male.) When the boy looks in the mirror and identifies for the first time with himself as a unified being he is also made aware of his difference from the mother. She lacks the penis he once thought she possessed. Entry into the Symbolic also involves repression of desire for the mother and the constitution of the unconscious in response to that repression. (Here, Lacan reworks Freud's theories of the phallus and castration.) Along with repression of desire for the mother comes the birth of desire: for the speaking subject now begins a lifelong search for the lost object - the other, the little 'o' of the Imaginary, the mother he relinquished in order to acquire a social identity.

As the child enters the Symbolic it acquires language. However, it must also succumb to the 'law of the father' (the laws of society) which governs the Symbolic order. Entry into the Symbolic is entry into law, language, and loss - concepts which are inextricably bound together. Thus, entry into the Symbolic entails an awareness of sexual difference and of the 'self' as fragmented. The very concept of 'T' entails lack and loss.

When the boy mistakenly imagines his mother (sisters, woman) is castrated, his immediate response is to disavow what he has seen; he thinks she has been castrated, but he simultaneously knows that this is not true. Two courses of action are open to the boy. He can accept her difference and repress his desire for unification with the mother on the understanding that one day he will inherit a woman of his own. He can refuse to accept her difference and continue to believe that the mother is phallic.
Rather than think of her lack, the fetishist will conjure up a reassuring image of another part of her body such as her breasts or her legs. He will also phallicize her body, imagining it in conjunction with phallic images such as long spiky high heels. Hence, film theorists have drawn on the theory of the phallic woman to explain the femme fatale of film noir (Double Indemnity, USA, 1944; Body Heat, USA, 1981; The Last Seduction, USA, 1994), who is depicted as dangerously phallic. E. Anne Kaplan’s edited collection Women in Film Noir (1978) proved extremely influential in this context.

The Oedipal trajectory, Metz argued, is re-enacted in the cinema in relation not only to the Oedipal nature of narrative, but, most importantly, within the spectator-screen relationship. Narrative is characteristically Oedipal in that it almost always contains a male protagonist who, after resolving a crisis and overcoming a ‘lack’, then comes to identify with the law of the father, while successfully containing or controlling the female figure, demystifying her threat, or achieving union with her.

The concept of ‘lack’ is crucial to narrative in another context. According to the Russian Formalist Tzvetan Todorov, the aim of all narratives is to solve a riddle, to find an answer to an enigma, to fill a lack. All stories begin with a situation in which the status quo is upset and the hero or heroine must - in general terms - solve a problem in order for equilibrium to be restored. This approach sees the structures of narrative as being in the service of the subject’s desire to overcome lack.

Furthermore, the processes of disavowal and fetishism which mark the Oedipal crisis are - according to Metz - also replayed in the cinema. In terms of disavowal, the spectator both believes in the existence of what was represented on the screen yet also knows that it does not actually exist. Conscious that the cinema only signifies what is absent, the (male) spectator is aware that his sense of identification with the image is only an illusion and that his sense of self is based on lack. Knowing full well that the original events, the profilmic diegetic drama, is missing, the spectator makes up for this absence by fetishizing his love of the cinema itself. Metz sees this structure of disavowal and fetishism as crucial to the cinema’s representation of reality.

Apparatus theory emphasizes the way the cinema compensates for what the viewing subject lacks; the cinema offers an imaginary unity to smooth over the fragmentation at the heart of subjectivity. Narrative structures take up this process in the way they construct stories in which the ‘lost object’ (almost always represented by union with a woman) is recovered by the male protagonist.

Thus, apparatus theory emphasizes the way the cinema compensates for what the viewing subject lacks; the cinema offers an imaginary unity to smooth over the fragmentation at the heart of subjectivity. Narrative structures take up this process in the way they construct stories in which the ‘lost object’ (almost always represented by union with a woman) is recovered by the male protagonist. In her 1985 essay ‘Feminism, Film Theory and the Bachelor Machines’, in which she critically assessed apparatus theory as theorized by Baudry and Metz, Constance Penley made the telling point that Metz’s ‘imaginary signifier’ is itself a ‘bachelor apparatus’ - a compensatory structure designed for male pleasure. As The Imaginary Signifier began to exert a profound influence on film studies in many American and British universities, problems emerged. Critics attacked on a number of fronts: they argued that apparatus theory was profoundly ahistorical; that, in its valorization of the image, it ignored the non-visual aspects of the viewing experience such as sound; and that the application of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory was not always accurate. The most sustained criticism came from feminist critics, who argued correctly that apparatus theory completely ignored gender.

Psychoanalysis, feminism, and film: Mulvey

Psychoanalytic film theorists, particularly feminists, were interested in the construction of the viewer in relation to questions of gender and sexual desire. Apparatus theory did not address gender at all. In assuming that the spectator was male, Metz examined desire in the context of the male Oedipal trajectory.

In 1975 Laura Mulvey published a daring essay, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, which put female spectatorship on the agenda for all time. As Mulvey later admitted, the essay was deliberately and provocatively polemical. It established the psychoanalytic basis for a feminist theory of spectatorship which is still being debated. What Mulvey did was to redefine, in terms of gender, Metz’s account of the cinema as an activity of disavowal and fetishization. Drawing on Freudian theories of scopophilia, castration, and fetishism, and Lacanian theories of the formation of subjectivity, Mulvey introduced gender into apparatus theory.

In her essay, Mulvey argued that in a world ordered by sexual imbalance the role of making things happen usually fell to the male protagonist, while the female star occupied a more passive position, functioning as an erotic object for the desiring look of the male. Woman signified image, a figure to be looked at, while man controlled the look. In other words, cinematic spectatorship is divided along gender lines. The
cinema addressed itself to an ideal male spectator, and pleasure in looking was split in terms of an active male gaze and a passive female image.

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She argued that, although the form and figure of woman was displayed for the enjoyment of the male protagonist, and, by extension, the male spectator in the cinema, the female form was also threatening because it invoked man's unconscious anxieties about sexual difference and castration. Either the male protagonist could deal with this threat (as in the films of Hitchcock) by subjecting woman to his sadistic gaze and punishing her for being different or he could deny her difference (as in the films of Joseph von Sternberg and Marlene Dietrich) and fetishize her body by overvaluing a part of her body such as her legs or breasts. The narrative endings of films, which almost always punished the threatening woman, reinforced Mulvey's argument about the voyeuristic gaze, while the deployment of the close-up shot, which almost always fragmented parts of the female form for erotic contemplation, reinforced Mulvey's argument about the fetishistic look.

Whereas Freudian and Lacanian theory argued that the castration complex was a universal formation that explained the origins and perpetuation of patriarchy, Mulvey demonstrated in specific terms how the unconscious of patriarchal society organized its own signifying practices, such as film, to reinforce myths about women and to offer the male viewer pleasure. Within this system there is no place for woman. Her difference represents - to use what was fast becoming a notorious term - 'lack'. However, Mulvey did not hold up this system as universal and unchangeable. If, in order to represent a new language of desire, the filmmaker found it necessary to destroy pleasure, then this was the price that must be paid.

What of the female spectator? In a second article, 'Afterthoughts on "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema"' Inspired by King Vidor's Duel in the Sun (1946) (1981), Mulvey took up the issue of the female spectator. Since the classic Hollywood text is so dependent upon the male Oedipal trajectory and male fantasies about woman to generate pleasure, how does the female spectator experience visual pleasure? To answer this question, Mulvey drew on Freud's theory of the libido, in which he asserted that 'there is only one libido, which performs both the masculine and feminine functions' (1981: 13). Thus, when the heroine on the screen is strong, resourceful, and phallic, it is because she has reverted to the pre-Oedipal phase. According to Freud, in the lives of some women, 'there is a repeated alternation between periods in which femininity and masculinity gain the upper hand' (quoted in Mulvey 1971: 15). Mulvey concluded that the female spectator either identifies with woman as object of the narrative and (male) gaze or may adopt a 'masculine' position. But, the female spectator's 'phantasy of masculinisation is always to some extent at cross-purposes with itself, restless in its transvestite clothes' (in Mulvey 1981: 15).

It is this aspect of her work that became most controversial amongst critics, such as D. N. Rodowick (1982), who argued that her approach was too reductive and that her analysis of the female character on the screen and female spectator in the auditorium did not allow for the possibility of female desire outside a phallocentric context.

Developments in psychoanalysis, feminism, and film

Mulvey's use of psychoanalytic theory to examine the way in which the patriarchal unconscious influenced film form led to heated debates and a plethora of articles from post-structuralist feminists. Theorists such as Joan Copjec (1982), Jacqueline Rose (1980), and Constance Penley (1985) argued that apparatus theory, regardless of whether or not it took questions of gender into account, was part of a long tradition in Western thought whereby masculinity is positioned as the norm, thus denying the possibility of a place for woman. They argued that there was no space for the discussion of female spectatorship in apparatus-based theories of the cinema. Responses to Mulvey's theory of spectatorship followed four main lines: one approach was to examine the female Oedipal trajectory; another approach, known as fantasy theory, drew on Freud's theory of the primal scene to explore the possibility of a fluid, mobile or bisexual gaze; a third concentrated on the representation of masculinity and masochism; and a fourth approach, based on Julia Kristeva's (1986) theory of the 'abject maternal figure' and on Freud's theory of castration, argued that the image of the terrifying, overpowering woman in the horror film and suspense thriller unsettles prior notions of woman as the passive object of a castrating male gaze.
The Oedipal heroine

Drawing on Freud’s theory of the libido and the female Oedipal trajectory, feminists extended Mulvey’s application of the theory to argue for a bisexual gaze. Perhaps the spectator did not identify in a monolithic, rigid manner with his or her gender counterpart, but actually alternated between masculine-active and feminine-passive positions, depending on the codes of identification at work in the film text.

In a reading of Hitchcock’s Rebecca (USA, 1940), Tania Modleski (1982) argued that when the daughter goes through the Oedipus complex - although she gives up her original desire for her mother, whom she blames for not giving her a penis, and turns to the father as her love object - she never fully relinquishes her first love. Freud also argued that the girl child, unlike the boy, is predisposed towards bisexuality. The girl’s love for the mother, although repressed, still exists. In Rebecca the unnamed heroine experiences great difficulty in moulding herself to appeal to the man’s desire. When she most imagines she has achieved this aim, the narrative reveals that she is ‘still attached to the “mother”, still acting out the desire for the mother’s approbation’ (1982: 38). Recently, the notion of the female Oedipal trajectory has been invoked in a series of articles published in Screen (1995) on Jane Campion’s The Piano (New Zealand, 1993), which suggests that these debates are still of great relevance to film theory.

Other work raised related issues. In The Desire to Desire (1987), Mary Ann Doane turned her attention to the ‘woman’s film’ and the issue of female spectatorship. Janet Bergstrom, in ‘Enunciation and Sexual Difference’ (1979), questioned the premise that the spectator was male, while Annette Kuhn, in The Power of the Image (1985), explored cross-dressing, bisexuality, and the spectator in relation to the film Some Like it Hot (USA, 1959).

Fantasy theory and the mobile gaze

The concept of a more mobile gaze was explored by Elizabeth Cowie in her article ‘Fantasia’ (1984), in which she drew on Laplanche and Pontalis’s influential essay of 1964, ‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality’. Laplanche and Pontalis established three original fantasies - original in that each fantasy explains an aspect of the ‘origin’ of the subject. The ‘primal scene pictures the origin of the individual; fantasies of seduction, the origin and upsurge of sexuality; fantasies of castration, the origin of the difference between the sexes’ (1964/1986:19). These fantasies - entertained by the child - explain or provide answers to three crucial questions: Who am I? ‘Why do I desire?’ ‘Why am I different?’ The concept of primal fantasies is also much more fluid than the notion of fantasy permitted by apparatus theory, which inevitably and mechanistically returns to the Oedipal fantasy. The primal fantasies run through the individual’s waking and sleeping life, through conscious and unconscious desires. Laplanche and Pontalis also argued that fantasy is a staging of desire, a form of mise-en-scène. Further, the position of the subject is not static in that positions of sexual identification are not fixed. The subject engaged in the activity of fantasizing can adopt multiple positions, identifying across gender, time, and space.

Cowie argued that the importance of fantasy as a setting, a scene, is crucial because it enables film to be viewed as fantasy, as representing the mise-en-scene of desire. Similarly, the film spectator is free to assume mobile, shifting modes of identification as Cowie demonstrated in her analysis of Now Voyager (USA, 1942) and The Reckless Moment (USA, 1949). Fantasy theory has also been used productively in relation to science fiction and horror-genres in which evidence of the fantastic is particularly strong.

Masculinity and masochism

Richard Dyer (1982) and Steve Neale (1983) both wrote articles in which they argued against Mulvey’s assertion that the male body could not ‘bear the burden of sexual objectification’ (1975: 28). Both examined the conditions under which the eroticization of the male body is permitted and the conditions under which the female spectator is encouraged to look. Neale explored three main structures examined by Mulvey: identification, voyeurism, and fetishism. He concluded that, while the male body is eroticized and objectified, the viewer is denied a look of direct access. The male is objectified, but only in scenes of action such as boxing. Mainstream cinema cannot afford to acknowledge the possibility that the male spectator might take the male protagonist as an object of his erotic desire.

In her book In The Realm of Pleasure (1988), Gaylyn Studlar, however, offers a completely different interpretation of spectatorship and pleasure from the voyeuristic-sadistic model. In a revision of existing feminist psychoanalytic theories, she ar-
argues for a (male) masochistic aesthetic in film. Studlar's original study was extremely important as it was one of the first sustained attempts to break with Lacanian and Freudian theory. Instead, Studlar drew on the psychoanalytic-literary work of Gilles Deleuze, and the object-relations school of psychoanalytic theory.

Object-relations theory, derived from the work of Melanie Klein and, more recently, D. W. Winnicott, is a post-Freudian branch of psychoanalysis that places crucial importance on the relationship between the infant and its mother in the first year. Klein placed the mother at the centre of the Oedipal drama and argued for a primary phase in which both sexes are identified with the feminine. She argued for womb-envy in boys as a counterpart to Freud's penis-envy in girls. In particular, she explored destructive impulses the infant might experience in its relationship with the mother and other objects (parts of the body) in the environment. During this early formative phase, the father is virtually absent.

Focusing on the pre-Oedipal and the close relationship formed during the oral phase between the infant and the dominant maternal figure, Studlar demonstrates the relevance of her theory in relation to the films of Marlene Dietrich and Joseph von Sternberg. In these Dietrich plays a dominant woman, a beautiful, often cold tyrant, with whom men fall hopelessly and helplessly in love. Titles such as *The Devil is a Woman* (USA, 1935) indicate the kinds of pleasure on offer. Studlar argues that the masochistic aesthetic has so many structures in common with the Baudry-Metz concept of the cinematic apparatus, in its archaic dimension, that it cannot be ignored and constitutes a central form of cinematic pleasure which had been previously overlooked.

Kaja Silverman also developed a theory of male masochism in *Male Subjectivity at the Margins* (1992). Silverman's aim was to explore what she describes as 'deviant' masculinities, which she sees as representing 'perverse' alternatives to phallic masculinity. Drawing on Freudian and Lacanian theory, and concentrating on the films of Rainer Werner Fassbinder, she examined the misleading alignment of the penis with the phallus and the inadequate theorization of male subjectivity in film studies. Silverman explored a number of different forms of male masochism, from passive to active. Her analysis of 'male lack' is particularly powerful, and her book, in which she argued that the spectator can derive pleasure through passivity and submission, made an important contribution to growing debates around psychoanalytic interpretations of spectatorial pleasure.

The monstrous woman

Perhaps it was inevitable, given analyses of the masochistic male, that attention would turn towards the monstrous, castrating woman. Feminist theorists argued that the representation of woman in film does not necessarily position her as a passive object of the narrative or of viewing structures. Mary Russo's essay 'Female Grotesques' (1986), which drew on the Freudian notion of repression, was very influential. So, too, was the Kristevan notion of the abject as a structure which precedes the subject-object split. Drawing on psychoanalytic theories of woman-particularly the mother-as an abject monster, writers such as Modleski (1988), Lurie (1981-2), and Creed (1993) adopted a very different approach to the representation of woman in film, by arguing that woman could be represented as an active, terrifying fury, a powerfully abject figure, and a castrating monster. This was a far cry from Freud's image of woman as 'castrated other'.

Critics of psychoanalytic film theory

Psychoanalysis exerted a powerful influence on models of spectatorship theory that emerged during the 1970s and early 1980s. One of the dominant criticisms of the apparatus theory was that, in all of its forms, it invariably constructed a monolithic spectator. In the Baudry model the spectator is male and passive; in the Mulvey model the spectator is male and active. Psychoanalytic criticism was accused of becoming totalizing and repetitive. Film after film was seen as always representing the male character as in control of the gaze, and woman as its object. Or woman was invariably described as 'without a voice', or as standing outside the Symbolic order.

Rejecting the role of ideology in the formation of subjectivity, some critics were more interested in the actual details of how viewers responded to what they saw on the screen. Given that 1970s theory developed partly in reaction to this kind of empiricism, it is significant that, in recent years, there has been a renewal of interest in the area. This is evident in the work of David Bordwell and Noel Carroll, whose edited volume *Post-Theory* (1996) sets out to challenge the dominance of 1970s theory and to provide alternative approaches to spectatorship based on the use of cognitive psychology. Their interest is the role played by knowledge and viewing practices in relation to spectatorship. According to Carroll, 'Cognitivism is not a unified theory. Its name derives from its tendency to look for alternative answers to many of the
questions addressed by or raised by psychoanalytic film theories, especially with respect to film reception, in terms of cognitive and rational processes rather than irrational or unconscious ones’ (1996:62). Judith Mayne argues that, while cognitivists have formulated a number of important criticisms of psychoanalytic film theory, ‘the “spectator” envisaged by cognitivism is entirely different from the one conceptualized by 1970s film theory’ (1993: 7). The latter addressed itself to the ‘ideal spectator’ of the cinematic process, while cognitivism speaks to the ‘real viewer’, the individual in the cinema. Mayne argues that all too often cognitivists, such as Bordwell, ignore the ‘attempts that have been made to separate the subject and the viewer’ (1993: 56) and recommends the writings of Teresa de Lauretis in Alice Doesn’t (1984) as illustrating that the appeal to perception studies and cognitivism is not necessarily in radical contradiction from the theories of the apparatus (as in the case with Bordwell and others), but can be instead a revision of them’ (1993: 57).

Second, psychoanalytic theory was charged with ahistoricity. As early as 1975 Claire Johnston warned that ‘there is a real danger that psychoanalysis can be used to blur any serious engagement with political-cultural issues’. The grand narratives of psychoanalysis, such as the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety, dominated critical activity in the 1970s and early 1980s, running the real danger of sacrificing historical issues in favour of those related to the formation of subjectivity and its relation to ideology. These critics proposed the importance, not of the grand narratives of subjectivity, but of ‘micro-narratives’ of social change such as those moments when cultural conflict might reveal weaknesses in the dominant culture. They argued that film should be studied more in its relationship to history and society than to the unconscious and subjectivity.

Third, some attacked the centrality of spectatorship theory and its apparently exclusive interest in the ideal spectator rather than the actual viewer. Spectatorship theory did not take into account other factors such as class, colour, race, age, or sexual preference. Nor did it consider the possibility that some viewers might be more resistant to the film’s ideological workings than others. Political activists argued that psychoanalytic criticism did not provide any guide-lines on how the individual might resist the workings of an ideology that appeared to dictate completely the formation of subjectivity as split and fractured. Furthermore, they argued, not all individuals are locked into roles determined by the way subjectivity is formed.

Cultural studies has developed partly in response to these problems. It sees culture as a site of struggle. It places emphasis, not on unconscious processes, but on the history of the spectator (as shaped by class, colour, ethnicity, and so on) as well as on examining ways in which the viewer might struggle against the dominant ideology. Whereas the cognitivists have clearly rejected psychoanalysis, the latter’s status within cultural studies is not so clear as cultural critics frequently utilize areas of psychoanalytic theory.

Fourth, empirical researchers argue that the major problem with psychoanalysis is that it is not a science, that psychoanalytic theories are not based on reliable data which can be scientifically measured, and that other researchers do not have access to the information pertaining to the case-studies on which the theories have been formulated.

Psychoanalytic theories reply that by its very nature theoretical abstraction cannot be verified by ‘proof’. Furthermore, the entire thrust of 1970s psychoanalytic film theory was based on the fact that there is no clear or straightforward relation between the conscious and the unconscious, that what is manifested on the surface may bear no direct relation to what lies beneath, that there is no cause-and-effect relation, which manifests itself in appearance, between what the subject desires to achieve and what takes place in reality. Only via psychoanalytic readings can one explore such things as displacement, disguise, and transformation.

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Recent developments

Although psychoanalytic film theory has been subject to many forms of criticism over the past twenty years, it continues to expand both within and outside the academy. This is evident, not only in the work of cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall, but also in the relatively new areas of post-colonialism and queer theory, and in writings on the body. Scholars working in these areas do not use psychoanalytic theory in the totalizing way in which it was invoked in the 1970s. Rather, they draw on aspects of
psychoanalytic theory to illuminate areas of their own special study. The aim in doing so is often to bring together the social and the psychic.

Post-colonial theorists such as Homi K. Bhabha and Rey Chow have drawn on psychoanalytic theories in their work. Whereas earlier writers on racism in the cinema tended to concentrate on questions of stereotyping, narrative credibility, and positive images, the focus of post-colonial theorists is on the process of subjectification, the representation of ‘otherness’, spectatorship, and the deployment of cinematic codes. In short, the shift is away from a study of ‘flawed’ or ‘negative’ images (‘positive’ images can be as demeaning as negative ones) to an understanding of the filmic construction of the relationship between colonizer and colonized, the flow of power between the two, the part played by gender differences and the positioning of the spectator in relation to such representations. In order to facilitate such analyses, theorists frequently draw on aspects of psychoanalytic theory.

In ‘The Other Question’, Homi K. Bhabha uses Freud’s theory of castration and fetishism to analyse the stereotypes of black and white which are crucial to the colonial discourse. He argues that the fetishized stereotype in film and other cultural practices works to rearticulate in the colonial subject the imaginary fantasy of ‘an ideal ego that is white and whole’ (1992: 322). Drawing on these concepts, he presents a new interpretation of Orson Welles’s A Touch of Evil (USA, 1958). In his writings on the nation, Bhabha draws on Freud’s 1919 essay ‘The Uncanny’, in which Freud refers to the ‘cultural’ unconscious as a state in which archaic forms find expression in the margins of modernity. Bhabha also uses Freud’s theory of doubling, as elaborated in ‘The Uncanny’, to examine the way in which colonial cultures have been coerced by their colonizers to mimic ‘white’ culture - but only up to a point. Difference - and hence oppression - must always be maintained. Throughout his writings, Bhabha uses many of Freud’s key theories, reinterpreting them in order to theorize the colonial discourse.

This approach has been adopted by other critics. In Romance and the ‘Yellow Peril’ (1993), Gina Marchetti focuses on Hollywood films about Asians and interracial sexuality. Adopting a position informed by postcolonial theory, Marchetti draws on psychoanalytic theories of spectatorship and feminine masquerade, refiguring these concepts for her own work on race.

In a similar vein, film critics, drawing on queer reading strategies, have carefully selected aspects of psychoanalytic theory to analyse film texts ‘against the grain’. As in post-colonial theory, queer theory represents a methodological shift. It, too, rejects an earlier critical emphasis on praising ‘positive’ and decrying ‘negative’ images of homosexual men and lesbians in film. Instead, queer theory sees sexual practices - whether heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, autosexual, transsexual - as fluid, diverse, and heterogeneous. For instance, the practices of masochism, sadism, or coprophilia may be adopted by homosexual and heterosexual alike: the belief that only heterosexual relationships (or any other type of relationship, for that matter) are somehow ‘normal’ is patently incorrect.

As a critical practice, queer theory seeks to analyse film texts in order to determine the way in which desire, in its many diverse forms, is constructed, and how cinematic pleasures are instituted and offered to the spectator. Previously reviled films such as The Killing of Sister George (GB, 1968), have been re-examined, and the history of the representation of gays and lesbians in film is being rewritten. In some films the homosexual and/or lesbian subtext, previously ignored, has been reinscribed.

Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990), which presents a queer critique of the psychoanalytic concept of fixed gender identities, has exerted a strong influence on film theorists seeking to analyse the representation of gays and lesbians in film. Wary of the 1970s approach to psychoanalytic theory, because it largely ignored the question of the gay and lesbian spectatorship, film theorists have turned to the work of writers such as Butler, Diane Fuss, Teresa de Lauretis, and Lee Edelman (see Smelik and Doty, Part I, Chapters 14 and 15).

A number of essays in How do I Look? Queer Film and Video (Bad Object-Choices 1991) discuss the fact that psychoanalytic approaches to the cinema have avoided discussions of lesbian sexual desire. In her article ‘Lesbian Looks’ Judith Mayne criticizes the way in which feminist film theory has employed psychoanalysis while also drawing on, and reinterpreting, aspects of psychoanalytic theory in her own analysis. Valerie Traub’s article ‘The Ambiguities of Lesbian Viewing Pleasure’ (1991), on lesbian spectatorship and the film Black Widow (USA, 1987), provides a good example of a queer reading.

Another area in which film theorists have drawn on a rereading of psychoanalytic theory is that of the body. Contemporary interpretations of the horror film have generally favoured a psychoanalytic reading with emphasis on the workings of repression. Since the mid-1980s writers have paid particular attention to the representation of the body in horror-the grotesque body of the monster. Based on psychoanalytic theories of abjection, hysteria, castration, and the uncanny, such an approach sees the monstrous body as intended partly to horrify the spectator and partly to make meaning at a more general level, pointing to the abject state of the social, political, and familial body.
Other approaches to the body take up the issue of the actual body as well as the cinematic body. Steven Shaviro's *The Cinematic Body* (1993) presents a thorough attack on apparatus theory, arguing instead for 'an active and affirmative reading of the masochism of cinematic experience' (1993:60). Drawing on the early work of Gilles Deleuze, he suggests that what 'inspires the cinematic spectator is a passion for that very loss of control, that abjection, fragmentation and subversion of self-identity that psychoanalytic theory so dubiously classifies under the rubrics of lack and castration' (1993: 57). Shaviro is highly critical of what he sees as the conventional use of psychoanalysis to construct a distance between spectator and image; he wants to use psychoanalysis to affirm and celebrate the power of the image, and of the visceral, to move and affect the viewer.

I have referred briefly to aspects of post-colonial, queer, and body theory to demonstrate that film theory, in its current use of psychoanalysis, has become more selective and nuanced. While no one would suggest a return to the totalizing approach of the 1970s, it would be misleading to argue that application of psychoanalysis to the cinema is a thing of the past. If anything, the interest in psychoanalytic film theory is as strong as ever. And the debates continue.

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