

Body and Screen

by Margaret Morse

The screen of cinema, video, and the computer is a threshold that divides the ordinary and the everyday from other realms that seem truer or larger than life. The interface between this world and the other world of imagination is a culturally produced and historically shifting construct that has taken many shapes and forms. Masking off part of the world permits images and symbols to invoke the other scene—not what is, but what could or might be or what was in some other time and place. Like a semi-permeable membrane, the screen filters out some things and not others, conjuring an auratic gleam from signs and symbols. Clearly, the alchemy of the screen is in the service of power as well as desire.

Since the advent of electronic media, image projections have been increasingly liberated from the need for a physical surface or support and are more and more free to haunt everyday life. The canvas screen familiar from the cinema has been stripped away, leaving an image plane that may still emanate from a monitor or liquid crystal display; however, it may also appear virtually as a projection or even volume of light, floating in space, or be wrapped like skin over a physical support in the built environment or around an object of body of any kind. By means of digital techniques, the image plane can sustain the impression of a three-dimensional world enveloping the visitor—it is as the visitor were able to step through the screen into the world on the other side. Computer technology and programming can invest the image plane or the wrap-around virtual

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world with interactive properties, allowing it to respond to a spectator's position and direction of gaze in virtual space. Or, even more disconcertingly, the screen may uncouple from its interdependent position in relation to the viewer, setting notions of identity and selfhood and ultimately the sense of cultural control over artifice at risk.

In concert, the spectator, once chained like a prisoner in Plato's cave, has become a performer, free to make a path charged with meaning through space. The once quasi-omnipotent and unencumbered eye has become embodied, foregrounding engagement with the screen. The screen, in turn, now marks a cybernetic frontier between the physical and the conceptual, the body and the machine, bio-technology and communications. The interactive computer user/viewer *corporeally* or at least *digitally* influences the display of symbols on the computer screen in real time. The embodied relation of screen and user effects the interactor in turn: sensimotor experience calls up "deep metaphor," that is, primary cognitive metaphors like up and down, forward and backward, that engage with the body and its orientation in space.¹ Mobility and the tension between body and screen becomes an emotional and cognitive tool. The threshold is less an entrance than a site of fascination where fantasy is invited or displaced. This is ontological play, a stepping, turning, and clicking on and off of fiction itself.

The cinematic apparatus has now been largely subsumed into an electronic culture of video and computer-assisted imagery based on principles of envelopment and temporal simultaneity rather than distance and sequential unfolding. Television, video, and the computer have "live" screens that expose multiple "heres" and "nows" that overlap confusingly with our own physical reality. Yet all these apparatuses co-exist in contemporary life and themes that were developed in one technology find counterparts in the others. The following explores themes of the shifting relations between body and screen, first in terms of the mobile screen, then of the mobile body and, finally, of decentered and displaced identity. Rather than treat media technologies as genres or as entirely separate spheres, each theme draws promiscuously on the cinematic, the electronic, and the digital.

Station Points and Projections of Light

The screen undergoing mutation in late twentieth century media and art is a legacy of the theater and the cinema. The theatrical tradition of the proscenium arch is itself a transformation of an actual, primordial threshold into a space dedicated to ritual transformation. To cross inside was to enter the liminal or in-between stage in a rite of passage from one mortal state or condition into another—birth, childhood, adult man- or womanhood, old age or death—while coming in contact with another realm that signifies the immortal or eternal.² In the liminal realm, there were no spectators, only celebrants who invited spirits and phantoms to inhabit their bodies.

In the theater, however, performers and audiences are separated not only by the stage and proscenium, but, eventually, by the footlights, the curtain, and the convention of the “fourth wall.” The trance state of ritual has also been divided off and tamed in what is known as the “fiction effect.” The formula—“I know it’s just a play [or movie], but nevertheless...”—expresses the capacity to surrender only part of consciousness to the other world.³ This capacity to succumb to what we know is illusion, Lacan speculates, is awakened in infancy during the mirror stage. The constitution of the primordial self based on the mirror image is, in essence, a case of mistaken identity: that image over there in the mirror is “me,” even though it is just a reflection. Identification with our own mirror image is, paradoxically, what allows us to borrow other masks or personas for brief periods of theatrical or cinematic enchantment.

However, in the cinema, unlike the theater, the divide between spectators and the other scene unfolding on the screen is absolute. The now century-old cinematic apparatus replaced the fourth wall of the theater with canvas on which a two-dimensional image was projected. The fourth wall became the injunction to the camera, “don’t cross the line,” or the 180-degree rule that left fictional (or “diegetic”) space on the other side inviolate. Flesh and blood actors had absconded, leaving only phantom characters to haunt an illusory third-dimension.⁴

The cinematic screen cannot be thought without a perceiver: the two are coupled, if not always actually, then virtually. After all, the screen’s purpose is to be

seen, albeit only from certain positions. In single point perspective in painting or photography, the station point of the perceiver floats virtually in physical space, across from the vanishing point in the image. Though this virtual position has been inflected somewhat differently by cinema, video, and the computer, each apparatus presumes a face-to-face symmetry between the screen and the viewer—essentially a mirror position, tacitly supporting assumptions about identity and subjectivity.

It is the perverseness of the camera's fixed station point and shots edited into one very, very long take that paradoxically unseat the spectator in Andy Warhol's eight-hour long film, *Empire* (1964). The film documents New York's architectural wonder during the passage from evening into night from one single point of view in more or less "real time." Even the early nineteenth century diorama—an apparatus that appeared to transform a scene with changing light that mimicked diurnal patterns—offered a mobile platform that could shift between two different views.⁵ In contrast, *Empire* fixes and disempowers the mobile, virtual gaze of the armchair traveler and, in the process, sacrifices every possible means of identification available to fiction film. Once the shape, mass, and scale of the building in the image have been apprehended, there is little to appreciate, other than the play of ambient light filtered through the recording and exhibition process. Perhaps this qualifies as a kind of minimalism extended into the urban landscape and the movie theater; it also anticipates the emphasis on endurance in the performance and video art of the early seventies. The fact that *Empire* was made as a film (before video technology was accessible) has the merit of emphasizing what a cinematic experience is not supposed to be, but what we have come to expect from live surveillance video or for that matter, netcameras, media that we and our keepers monitor but to which we seldom lend our full attention.

A far different piece of minimalist art reveals the charm that mobilizes the spectator at the threshold between illusion and disenchantment. As in many of James Turrell's light sculptures, the divide between seeing *Catso Blue* (1967) as the illusion of a free-floating, three-dimensional volume or as flat panels of projected light can be repeatedly crossed simply by walking back and forth between one viewing position and another or even by rocking in place. *Catso*

Blue hangs suspended in space and seems to rotate as the visitor moves back and forth in front of it, only to resolve as light on the wall as the visitor approaches. Turrell's light sculptures demonstrates that it is a fallacy to assume that a screen must display some signifiable image or make use of figuration to fulfill its function: a screen may also be composed of pure light. Turrell tells the story that he was more interested, as a student, in watching the beam of light from the slide projectors illuminate the dust in the air of his art history and studio art classrooms than he was in the image on screen. Though it is the ground of perception, consciousness of light itself as a sculptural force in the world that is largely taken for granted and filtered from consciousness. By abstracting light from the object world, Turrell can focus on perception itself or what Robert Irwin calls the threshold between "seeing and not seeing, of how we actually perceive or fail to perceive 'things' in their real contexts."⁶ To play with this oscillation between positions, perceptual states, and degrees of belief is like the fort-da game that Freud described of an infant tossing a toy from the crib for an adult to fetch: now it's there and now it's gone. The charm of the situation is its reversibility and ephemerality.

A quarter century later, Perry Hoberman's *Faraday's Garden* (1993) makes this stepping back and forth into a dance to the intermittant sound of obsolete consumer electronics. Sensors in a mat on the floor allow multiple visitors to awaken a symphony of hums, whirs, and buzzes of dated can openers, clock radios, 8mm film projectors, etc. brought back from the wasteland where machines wind down. This machine-human interaction is decidedly conscious and humorously empowering in demystifying the domination by technology of everyday life. Perry Hoberman's CD-ROM piece, *The Sub-Division of the Electric Light* (1996)⁷ brings more obsolescent home-movie projectors into the virtual sphere. Each projector materializes on the monitor out of darkness, offering dreams to be manipulated by a viewer's clicks. Some clicks switch reels from various stages in familial life; other clicks turn the projector on and off; click elsewhere on the image of a baby and the "film" melts. Other clicks place objects in front of screens which are themselves heavily keened and canted, offering anamorphic views of lives now faded and gone. Moments from *Frankenstein* and *The Incredible Shrinking Man* take their places amid mundane scenes that are horribly distorted or grotesque or that exceed their frames. In this darkness in

which projectors and screens are suspended there is also a beacon of light, an egress, an aperture that evokes a window or a door or an interior realm lit entirely by artificial light.

The Threshold and the Corridor

In the early seventies, more experimentation with the body-screen relation focused on the decentering effect of the video monitor on the relation between the perceiver and the image. Aesthetic strategies for displacing that symmetrical relation are at the heart of the closed-circuit video installations of Bruce Nauman, Peter Campus, Dan Graham, and others. While Turrell's chambers offered the visitor relative freedom, Bruce Nauman's corridor pieces are claustrophobic passages that metaphorically suggest the linearity of narrowly defined social roles or, for that matter, the passage through mortal life. *Live Taped Corridor* (1968-70) recalls one of the most frightening events that a human being can experience, a loss of identity or self. The passage itself is a lure in the way that children are driven to break into houses and creep into caves. The other draw is to see what is on the two monitors at the end of the corridor. However, the bottom monitor has an image of this very corridor that is disconcertingly empty, ignoring the visitor's presence. The top monitor promises access to feedback of one's own live video image. Schooled to expect a mirror view of myself in a close-up at the end of corridor, for me it was a shock to discover myself getting smaller and viewed from the back, the nearer I got to the upper monitor. It was as if my own image were peeled away from my body, leaving me raw and exposed, without the cover of self or "me." Of course, the placement of the camera high up and at the entrance of the corridor is the explanation for the disruption of a mirror relation.

This video corridor can be found again as the second of six thirty-two foot long corridors in *Corridor Installation (Nick Wilder Installation)*, 1970. Three of the six corridors are impassable and three (though not exactly the same three) are dark: this is a piece about interdiction of the physical body and of the eye as much as it is about the body and the screen. Luckily, the ability to see a video monitor does not depend on natural light; furthermore, a live camera can see around

corners and peer into places the human body can't go. In this case, an inaccessible room that opens off the first narrow, brightly lit corridor is scanned by a live video camera; simultaneously the images from it are screened on monitors at the end of the fourth and fifth corridors. Corridor four also has another closed-circuit camera mounted high up and on its side that allows the visitor passing to corridor five to just glimpse his or her image, as if falling off the screen, in another monitor at the end of the fifth corridor. This passage is also wide enough to stay and watch the respective images of other visitors fall away.⁸

Another of Nauman's installations is probably the most perverse variant in this paradigm of loss. In *Video Surveillance Piece (Public Room/Private Room)*, 1969-70, the camera is placed in a room which is closed to the public and the image it captures is projected into a room to which the public has access; in that room there is a camera that projects the image of the public into the empty room. In essence, the piece reproduces the situation of surveillance, but without the redemption of having been seen or recognized by some one. There is an absolute separation of camera and monitor: the image the public sees is, more or less, nothing; furthermore, its image of "me" and "us" is lost, seen by no one. Of course, the visitor must be aware of this chiasmic or criss-cross arrangement in order to appreciate the cruelty of this piece.

Passing over other pieces in this rich period, subsequent decades do not lack for this miniature experience of the life course. Gary Hill's moving video installation, *Tall Ships*, 1992, is a reiteration of this theme: a long and wide darkened corridor is lined with electronic switches that visitors trigger as they walk through the space. Each switch operates separately in activating one of the seventeen images staggered along the walls of the corridor, with one image at the end. Every image, projected obliquely from a lens on a four inch black and white monitor, is of a person, spectral in appearance, seen from a distance in what amounts to the far end of a corridor. The image advances toward the visitor until it is approximately life-size or even slightly larger, arousing expectations of an encounter and possibly a sense of threat. These silent and somewhat blurry photographic personas are of different ethnic origin and gender; each body seems to stand away from the wall, waver for a time and then turn and walk away, independent of the will of the visitor. It is the last image of a

young girl at the end of the corridor that is particularly hair-raising, perhaps because of her age; she most of all promotes the feeling in me that I had been approached and contemplated by something uncanny, neither living nor dead. Studio Azzurro's *Coro* (1996) is a "coil" or "carpet" that invokes again the life course. A walk across a floor with a carpet of projected light causes some of the bodies of infants and children, young adults and men and women to stir and sigh and groan as if disturbed by the footfalls of the living. In a comparable way, each footfall along a corridor in Bill Viola's first interactive computer installation environment, *The Tree of Knowledge* (1997) has a relation to mortality. The visitor enters a corridor opening just large enough for one. The corridor is circa sixteen meters long and gradually widens toward the end to accommodate the full-size video projection screen (2.4 x 3.2 meters) on which a computer-graphic tree is back-projected at near (human) life-size. At the entry of the corridor, the image of the tree is a sapling, but as the visitor advances the tree grows in size, leafs out, blossoms, produces fruit, and then the leaves turn color and fall, so that by the end of the corridor, the visitor confronts a barren trunk. The tree, on a black ground, is the only emitter of light that waxes and wanes like sunlight over one day. Thus, each step along the corridor stands in direct relation to a moment that is a temporal composite of the diurnal, annual, and biological life-cycle of a more symbolic than species-specific tree. If the visitor walks quickly, the aging process in the tree runs smoothly, that is, the animation of 300 frames unfolds in real time. However, any perceptible motion of the body results in a recognizable change in the image. The visitor can thus "age" the tree or rejuvenate it, or, choose to rock back and forth, in a play with control of the image and/or what it symbolizes. Or, he or she may stand still at any one of the points in this linear, albeit reversible path.⁹

The Displaced and Broken Mirror

The following section explores the shift in late twentieth century media that changed a stable, mirror relation between a spectator and the screen into a dynamic one between a mobile spectator and a screen that is released, free to seduce or evade our gaze. The viewer's own image can be instantly captured by a "live" video camera and shown on screen; the closed-circuit image that

results is not a mirror but a replicant of the viewer.¹⁰ This replicant is free to wander and, once recorded, it is unleashed in time as well to enjoy its semi-autonomous but ever so repetitive existence. When seen in the same frame together, the mirror image and the replicant image produce confusing inverted symmetries. Peter Campus's *Interface*, 1972, allows the visitor to experience this division and multiplication for her- or himself by projecting the visitor's video image onto the same glass on which reflected light produces a mirror-reflection. The double image that results is inverted right and left and can overlap or divide, according to the visitor's will.

In a similarly convoluted play with the mirror, this time a virtual one, Nancy Burson's interactive computer installation, the *Age Machine*, 1968, produced with programmer David Kramlich, captures an image of the spectator in order to produce a portrait of the same face, ravaged by time.¹¹ The result is profoundly alienating, much like the portrait of Dorian Gray in taking onto the image plane precisely what is repressed in culture. Burson is concerned with the cultural codes of gender and power, though her strategy is based on compositing multiple images rather than serializing them or overlapping them with her own. On the other hand, one can imagine that a composite image of a number of "perfect," youthful female specimens might produce an even more perfect collective representation of female beauty. However, Burson's *First Beauty Composite*, 1982, of female stars of the fifties, proves otherwise, for the combination of is slightly monstrous, suggesting the absurdity and arbitrariness of a feminine ideal. When this composite is compared with *Second Beauty Composite*, 1982, of stars of the seventies, it shows how what is supposedly transcendent changes over time.

Burson's "morphing" procedure can be traced to the nineteenth century surveillance techniques of Francis Galton and his composite portraiture first proposed in 1877.¹² Galton's belief in eugenics was the occasion for his technique of superimposing the images respectively of criminals, consumptives, Jews, and others into a collective and almost exclusively "anti-ideal" image. The underlying assumption was that not only race and gender could be read from appearance, but also the propensity to aberrant behavior to which they were linked. Galton divided total exposure time into percentages that reflected the original number of photographs. In contrast, the percentage of the face of each leader

of a nuclear nation in Nancy Burson's composites, *The First Nuclear Powers Composite: Reagan, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Brezhnev, Deng, Gandhi, Trudeau*, (1982), and *Warhead II*, (1983), was determined by the number of warheads for which the respective head of state was responsible. The resulting contamination of East and West and of First, Second, and Third Worlds into one image is biting political caricature that brings the work of power back into the issue of what is represented on the image plane.

This was also a period in art in which identity was not only inverted and composited, but decentered or lost entirely, or even—like a hand-mirror in a performance of Joan Jonas, robed in alchemical symbols—is murdered by the artist, “beaten to death” with a large silver serving spoon.¹³ Yet, the moment when “Joan got up, turned on the lights, smiled and asked “what did you think of the performance?” is that threshold of the screen, the cusp between one world and the next that is a thrill in itself to experience. Rosalind Krauss's 1976 critique of this strand of work with feedback of the artist's own image diagnosed it as narcissism.¹⁴ Narcissism is indeed one moment in an oscillation at the threshold between gaining and losing one's own image. As Joan Jonas explained, “It was also fascinating to see yourself. It was like looking into the pool and not being able to look away.”¹⁵ However, the practice of the period was indeed to disturb the waters: if electronic media introduced new possibilities for presence, it did the same for absence, and even more for the play between the two. The boundary between having and losing one's image was one that was crossed over and over, back and forth, like a scar that reminds one of one's own mortality. Many pieces of Jim Campbell's work from the late eighties and early nineties feature the destruction or immolation of one's own image: In *Shock Treatment* (1988) the viewer is invited to destroy her own digitally-captured image by pushing a button that erases it click by click, while in *Hallucination* (1990), the screen is an incendiary device for self-immolation. To approach the monitor may or may not set one's image into flames that burn more brightly and loudly the nearer one approaches. Here, coupling the monitor and the image involves an emotional toll.

My own contemporary relation to the computer screen owes as much to Warhol's *Empire* as it does to Nauman's *Public Room/Private Room* or Burson's composites.

My aching body is physically bound to the computer in a way that is far more constraining than a movie or a Greek play. Only by wearing the screen on my body in the form of my handheld computer or cell-phone do I regain my mobility. Interacting with the computer screen interface allows me to set delegates, semi-autonomous agents, and avatars to work virtually scanning information or flying-through digital worlds in ways that cannot be entirely visualized or controlled. Furthermore, every interaction I perform with the digital world leaves traces that can be datamined by unseen agencies to construct personas or identities that bear small resemblance and that may never be seen or known by me.

At this point, a new problematic arises that will surely be explored into the next century: the extension of the malleable virtual body, itself a kind of volume in light, into disjunctive spaces and dissociated temporalities. That is, the bounded entities of the screen and even the volume of screen space known as virtual reality may cease to be of significance in a culture in which the subjectivity and agency, including the capacity for interaction are distributed virtually and unevenly across the material world. It will be as if the image plane and the subjectivity that it represents were thinly spread, torn and shredded here and there, over everyday life, presenting an ontological mixture of unexpected gaps and thresholds to a form of fiction against which we have few defenses. Furthermore, the construction and perhaps the nature of subjectivity will change when the body and its personas can no longer be coupled in physical space.

Semi-autonomous personas also comprise Luc Courchesne's interactive video installation, *Family Portrait*, 1993. The visitor has a metaphoric encounter with the images of four people that seem to hang in space where they might stand in life, spectral reflections off monitors onto half-mirrored glass. By selecting one of the four options on a computer monitor in front of each image, the visitor can hold a conversation with one of the ultimately nine different video personas that inhabit the piece. The set of conversational options enforce a sense of civility on the visitor that is seldom applied to addressing images, including introducing and excusing oneself from their "presence." More importantly, these images respond to each other with well-directed looks and speak to each other, more or less talking through the visitor in-between them. Evidently, these artificial beings have a network of relations with each other that supposedly

began long before we came into the scene. It is hard to say exactly why the apparent autonomy of their virtual lives has such charm, but it does.

Courchesne's subsequent piece, *Hall of Shadows* (1995), a multi-user interactive video theater, extends this notion of autonomy yet further. A narrative embedded in four virtual actors is triggered by visitors to the gallery space. However, these four characters are deeply engaged in their own conversation; while they respond to the visitor's presence, it is hard to get their attention and break into a conversation with one of them (by selecting a comment or question from a set on a computer screen.) Forming a bond with a character may lead to being introduced to the group and joining in or observing a conversation, for instance, about what it means to be human or to be a couple, on what social order will dominate the future, how light affects the perception of reality or where to find the best ice-cream. Most significantly, the virtual society begins to discuss its own status as images, "trapped" according to Courchesne, "in a strange time-space warp" that does not evolve, but repeats ad infinitum. Courchesne's virtual society implicitly raises questions about our own human society and what it means, conversely, to be embodied, to live together, and to change, questions that should hang in the air long after the lights are turned on. Considering our growing immersion in the image world, how would we come to know ourselves individually or as a culture without the ever more convoluted inflection of our bodies, our sense of self, and our relations to the world and each other with the evolving electronic image? Yet, let us not forget the subtext of the art discussed throughout this essay: the ineluctable difference of waking life from the other scene, ultimately inaccessible—however immersed we may feel—beyond the threshold, on other side of the screen.

Notes

1. See Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
2. This discussion of the cultural function of the screen draws on Victor Turner's development of liminality from the anthropological discourse on rites of passage in a wide number of publications throughout his career. It also owes much to Friedrich Nietzsche's opposition of between the Dionysian and Apollonian in *The Birth of Tragedy*.
3. Christian Metz famously applied the notion of split-belief to the cinema in *The*

Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, trans. Celia Britton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

4. Metz explains how this absence enhances the fiction effect in *The Imaginary Signifier*. He also describes the spectator and the screen as a cinematic couple—an exhibitionist that pretends not to know it is being looked at and a voyeur who sees without being seen.

5. See Anne Friedberg's *Window Shopping* for further explication of this mobile gaze.

6. Citation from Robert Irwin, *Being and Circumstance: Notes Towards a Conditional Art* (San Francisco: The Lapis Press; New York: The Pace Gallery, 1985), 10, cited in Craig Adcock, James Turrell, 58.

7. One of three artists' pieces published in *artintact 3* (Ostfildern: Cantz Verlag, 1996).

8. Description of this and the next piece are drawn from *Bruce Nauman: Exhibition Catalogue and Catalogue Raisonne*, Joan Simon, ed., (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center and Distributed Art Publishers, 1994, p.241.

9. See my essay on Viola's piece in *Hardware, Software, Artware* (Ostfildern: Cantz and Karlsruhe:ZKM, 1997), 146-151.

10. Unlike film, in which the camera, the optical printer and the projector occupy the same position at different times, in closed-circuit video, the monitor is operates simultaneously with the camera and must be placed asymmetrically to it to some degree or other, (barring putting the camera into the monitor). This decentering effect is hidden in the ordinary use of video as one-way television. The skewed relation between physical space and its representation on screen becomes apparent in live video feedback, most especially when the viewer's body in relation to his or her own image is involved. Splitting the symmetrical relationship of the body and the image apart breaks the illusion most fundamental to mass culture and to broadcast television—that serially produced merchandise or broadcast images are meant for “just for you.”

11. Cf. Mark Dery, “Art Goes High Tech,” *Art News* (February 1993), p.76.

12. A history and ideological critique of these surveillance techniques can be found in Allan Sekula's “The Body and the Archive,” *October 39* (Winter 1986), pp.3-64.

13. A performance witnessed and chronicled by Richard Serra in “Impromptu, February 1968” in: *Joan Jonas: Works 1968-1994* catalog, Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam, 1994, p.33. Thinking of this performance in conjunction with Jonas's signature performance of *Mirror Check* (1970), in which she submitted her entire nude body to the investigation of a hand mirror, the impromptu suggests the intentional destruction of a persona that, despite its theatrical frame, is both devastating and optimistic in its utter vulnerability. See Joan Simon, “Scenes and Variations: An Interview with Joan Jonas,” *Art in America 83* (July 1994), pp.72-79, 100-101.

14. Rosalind Kraus, “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism,” *October 1* (Spring 1976), pp.50-64; reprinted in *New Artists Video* ed. Gregory Battcock, (New York: Dutton, 1978), and *Video Culture: A Critical Investigation*, ed. John Hanhardt (Rochester: Visual Studies Workshop, 1990), pp.179-191. William D. Judson emphasizes the contribution of this essay in displacing the application of modernist aesthetic criteria to video in his essay in: *Points of Departure. Origins in Video: Peter Campus, Beryl Korot, Bruce Nauman, William Wegman* exhibition catalogue (Pittsburgh: The Carnegie Museum of Art, 1990), pp.4-18.

15. Simon, “Scenes and Variations,” p.76.