THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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SOME recent trends in international relations—the United Nations’ imprimatur for intervention in the politics of broken, war-torn, malnourished, and dictatorial states, the formation of the European Union in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty—depart notably from what international relations scholars refer to, out of common grammar and historical consensus, as the Westphalian system of sovereign states.

When a political order ruptures, its rival inhabitants will seek out its origins—conservatives, to fortify the system’s pedigree; revolutionaries, to reveal its flawed foundations; scholars, to descry the sorts of winds that brought the order and the sorts that might carry it away. This article takes on the scholar’s task—if the crumbling order is Westphalian, then how did it come to pass?—and it proposes that a crucial spring of our state system was the Protestant Reformation. Religious ideas, it is argued, are at the root of modern international relations. The Reformation was not Westphalia’s sole cause; long-term material trends contributed, too. But if ideas did not act alone, they were yet indispensable: no Reformation, no Westphalia.

The claim is a counterfactual one. Had the Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have arrived, at least not in the same form or in the same era. Skeptics imagine an alternative world in which the Reformation never happened, yet one in which

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Westphalia nevertheless arrived when and how it actually did and was brought by the same forces that social scientists most commonly identify to explain the rise of individual states—shifts in economic and organizational structures, in trade, class, societal coalitions, wealth, technology, military might, the institutions of domestic coercion, and the international balance of power. But such a world, it is argued here, could not have yielded Westphalia.

The Reformation’s indispensability emerges most saliently through the following correlation: those polities that experienced a Reformation crisis were the same ones that adopted an interest in Westphalia; those that saw no such crisis did not. In plumbing the causal logic behind this correlation, I argue that the intrinsic content of Protestantism itself points to sovereignty. Then, considering the diverse historical pathways taken by Germany and France, I show how Protestant ideas led to interests in Westphalia. I also argue that such strong correlations do not obtain in the skeptic’s world; that is, polities favoring Westphalia failed to acquire more powerful state institutions, arms, and wealth prior to their interest in Westphalia, while there were relatively powerful and wealthy polities that opposed Westphalia. Indeed, much of the material growth and decline that helped to realize Westphalia—the “military revolution,” for instance—was itself due in important part to the Reformation. Geographical and temporal correlations, combined with the historical accounts of how separate polities arrived at an interest in a system of sovereign states, together make the case for the efficacy of the Protestant Reformation.

The argument presented here contributes to international relations scholarship in three ways. First, it accounts for the origin of Westphalia, of the very authority structure of the system of sovereign states. International relations scholars have long granted that a state system exists and have sought to theorize its laws and patterns of war, peace, and commerce. Recently, though, several scholars in the field have come to emphasize the “constructed,” historically contingent character of the international system itself—an emphasis echoed in the article. A few of these constructivists have even begun to chart the genesis of the system’s very political authority.1 It is these rules that define au-

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thority—or sovereignty—in the international system whose origins I want to explain.

A second contribution is a corresponding view of what fueled this epochal change—the kinetic energy of ideas. Most scholars of the origins of the state, including those who have addressed the states system, have privileged material changes, and their work has yielded a vast new understanding of how the state and the state system came to be. But few of them have looked to ideas, still less to religious ideas, as a crucial source. Should it prove efficacious, the Reformation would warrant recognition as a kind of historical cause that merits more attention in the international relations literature.

Yet the very premise of the argument that Westphalia is the origin of modern international relations has itself recently come under attack, prominently from Stephen Krasner. The third contribution, then, is an updated and qualified defense of this conventional wisdom. As this premise undergirds the first two contributions, its defense is the first task of the essay.

**WESTPHALIA AS ORIGIN**

In his classic 1948 article, the international legal scholar Leo Gross calls Westphalia “the majestic portal which leads from the old world
into the new world.” Hans Morgenthau and other leading political scientists echoed Gross, rendering Westphalia metonymy for the modern international system. Why the audacious ascription? Westphalia, such scholars hold, defined an international scheme of constitutional authority that centered upon sovereign states—polities with supreme authority located within a bordered territory.

Recent iconoclasm, however, challenges Westphalia’s “majesty.” Krasner, for instance, argues that before Westphalia, Europe was substantially modern—states with sovereign privileges already existed—and that after Westphalia, Europe was persistently medieval: the Holy Roman Empire and several compromises of sovereignty, including minority agreements for religion, remained. On the trek to modernity, then, Westphalia was not a continental divide but just another hill. The iconoclasm is strong, not easily dismissed.

Westphalia’s prestige can be rescued, but only with a new defense that is more subtle and qualified than the conventional wisdom. The nub of the Westphalian claim: before 1648, as long as the Thirty Years’ War was still smoldering, political authority in Europe was essentially incompatible with sovereign statehood, whereas afterward sovereignty generally prevailed. I argue, however, that Westphalia signals the consolidation, not the creation ex nihilo, of the modern system. It was not an instant metamorphosis, as elements of sovereign statehood had indeed been accumulating for three centuries. Even modernity’s victory after Westphalia must be qualified, for some medieval anomalies persisted. But consummate fissures in history are rare, and Westphalia is as clean as historical faults come.

Politics after Westphalia appears sharpest in relief against the Europe of the High Middle Ages, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. In the *Respublica Christiana*, there was no supreme authority

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6 See especially Krasner (fn. 3), 235–64.

within a territory, manifestly no sovereignty.\textsuperscript{8} This dispersed authority, of course, did not last forever. The European landscape came gradually to be filled with sovereign states over the next three and a half centuries. By the eve of the Reformation in 1517, monarchs in Britain, France, and Sweden had established supremacy over the church and other territorial rivals, while in Italy, a small system of sovereign states had survived for a century.

But Europe’s metamorphosis into modernity was far from finished. At roughly this time the Italian states system was conquered from without, and Charles V became both king of Spain and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, acquiring substantial, but not sovereign, powers in lands extending from the Netherlands to Austria. The church was still temporally formidable, too, with its vast holdings of land a major source of wealth and power. Within the empire alone the church held one-third of the land overall, including one-fourth of the property in the cities.\textsuperscript{9} Its archbishops and bishops occupied political offices. The church partially governed education, raised considerable revenues, helped administer poor relief and other public affairs, and most of all, often with the cooperation of temporal rulers, monitored the religious allegiance of its members. Having sworn allegiance to the pope, to upholding the faith, Charles V served as the temporal enforcer of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, the commander of Catholic armies.\textsuperscript{10}


\textsuperscript{10} On the implosion of the Italian states system, see Wight (fn. 7); Tilly (fn. 7), 77–78. On Charles V’s powers, see Kann (fn. 9), 1–24; Koenigsberger (fn. 9); Bérenger (fn. 9); Jonathan Israel, \textit{The Dutch
Later in the century sovereignty made gains, but these were frail and reversible. Most importantly, the 1555 Peace of Augsburg allowed German princes to enforce their own faith within their territory according to the formula *cuius regio, euis religio* (whose the region, his the religion). But Augsburg did not last. Endless clauses and mutual dissatisfaction with the agreement brought war, expanding eventually into the titanic Thirty Years’ War. Not until the close of this war did a proscription of such intervention become accepted and respected and practiced—not, indeed, until 1648.

What, then, was this Peace of Westphalia of 1648? Although the component treaties of the settlement, Münster and Osnabrück, never explicitly mention sovereignty, an analysis of the treaties’ text, of the intentions of its framers, and of state practice following Westphalia shows the settlement to be a fulcrum, not just a milepost, in the evolution of the sovereign states system. This is apparent in two respects: in the respective status of states and imperial institutions and in the matter of religion.

Although Westphalia was officially a new set of laws for the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted until 1806, in effect the settlement bequeathed to states absolute sovereign authority. In the wake of Westphalia states became the chief form of polity in Europe and faced no serious rival in the Holy Roman Empire—this is the heart of the claim about historical change. The United Provinces and the Swiss Confederation gained effective independence. The German states regained

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11 Koenigsberger (fn. 9); Barraclough (fn. 10), 355–405; Holborn (fn. 10), 284–338.
12 Holborn (fn. 10), 243–46; Barraclough (fn. 10), 371.
14 On the settlement in general, see Dickmann et al. (fn. 13); Dickmann (fn. 13, 1965 and 1963); Pages (fn. 13); Parker (fn. 13); Polisensky (fn. 13); and Rabb (fn. 13).
their “ancient rights” against the empire and acquired the right to form alliances outside the empire. The communications between diplomats at Westphalia are laced with references to state autonomy, the equality of states, an equilibrium of states, and even an early version of collective security—all notions that are unintelligible apart from a sovereign states system. Following Westphalia, states became virtually uninhibited in their internal authority. Imperial institutions functioned as a forum for German cooperation, but they did not abridge sovereignty. The emperor himself retained significant constitutional powers only because he and his successors were Habsburgs, but the Habsburgs themselves were effectively reduced to just another sovereign, within their central European lands.

Politics and religion provided the other major context in which Westphalia effectively ushered in state sovereignty. Here, too, the text of the treaties does not explicitly establish sovereignty—at least not in the exact form of Augsburg in 1555, which granted German princes authority over religion in their lands. Instead, princes agreed to allow designated proportions of Catholic, Lutherans, and Calvinists to live and practice their faiths in their territories, and to refrain from attempting to convert one another’s subjects.

But the crucial question for sovereignty is not whether princes signed agreements regarding their internal affairs; modern states, after all, frequently agree to regulate prices or pollution within their borders without compromising their sovereignty. Rather, the issue is whether any institution outside the state was vested with the constitutional authority to execute, judge, or legislate about these agreements about religion. Here, the text of the treaties calls for arbitration of religious disputes, but through compromise, not majority decision, thus leaving

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15 Israel (fn. 13), 27; Osiander (fn. 13), 46–47.


17 Exceptional were the imperial circles, regional organizations of princely states that revived in the late seventeenth century and whose members would at times combine their military forces under a single command. But this exception was limited: the strong form of military cooperation was limited largely to the circles of Franconia and Swabia, composed only of small German states, and it lasted only from 1697 to 1714, when states defended themselves against the invasions of Louis XIV. See Roger Wines, “Imperial Circles, Princely Diplomacy, and Imperial Reform, 1681–1714,” Journal of Modern History 39 (March 1967), 27–29. More generally, see Kann (fn. 9), 52, 54; Osiander (fn. 13), 46; Barraclough (fn. 10), 381–87; and Gagliardo (fn. 10).

18 Osiander (fn. 13), 40; Holborn (fn. 10), 368–69.
the sovereign right of assent virtually intact. But given the outlooks of contemporary statespersons and diplomats and considering subsequent practice, these procedures would mean little. Historians of the period commonly agree that even in the late stages of the Thirty Years’ War, political leaders had lost their religious zeal and ceased to contest religion as a political affair. There is also little record of any religious matter being adjudicated through imperial institutions. Finally, for over a century and a half after Westphalia, unlike after Augsburg, neither princes nor the emperor intervened to contest religion within another prince’s territory. Even though future European treaties compromised sovereignty on behalf of religious minorities, never again would intervention for religion play anywhere near the role that it did between 1517 and 1648. Although religion was occasionally a partial contributor to war between states, in general, religion ceased to be a casus belli.

It is in the context of the political history of the mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century that one best discerns the enormous historical significance of state sovereignty. Religious war and its attendant abridgments of sovereignty were the chief sources of contention in European politics for over a century, but after Westphalia this centrally defining form of conflict ceased. International pronouncements and practices then evolved to legitimate and deepen Westphalia’s achievement. First in Europe and then gradually elsewhere states became the only polity to exercise significant executive, legislative, and judicial power within a territory. Over the coming century philosophers like Emmeric Vattel and Christian Wolff came to recognize this reality in articulating doctrines of international law and state legal equality; states themselves solidified it by creating diplomatic offices and practices appropriate to a system of states. European states also developed standards of recognition by which polities would be accepted as members of the system only if they displayed essential attributes of statehood. Finally, states came to espouse nonintervention as a cornerstone of international diplomacy. All of this is what makes Westphalia revolutionary.

19 Osiander (fn. 13), 40–42.
21 Holsti (fn. 20), 46–59; Osiander (fn. 13), 49; Barraclough (fn. 10), 381–87.
But if Westphalia was an origin, what was the origin of Westphalia? That the Reformation elicited Westphalia is a claim about a contradiction between the existing order and iconoclastic ideas. Such a contradiction must have developed between 1517, the beginning of the Reformation, and 1648, the year of Westphalia. The fact that in 1517 Europe was ebbing away from sovereignty as Charles V consolidated his lands intimates that during this period some novel source of gravity arose to reverse history’s tide back toward sovereignty. We can locate this reversal at the strewn dates when several European polities expressed their initial interest in a system of states. An account that looks to ideas will note that in many of these cases this interest appeared roughly when Protestantism did. Even skeptical accounts cannot deny this coincidence, but they would portray it as little more. Believing material structures inexorable, they would minimize the turn back from modernity and consider Charles V to be but the final paroxysm of a dying Middle Ages. Interests in sovereign statehood, in their view, were the culmination of centuries of material change. And most social scientific accounts of the state and the state system indeed claim the sufficiency of material change.

I am not the first to point out the influence of the Reformation upon Westphalia; some historians and a few social scientists have done so as well.24 But none of them has described the mechanisms of this influence systematically or demonstrated its independence from material forces.

My own work, heeding the normal entanglement of ideas and material forces, argues for the Reformation not as a sole cause but as a central cause, by which I imply the following counterfactual claim: had the Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have developed, at least not in the same form or in the same era as it did. More precisely, were it not for the Reformation, persistently medieval features of Europe—the substantive powers of the Holy Roman Empire and its emperor, the formidable temporal powers of the church, religious uniformity, truncations of the sovereign powers of secular rulers, Spain’s control of the Netherlands—would not have disappeared when they did, to make way for the system of sovereign states.
To be valid, a counterfactual claim of this sort must follow a “minimal-rewrite-of-history rule,” posing an alternative world where the alleged cause is extracted while other events and conditions remain intact. It must also meet a “cotenability” criterion, positing a theory of how, in this plausible alternative world, the remaining events and conditions might have brought about the same result. Otherwise, the counterfactual is no more than an implausible straw man. It is not hard to envision an alternative world, one without the Reformation. It is precisely the one described by the dominant structural materialist accounts, a world where the state and the states system form completely apart from Protestantism.

But while such a world meets the standard of plausibility, it is not compelling. Without the Reformation, history would have looked different. In essence, medieval impediments to a sovereign state system would not have disappeared when they did but only much later. Nor would they have receded as sweepingly. Protestant ideas—continental in geography and encompassing in their content—challenged all temporal powers of the church and the empire. Sweeping causes produced sweeping effects. Were it not for the Reformation, the recession of the Middle Ages would likely have been staggered, this feature disappearing at one time, that feature disappearing decades or a century later. Material accounts themselves support this claim, for they show different states developing at different times. With Hendrik Spruyt, I argue that “competitor” institutional forms persistently challenged the sovereign state long after the High Middle Ages, right up to the consolidation of the state. Spruyt places this consolidation roughly at Westphalia but does not treat the Reformation as an important explanatory cause. My argument is that apart from the Reformation, institutional eclecticism would have continued long after Westphalia.

Had the Reformation not brought about the state system at Westphalia, much subsequent history would have been different, too. For out of the religious wars wrought by the Reformation came the hollowing of the Holy Roman Empire, the rise of the eighteenth-century balance of power, the Enlightenment, and the increased separation of

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25 On these criteria, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, “Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics,” in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 21–25. With regard to the “minimal-rewrite-of-history rule,” I will ultimately argue that even structural material forces were themselves shaped in part by the Reformation and were thus not independent of it. I claim here only that a world in which they were independent is plausibly imagined and indeed posited by most of the social scientists whom I address.

26 See Tilly (fn. 7).

religion and politics. Had these events not occurred, much else would have been different, too, and so on, with the trajectory of each historical branch becoming ever more speculative. In reasoning counterfactually, we cannot be precise about this alternative, imaginary world. We can claim only that if a system of sovereign states had arrived within it, we would not call that system Westphalian but would instead associate it with some later century, some unimaginably different combination of wars and historical forces.

How can we demonstrate the dependence of Westphalia's timing and sweep upon the Reformation? The method here focuses on interests in Westphalia as they developed (or failed to develop) in separate polities, thus simplifying the complex causes of a continent-wide event and identifying an array of separable cases that can be compared across time and space. Some of these polities—the German states and the northern provinces of the Netherlands—were protostates, partially independent: for them and for all those similarly situated, Westphalia meant independence. Others—France and Sweden—were already independent. Their interest took the form of sovereign statehood for the rest of Europe. All of these polities, as I show, developed their interest in sovereign statehood as a direct result of a crisis brought on by the Reformation. Using a positive strategy, I demonstrate the tight causal link between Reformation crises and the development of these interests. Then, negatively, I expose the weak connection between the same interests and structural material trends, which shape the skeptic's imaginary counterfactual world. If they fail to explain interests in Westphalia, then the imaginary world is not a compelling one. What the two strategies together support is a claim for what James March and Johan Olsen call a “historically inefficient” path to Westphalia, that is, an explanation of how norms and institutions develop in a way that cannot be predicted from prior environmental conditions, here, material ones. Only an unexpected revolution in ideas can explain Westphalia.

28 On counterfactuals, see James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43 (January 1991); and Tetlock and Belkin (fn. 25).
29 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba refer to this strategy as “making many observations from the few”; see King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 217–28. Tetlock and Belkin (fn. 25) propose that this method can be used compatibly with and within counterfactuals (pp. 30–31). It meets what they call the “projectability” criterion.
TWO ROLES OF IDEAS

Like scholarship on the Reformation, theories of the social influence of ideas are hardly new—Weber’s essay on Protestantism is an example of both. Recently, though, scholars of international relations and comparative politics have led a revival of interest in ideas. In explaining how the Reformation brought about Westphalia, I draw upon their work and that of earlier scholars in arguing that ideas exert power and mold political interests through two separate roles.

In the first role, groups of people adopt new ideas into their identities. They undergo “conversion” and come to want what ideas prescribe. Identity here refers to a person’s conception of which of his characteristics make him distinct from others according to his social role: is he a Lutheran, a Catholic, a German nationalist? Identities are made up in part of ideas, which people hold stably over the long term. A person with a Protestant identity, for instance, persists in holding Protestant ideas. But identities can change and do so when people come to hold new ideas and self-conceptions.

That ideas form identities may seem like a trivial claim. Or even true by definition: do not ideas themselves compose identities? The claim becomes more meaningful, though, if we understand it as one about how people arrive at their new identities, that is, through reasoned reflection upon ideas’ propositions about what is intrinsically valid, whether theoretically or practically. Such “reason of reflection” contrasts indeed with significant skeptical alternatives. It denies that people might adopt ideas as mere “hooks”—as the means to an entirely separate end, for example, wealth and position. This approach disputes

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32 I propose my framework as a useful one for explaining the revolution at hand, not as the only process by which ideas operate. For portfolios of pathways and mechanisms, see Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 8–26; and Katzenstein (fn. 31), 52–65. I am not proposing a general theory that denotes the conditions under which ideas will have influence; rather, the argument is a theory of the causes of revolutions in sovereignty (revolutions in ideas) and not one of what causes revolutions in ideas.

33 For a definition of identity, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Katzenstein (fn. 31): “the images of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant others” (p. 59).

even a somewhat stronger role for ideas, that they “resolve uncertainty” about the means by which material ends are to be pursued but do not shape the content of ends themselves. It also proposes identity change as more than a psychological mechanism for processing information. Reason of reflection is identity change of the most fundamental sort.

My argument is not that reason of reflection is the only way in which people arrive at identities. The skeptical alternatives are plausible and doubtless actual; any major social revolution in identities quite probably involves some combination of the alternatives and reason of reflection. What I dispute is that identity change reduces to any of the skeptical alternatives. And I hypothesize that reason of reflection was a crucial motor behind the Protestant Reformation. Evidence for it lies in the correspondence of identity change with the rise of social circumstances that, by their very nature, promote reflection—the sermon, the pamphlet, the printing press, changes in theology, and the crisis in the Catholic church, among others. Evidence against a skeptical reduction lies in the lack of a tight link between such identity change and changes in the sort of social circumstances that foster the novel pursuit of separate, material ends, for example, class revolution.

But shaping group identities is not enough. Popular conversion alone does not explain how ideas bring leaders of principalities or states to campaign or move troops on behalf of new international constitutions or how ideas hamper or overthrow obstructing leaders. In the second role of ideas, as social power, converts to new identities attempt to alter the costs and benefits to their prince, parliament, president, or anyone else who can deliver or hinder the new constitution. To this end they use carrots and sticks in the form of traditional political currency: votes, taxes, bureaucratic power, the threat to rebel, and so on. In this sense, the second role of ideas resembles rational choice theory, as people pursue their demands by altering the opportunity costs of those in a position to bring about their ends. What is distinctive here is that those wielding these tools are converts to new identities composed of ideas that define their preferences. Ideas here are manifestly more than mere legitimations for the pursuit of wealth or power and more, too, than “focal points” in bargaining. The new social power is evidenced when

35 Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 16.
36 See Brian Ripley, “Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory,” Political Psychology 14 (September 1993).
38 Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 17–20; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market,” in Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 3); Shepsle (fn. 34); for a key source on social power, see also Mann (fn. 31).
resultant outcomes (like interests in Westphalia) correspond in time and place to the strategic actions of bearers of identities asserting the demands implied by those identities.

Together, the two roles are the mechanism of contradiction between the new ideas and the old constitution, the fuel that spurs ideas from the heads of intellectuals to fresh international orders. The roles say little, though, about the people and the institutions involved. Ideas are not choosy about the “courier” that delivers them into politics; the roles are about processes, not actors. The cases at hand involve intellectual communities, transnational networks, ruling elites, and all classes of citizens who exercise their power by changing their pattern of religious participation, joining Protestant armies, threatening rebellion, and otherwise creating incentives for leaders to pursue Westphalian sovereign statehood. These actors and forms of power express new kinds of interest differently in different polities through (1) “Reformation from below,” in which social groups pressured elites; (2) “Reformation from above,” in which elites played a stronger, more proactive role; and (3) the “politique solution,” in which Protestant reformers did not succeed in creating a Protestant state but coaxed a social compromise that entailed the political secularization embodied in Westphalia.

Each of the two roles of ideas—as changing identities and as wielding social power—echoes the commitments of constructivist scholars. In explaining how interests are shaped, some constructivists embrace the first role of ideas as transforming identities. Far more, though, stress the second role, of how actors or institutions whose identities are defined by ideology and culture then exert social power to shape the state’s interests. The framework employed here acknowledges and combines the two strands. Like the constructivists, this account also takes issue with those rationalist theories—neorealism and neoliberal-


40 On causal pathways, see Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 24–26; and Katzenstein (fn. 31), 52–65.

41 In the first category, see Mlada Bukovansky, “American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812,” International Organization 51 (Summer 1997); Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52 (Summer 1998); Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo,” in Katzenstein (fn. 31); Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Finnemore and Sikkink (fn. 1), 898. In the second category, see, for examples, the essays in Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 3); and most of the essays in Katzenstein (fn. 31).
ism—that assume that states have fixed identities and interests, usually material, and that they pursue these interests through rational calculations of ends and means. Rather, states’ identities and interests are shaped through their social environment. But we should not draw too sharply the contrast with rationalist accounts, the more sophisticated versions of which do take account of the role of identities, norms, and social contexts. It is only with those rationalist theories that take a structural materialist form that constructivism and the account presented here part ways. Most accounts of the formation of the state and the states system indeed express such a materialist rationalism.

In one respect, though, I propose to extend the constructivist agenda by explaining international constitutive normative structures (here, the structure of sovereign constitutional authority) as the result of the actions of agents (here, states). Although constructivists acknowledge the importance of sovereignty as a constitutive norm, they typically treat it as a determinant of state identities and behavior, and not as their product. There are exceptions to this thinking, however, most prominently Rodney Bruce Hall’s *National Collective Identity*, a work that traces the relationship between national identity and the international system from early modern Europe through the First World War. Broadly sympathetic to Hall, my argument focuses on what he calls “territorial sovereignty” and its origins in the Protestant Reformation, an event that he treats far more briefly than I do. Friendly commentators on constructivism call for just the sort of theoretical development that authors like Hall have begun and that I seek to further: Jeffrey Checkel urges an explanation of how agents shape normative structures; Janice Thomson commends an account of the origins of norms of sovereignty.

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42 See Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (fn. 33), 58–60.
43 Such versions adopt a variety of strategies, ranging from showing how utility functions are specified by ideas, culture, or psychological schema, to asserting the rationality of the attempts of “norms entrepreneurs” to construct common knowledge and alter others’ utility functions in accordance with their commitments, to devising models of how ideas modify the pursuit of rational action as “focal points” or “resolvers of uncertainty,” and to charting the social context of rational action. See Finnemore and Sikkink (fn. 1), 909–15; Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 3–30; Miles Kahler, “Rationality in International Relations,” *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998), 933–38; March and Olsen (fn. 30), 952–54; Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); idem, *Political Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a more skeptical view of the reconcilability of constructivist and rationalist traditions, see Ruggie (fn. 1, 1998), 883–85.
44 See the essays in Bierstecker and Weber (fn. 1); Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (fn. 33), 45–46; Ruggie (fn. 1, 1993); Ruggie (fn. 1, 1998), 870; Wendt (fn. 1, 1992), 412–15.
45 Hall (fn. 1), 51–58.
46 Checkel (fn. 1), 340–42; Thomson (fn. 1). See also John Gerard Ruggie’s comment that “[s]ocial constructivists in international relations have not yet managed to devise a theory of constitutive rules”; Ruggie (fn. 1, 1998), 872.
STRUCTURAL SKEPTICISM OF THE REFORMATION’S INFLUENCE

Wary of these alleged workings of ideas are critics who would explain polities’ interests by appealing instead to various material structures. These are those social constraints on the behavior of individuals and groups that do not consist of ideas themselves—technology, institutions of coercion and taxation, class, societal coalitions, the international distribution of military and economic power, and the like. According to these critics, polities developed an interest in a sovereign state system when they accrued the power inhering in arms, wealth, stronger extractive bureaucracies, and the like. Interests, that is, followed from power and, in turn, enabled polities to prevail over rival institutions like the Holy Roman Empire. Westphalia was merely the set of norms that legitimated their ultimate victory.

According to some versions of this structuralism, the state prevailed because it was the institution best suited to fight wars. Examples are the work of Charles Tilly and of the theorists of the “military revolution,” the early modern transformation of military technology and organization that rendered states the most optimal institution for bearing the cost and scale of warfare. Other versions see the state triumphing because it could best produce wealth, through its ability to assure property rights, extract taxes, and commit credibly to trade agreements with other states. Hendrik Spruyt, for instance, argues that an explosion of trade during the Middle Ages shifted social power toward the towns, which then allied with monarchs to create state institutions that could best foster commerce. In still other versions, the state developed out of changes in the early modern class structure.

Finally, there are realist accounts of the triumph of the state. This, at first, may seem misleading: does not realism assume that sovereign


states already exist? Strictly, yes, but we can still find accounts closely resembling realism that tell how the European balance of power shifted away from the empire, Spain, and the Habsburgs and toward an alliance of France, Sweden, and the partially independent German and Dutch protostates. Westphalia merely ratified the victory of this alliance. In sum, any account rooted in ideas must answer all of these forms of skepticism.

EVIDENCE FOR THE REFORMATION AS ORIGIN OF WESTPHALIA

Reformation crisis as used here means a deep and contested social struggle between advocates of a Protestant political order and advocates of a Catholic political order within a polity, sometimes involving widespread violence but always involving a demand on both sides for uniformity of faith. It was through such a Reformation crisis that politics came to develop an interest in sovereign statehood. The social struggle is what unfolded through the two roles of ideas. But to know how Protestant ideas wielded influence, we must first know what Protestant ideas were and why they were politically potent. The case for the influence of the Reformation begins with the answers to these questions.

THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMATION

Though voluminous and complex and rendered variously, Reformation theology uniformly asserted a common doctrine about what the Christian church was not: a visibly united institution under a single human authority. At least for Martin Luther, it was simply the aggregate of doctrinally authentic local churches. This ecclesial theology had enormous institutional implications—confiscating the church’s large tracts

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of property, ending the emperor’s authority to enforce religious uniformity, forbidding ecclesiasts from holding temporal offices, and eliminating the ecclesiastical powers of the pope and emperor.\footnote{Cameron (fn. 51), 145–55.}

But such relinquished powers could not be left adrift. They were assumed by the secular authorities—in Germany, by princes; in the Netherlands, by the Estates-General; in Sweden and England, by the king. This new separation of functions also sprang from Luther’s “Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and the Two Governments,” his political theology. God created two earthly orders with two forms of government. One was the realm of the spirit, the site of the relationship between Christ and the believer’s soul; the other was the realm of the world, the order of secular society, governed through civil magistrates, laws, and coercion. The reformers demanded a separation. Thus, the pastors of the church were not to perform the duties of public order, just as magistrates, princes, and kings would not preach or perform the sacraments.\footnote{Ibid., 152–53;} In separating the two realms, Reformation political theology essentially prescribed sovereignty, even though neither Luther’s tracts nor John Calvin’s \textit{Institutes} outline a Westphalian system of sovereign states. For secular authorities within the empire the remaining temporal prerogatives of the church filled out their portfolios of power. The point is essential: sovereignty was implied in the very propositions of the Reformation.

The church condemned Luther at the Diet of Worms of 1521; a decade later Charles V sent his troops to quell the heresy, an imperial endeavor that would continue at least through the 1630s. Facing armed threat, the reformers now found even more reason to ally with and give full sovereignty to the secular rulers, whose armies could protect them. Reformation theology, then, led to sovereignty not only directly, by prescribing it, but also indirectly, by motivating Charles V to quash its challenge and by prompting reformers, in turn, to seek protection. Although physical protection considered in isolation is hardly a theologically laden desideratum, the reformers’ need for it is scarcely intelligible apart from their heretical beliefs, which alone had elicited the emperor’s armed response. Sovereign statehood was the carapace that would stanch the Counter-Reformation.

Another important feature of the Reformation was the novelty of its political propositions in the history of European Christendom. Such originality parries a methodological objection: if it was heretical theological ideas that led to Westphalia, then why did previous heresies not have the same political effect? Indeed, to the contrary, heresies of the preceding three centuries—the Lollard movement in England, the Waldenses in southern Europe, and the Hussites in Bohemia—did not imply the same political ideas. The earlier movements challenged church doctrines and practices, to be sure, but did not advance a political theology that undermined the church’s hierarchical or temporal powers. True to the argument, different ideas with a different content produced a different political result.

**THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE REFORMATION AND POLITIES’ INTERESTS IN WESTPHALIA**

If Reformation theology and sovereignty are connected intrinsically and conceptually, they are also connected historically and causally. Thus, every polity that came to have an interest in a system of sovereign states had experienced a strong Reformation crisis, whereas in every polity that fought against a sovereign states system, the Reformation won few converts. The correlation also involves timing: most of the polities that acquired an interest in a system of sovereign states usually did so within a generation of the arrival of Protestantism in their land; most of them had shown little inclination toward a system of sovereign states before Protestantism arrived. These correlations anchor the argument.

The first three columns of Table 1 show this correlation simplified. Column 1 lists the major polities in Europe during the century prior to Westphalia. Column 2 displays whether the polity adopted an interest in a system of sovereign states and if so, when. Column 3 then displays whether and when a polity experienced a Reformation crisis. Column 4 generalizes about the timing and nature of the growth in the state’s institutions. Columns 2 and 3 show that the presence and timing of a Reformation crisis correspond strongly with a political interest in Westphalia. In the four chief polities (or region of polities, in the case of Germany) that fought for Westphalia in the Thirty Years’ War—Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and France—an interest in a system of sovereign states arose within a generation of its Reformation crisis. Though not integrally involved in the armed conflict for Westphalia, England, Denmark, and Transylvania, too, experienced a Refor-

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54 Cameron (fn. 51), 70–78.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Polity</th>
<th>(2) Interest in Westphalian System of Sovereign States</th>
<th>(3) Reformation Crisis</th>
<th>(4) Growth in Material Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German Protestant states</td>
<td>1520–45</td>
<td>1520–1540s</td>
<td>gradual in 16th century; sharp after 1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Catholic states</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>weak, remaining minority status</td>
<td>gradual in 16th century; sharp after 1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (United Provinces)</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>1560s</td>
<td>sharp beginning in 1590s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1540s</td>
<td>1520s</td>
<td>gradual after 1600; sharp between 1672 and 1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1620s</td>
<td>1560s–1598</td>
<td>gradual and halting after 1600; sharp after 1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>sharp from 1470s to 1550s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1400s, growth of city-states, approximation of sovereign states system until 1527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>spread of Protestantism but no crisis</td>
<td>little significant growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habsburg Hungary</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>mild spread of Protestantism but no significant crisis</td>
<td>little significant growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania</td>
<td>1618</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>little significant growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1538</td>
<td>1520s and 1530s</td>
<td>little significant growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>support for European Protestants short of all-out war, 1560s–1648</td>
<td>1530s</td>
<td>significant growth through 16th century</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aSome German states switched between official Catholic and Protestant status as a result of war and political bargaining between the 1555 Peace of Augsburg and 1648. I label the states here according to the status they first assumed during the Reformation crisis of 1520–45.
mation crisis and supported the anti-imperial powers diplomatically. Important, too, is the fact that none of the Catholic polities, the Catholic German principalities, Spain, Italy, or Poland, developed any interest at all in a system of sovereign states. They remained allies with the empire.

Princes and kings came to pursue an interest in a system of sovereign states when and where a Reformation crisis took place. This is important evidence, but circumstantial. Who, then, were the players, what were the events and institutions, through which the two roles of ideas advanced?

Conversion to Protestantism, the first role of ideas, is evidenced in the new religious practices of those who adopted the Reformation. Protestants attended churches where preachers taught Protestant theology; they conducted mass, confession, and the other sacraments as the new teaching prescribed; the more unruly of them smashed icons and rioted against Catholic churches; they refused to obey the sanctioning authority of Rome. But what brought them to conversion? It was the theology of Martin Luther that led most immediately to the Reformation crisis. Luther did not create his ideas de novo but was influenced by late medieval theology, especially nominalism. His own spiritual crisis was an important precipitant, too, as his ideas circulated quickly and alarmingly first through the monasteries, then through the clergy and missionaries, then to congregations—a pattern of diffusion replicated throughout Europe, in the many versions that Protestant ideas assumed.55

Two main conduits, both of them fairly novel, aided this dissemination—the sermon and the pamphlet. Protestant theology and worship placed new importance on the pastor’s conveyance of the Word, an imprimatur of authority that attracted its hearers to its injunctions.56 In the same period the print media burgeoned. Between 1517 and 1520 Luther’s followers printed thirty of his writings in well over three hundred thousand copies, pamphlets devoured in the universities and by clerics, who then spread their ideas through word of mouth to larger audiences. Pamphlets proliferated in other locales as well.57 Both modes of communication, sermon and pamphlet, were received in virtually all

55 Ibid., 99–110.
sectors of society, but most enthusiastically by merchants and artisans, who made up the majority of Protestants.

Other social precipitants abetted the Reformation, too. Most obvious and familiar was the perceived corruption of the medieval church. In Germany, where the Reformation began, this perception was stronger than anywhere else in Europe and had been growing steadily over the decades prior to the Reformation.58 Intellectual, theological movements also corresponded to the Reformation. Christian humanism and nominalism, both precursors of Reformation theology, were most widespread in Germany, Switzerland, and the Low Countries, where the Reformation happened earliest and most intensely, and had been steadily building over the previous two centuries.59 The influence of other factors—the printing press, literacy, the intensity of central papal and imperial control—is witnessed in urban settings, where the Reformation was most successful.60

Reformation scholars also emphasize a separate urban factor, the economic interests of the rising bourgeoisie. The debate over the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, of course, dates back to Friedrich Engels and Max Weber; it is not one that I intend to join here. Few Reformation historians today, though (even among the recent generation that emphasizes the social causes of Protestantism), argue that Protestant ideas were reducible to, rather than the product of, a complex interaction with class and economic interests. Few would argue away the autonomy of Reformation ideas.61

Once converted, Protestants then brandished their social power—the second role of ideas—in diverse ways. Since the church’s authority depended most directly on the believer’s practice, its authority was most

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61 On Reformation historiography, see Steven E. Ozment, ed., Reformation Europe: A Guide to Research (St. Louis, Mo.: Center for Reformation Research, 1982); Hsia (fn. 60); Wuthnow (fn. 56), 25–51; Pettegree (fn. 60); and Bob Scribner, Roy Porter, and Mikulcs Teich, eds., The Reformation in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
directly undermined when believers simply practiced heterodoxy. Protestants attended churches where preachers taught Protestant theology; they conducted mass, confession, and the other sacraments as the new teaching prescribed; the more unruly of them smashed icons and rioted against Catholic churches; and they refused to obey the sanctioning authority of Rome. \(^{62}\) Defiant practice was itself a form of social power.

Practical dissent ultimately required a coarser power, too. Protestants took up arms against the emperor on behalf of the prince who would ally with them, and they rebelled against the resistant prince. Merchants, laborers, artisans, peasants, and nobles of all ranks offered their military service in one of these ways. In every case any form of social power had to provide the prince, king, or magistrate with the incentive and means to seize the church’s lands and temporal powers and perhaps also to fight the emperor. If the head of a polity himself converted, then he could exercise the social power of ideas by virtue of his position. \(^{63}\) He could enforce doctrinal uniformity within his territory, appoint new church leaders, nullify the authority of the Roman hierarchy, disband the monasteries, seize church property, and raise troops to fight the empire. But even if he did not convert, out of either obstinacy or indifference, he might still further the Reformation in these ways, either because he feared the rebellion of converts or because he saw an opportunity to gain wealth and power through allying with them. Whether he was pious, rapacious, opportunistic, or afraid, it was only because of the extensive Protestant social power arrayed around him that a leader could successfully defy the church. \(^{64}\) The social power of position wielded by heads of polities, along with the social power of defiant religious practice, of rebellion, and of military service, together constituted the social power of the Reformation.

This is a general account of how Reformation ideas, through their two roles, brought polities to their interest in sovereign statehood. Different polities, though, experienced variations on this narrative. They followed three causal pathways, each of which helps us to see more precisely how and through whom conversion and social power operated: Reformation from below, Reformation from above, and the politique solution. Figure 1 presents a schematic summary of each of the path-

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\(^{62}\) Cameron (fn. 51), 99–110, 199–318; Ozment (fn. 51), 43–86.

\(^{63}\) For an example of the influence of a ruling elite, in this case Gorbachev, who himself converts to and empowers new ideas, see Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in Katzenstein (fn. 31).

\(^{64}\) Cameron (fn. 51), 199–318.
1. Reformation from Below (Germany, the Netherlands, Transylvania)

*Pathway of Conversion*
Reflection of theologians → monasteries and → ordinary clergy → conversions in a broad array of sectors, including ruling elites

*Pathway of Social Power*
Broad array of Protestant social sectors → elites especially urban middle classes, exercising social power of defiant religious practice, resistance, and participation in armed forces (social crisis)

2. Reformation from Above (Sweden, England, Denmark)

*Pathway of Conversion*
Reflection of theologians → monasteries and → missionaries → ordinary clergy universities → conversions in a broad array of sectors, including ruling elites

*Pathway of Social Power*
Protestant ruling elites exercising the social power of their position (social crisis) → the polity’s interest in Westphalia

3. The Politique Solution (France)

*Pathway of Conversion*
Reflection of theologians → monasteries and → missionaries → ordinary clergy universities → conversions in a broad array of sectors, including nobility

*Pathway of Social Power*
Protestants in broad array of sectors exercising social power of armed resistance → interest in secular politique solution among powerful Protestant and Catholic elites whose foreign policy power includes an interest in Westphalia

**Figure 1**
**Schematic Summary of Each Pathway**
ways, showing the chain of events through which the two roles of ideas unfolded. Reformation from below and the politque solution are then illustrated through the cases of Germany and France, respectively. Reformation from above and the experience of other European polities listed in Table 1 are described more briefly.65

GERMANY: REFORMATION FROM BELOW

In Germany, the Reformation began; in Germany, it first had political effects. Between 1523 and 1546 princes and magistrates scattered across more than half of the German-speaking territory, including Swiss and Austrian regions, secularized and seized church lands, cutting off the local church hierarchy from the commands of Rome and effectively creating a territorial church. Prepared to fight for what they seized, they resolved to defend an interest in sovereignty. As Figure 1 shows, ruling elites are the final link in the causal chain that ends with this interest; they are the ones whose position conferred upon them the social power to take it up. Rulers came to such interests only amidst the widespread conversion to Lutheran ideas, as converts were practicing religious defiance, threatening rebellion, and joining armed forces against the empire.66

Within a decade of Luther’s public dissent in 1517, German rulers began to wrest extant prerogatives from imperial powers. These rulers, from three hundred separate polities in Germany, were an eclectic group of city leaders, nobles, knights, princes, and sometimes imperial electors. In Luther’s own region of Saxony, for instance, the elector John placed church lands under state control, replaced Catholic bishops with a “visitation” committee of electoral councillors and theologians, and began to enforce devotional uniformity, improve the standards and conduct of the clergy, and oversee the moral and spiritual affairs of the laity.67 Much the same occurred in dozens of cities and principalities across Germany between 1523 and the late 1540s, by which time the German Lutheran Reformation finally ceased to expand. The princes often took greater control over the church than

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67 Elton (fn. 66), 56; Chadwick (fn. 66), 67–71; Todd (fn. 66).
Luther had intended, although he was generally supportive of their appropriation. He actively assisted Elector John of Saxony in placing church governance in secular hands. Where princes made Protestantism official, they generally also made it uniform, requiring worship in a single church, outlawing dissent, and making Protestantism constitutive of their order’s legitimacy. During the rest of the sixteenth century the reliance of Protestant churches on the prince only grew stronger.  

How did prince and town leaders come to wrest such power, create such an order? Only in response to what came first from below. Conversion in Germany was paradigmatic, flowing from theologians to monastery to university to clergy to congregation, involving the sermon, the pamphlet, and all of the circumstances that generally obtained in conversion across Europe, as described above and illustrated in Figure 1. The figure also illustrates the exercise of social power. In virtually every German city or principality that became Protestant, the Reformation first spread popularly, to merchants, laborers, shopkeepers, farmers, and sometimes nobles; only afterward did town councils or princes ally with reformers. Wherever Protestantism spread, it brought defiant religious practice almost immediately: priests and parishioners adopted new rites and rituals, ignored the commands and excommunications of their superiors in the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and often rioted and staged public protests. It was a popular movement that the ruler could ally with to his benefit or ignore at a cost.

Converts also exercised more direct political power, according to patterns that varied from region to region. In many northern cities the most important converts were merchants and craftsmen who were excluded from political privilege. Once they converted, they attempted coups, exerting the social power of rebellion, often winning over acquiescent city leaders. The Reformation also reached the rural proletariat, which rose up in the peasant rebellions of the mid-1520s but was cruelly and summarily defeated in battle by the nobility, indeed with Luther’s encouragement. In other cities, in central and southern Germany and northern Switzerland, a “civic reformation” took place in which conversion occurred across several layers of society, but most crucially among literate and influential economic elites. Through city politics, these elites succeeded in overcoming the opposition of other elites in persuading city leaders to support the Reformation. In almost every

68 Barraclough (fn. 10), 374.
69 Cameron (fn. 51), 199–318.
German principality that became Protestant and supportive of Westphalia, monarchs converted only after vast swaths of their publics had already done so themselves. In every Protestant polity, too, once the Reformation became official, converts exercised social power by joining armed forces to fight the empire. By contrast, in those German polities such as Bavaria that remained officially Catholic and allied with the empire throughout the sixteenth century, the Reformation spread comparatively little among the populace, was not taken up by heads of polities, and was fought by Catholics who correspondingly populated Catholic armies.70

Once polities began to become officially Protestant, Emperor Charles V and the stalwart Catholic princes were forced to respond. After several failed attempts at reconciliation during the 1520s, Catholic forces prepared to take up arms against Protestantism. The Protestant principalities organized into the Schmalkaldic League for defense, and Charles V determined to end the schism. From then on both sides would fight and a unified empire was doomed. In these struggles Protestant converts exercised social power by joining armies and fighting for their polity once it had become officially reformed. Of course, Catholics exercised similar social power by fighting for their ruler—those princes and magistrates who did not go along with the Reformation. Hesse, Brandenburg, Electoral Palatinate, Saxony, and tens of other principalities and cities became officially Protestant; rulers in Bavaria, Austria, and elsewhere remained Catholic; some regions switched back and forth during the sixteenth century. The 1555 Peace of Augsburg proved only a temporary truce, not a lasting solution.

“Since conversions and reconversions continued to occur after 1555, Germany’s confessional map resembled a periodically changing checkerboard into the time of the Thirty Years’ War,” historian John Gagliardo writes. Only after Westphalia would the sovereignty of German states rest unchallenged.71

In German polities, then, the Reformation came from below, with conversions across societal sectors and social power exercised through defiant religious practices, threats of rebellion, politics within cities and principalities, rulers asserting the power of their position, and broad participation in the armed forces. The timing of interests in sovereign


71 Holborn (fn. 10), 137–39, 158, 162, 284–95, 374; Chadwick (fn. 66), 67–71; Todd (fn. 67), 230–39; Dickens (fn. 66), 87–106; Elton (fn. 66); Barraclough (fn. 10); Gagliardo (fn. 10), 14; Cameron (fn. 51), 210–91.
statehood testifies to these influences. German assertions of sovereignty during the 1520s, 1530s, and 1540s corresponded remarkably well with the furious advance of the German Lutheran Reformation during this same period. Prior to Luther’s defiance of 1517, German rulers had not threatened or hinted at a takeover of the church’s temporal powers, though they had long appealed to German nationalism and brought hostile grievances against the church and empire before imperial diets. Not until after Luther rebelled did the first German ruler take up the cause and then not until his own subjects had first taken up reformed teachings. In Germany the coincidence in timing between the Lutheran Reformation and interests in sovereign statehood was virtually exact.72

Geographic comparisons also corroborate the same relationship between confessional loyalty and political interests. With very few exceptions, polities that were officially Protestant fought for sovereign statehood and independence from the empire, whereas officially Catholic polities remained loyal to the empire. In two periods of German war, between the 1530s and the 1550s and then from the 1580s through Westphalia in 1648, alliances of Protestant polities fought alliances of Catholic polities and the empire. Alliance patterns consistently followed confessional lines, even when a polity changed religious hands; typically, it would then also change its alignment. Apart from the spread of Protestantism, there appears to be no geographical pattern as to which polities became Catholic and which became Protestant. There is no pattern, for instance, that corroborates a proximity-of-threat hypothesis drawn from international relations scholarship, one that would predict lands on the border of Habsburg Austria to remain Catholic in order to attain safety from the Holy Roman Empire, and more distant, buffered lands to become Protestant. In fact, both Protestant and Catholic lands bordered Austria and were scattered throughout Germany without apparent geostrategic pattern.73

Against this case for ideas, the most immediately obvious skepticism claims instrumentality—that secular rulers used the Reformation to legitimate their seizure of sovereignty and their acquisition of the church’s remaining powers and wealth. According to this line of thinking, the Reformation exercised little social power over rulers. For four reasons, though, such motives are not a persuasive substitute for ideas. First, Reformation historians reveal the rapacity of some princes and

72 Holborn (fn. 10), 37–51; Barraclough (fn. 10), 363–67; Gagliardo (fn. 10), 2–4.
73 See Cameron (fn. 51), 199–313.
rulers but also assert the veritable devotion of others. Elector Frederick the Wise, for example, supported and harbored Luther shortly after his famous defiance of the pope and emperor at Worms, a time when Luther had few other powerful public supporters.74

But even if one were to assume that every prince was motivated by familiar material desiderata, the argument encounters a second objection: it is unclear that ecclesial booty was a rational desideratum at all. Several historians of the Reformation agree that most reforming princes failed to acquire great wealth from church lands. Many, such as Frederick the Wise, risked their power, even their lives, for their stand. That the benefits outweighed the costs was hardly clear.75 But even assuming that all rulers who sided with the Reformation did so for instrumentally rational, material reasons, there is a third problem: the explanation does not account for the sorts of social power that enabled princes to seize the church’s powers and wealth. Who fought in their armies? Who occupied the churches and disobeyed the bishops? Rulers’ motives alone fail to explain this. One needs to take account of the sources of their popular support.

The fourth—and most damaging—problem with the argument is, again, one of timing. It fails to explain why, if secular powers were motivated by what they stood to gain materially from church goods, they chose to seize sovereignty at this particular time and only in certain places. Why did some European princes and nobles rebel against the emperor, while others, similarly rich and empowered, remained loyal? And why did rebellious rulers not pursue sovereignty one hundred years earlier? Late medieval theology, after all, abounded with ideas that challenged traditional authority and that might well have served as legitimating rationales.76 The argument from motives alone has little capacity to explain the historical specificity—the timing or the pattern—of rulers’ interests in Westphalia. As I have argued, the presence or absence of Reformation ideas explains these interests quite well. The two roles of ideas tell the story behind these interests. In Germany it was a story of reformation from below.

FRANCE: THE POLITIQUE SOLUTION

France defined its interest in a European system of sovereign states quite differently than Germany did. As it was already a sovereign state,

74 Ibid., 101–3.
75 Ibid., 294–99; F. L. Carsten, Princes and Parliaments in Germany from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); A. G. Dickens, The German Nation and Martin Luther (London: Edward Arnold, 1974); Brady (fn. 60).
76 McGrath (fn. 59); Oberman (fn. 59).
it came to fight for sovereign statehood for the rest of Europe, entering the Thirty Years’ War in 1635 to bring the defeat of the Holy Roman Empire’s remaining sovereign powers in 1648. France nonetheless retained its Catholic monarchy. The lesson: a state need not become officially Protestant in order to pursue an interest in sovereign statehood; rather, it need only experience a Reformation crisis. As politique doctrine prescribed, France would allow religious toleration within the realm, while pursuing a secular, sovereign states system, friendly to its security in Europe.

The Reformation had roiled France in the last three decades of the sixteenth century and corresponds closely to France’s inclination toward a European system of sovereign states. As in Germany, the Reformation came from below, but it led not to an independent Protestant state but to a sundering civil war, one that in turn evoked the novel, secularizing compromise solution proposed by the politique party. Figure 1 shows this novel pathway of social power.

It was during the early seventeenth century that France first adopted its interest in Westphalia. Although the Habsburg threat dated back to 1519, the French opposition took different forms during different periods. Between 1522 and 1559 France fought to prevent a Habsburg invasion and to expand its buffer zone, but it did not seek to eliminate the empire or the church’s temporal powers. Between 1560 and 1598 France imploded in civil war, allowing it scarcely any foreign policy except for a brief defensive war against Spain during the 1590s. In the quarter century after 1598 civil war ceased within the realm, while France remained at peace with Spain and hesitant to intervene in the religious fracases stirring in the empire between 1610 and 1624. It was not until the age of Cardinal Richelieu, a politique who became chief royal adviser in 1624, that France adopted an offensive policy of weakening and then destroying the empire and the Habsburgs and fighting for the sovereign rights of German princes—an interest in European sovereign statehood.77

Calvinism evoked this new interest in two ways. Most importantly, the social power of its armed uprising gave rise to the politique ideology, which supported a system of sovereign states. In the 1550s, acting out the first role of ideas, an international network of Calvinist mis-

tionaries converted French hearers through the sermon, the pamphlet, and favorable circumstances similar to Germany’s. As Figure 1 shows, this pathway of conversion was similar to that in Germany, except for the addition of missionaries. Although Protestantism in France was not indigenous, it was successful. Thus, at the onset of the civil wars in the 1560s, 10 percent of the French people and 40 percent of the nobility were Calvinist.78 The nobles who converted allied immediately with the congregations, some out of conviction, some out of desire for church property, some out of both. Like the Protestant German princes, they confiscated church lands, gained control of local and provincial governments, and then fought off Catholic princes and armies supplied by the congregations.79

Between 1562 and 1598 Calvinism spread, Huguenots revolted, a Catholic League formed in response, and eight civil wars ensued. The political costs and incentives facing nobles and kings were radically altered. Nobles could ally with Huguenots or fight them off. If they allied, they could gain wealth, office, and armies, but they would then have to wage war against Catholic nobles and their armies. Kings, almost all of them Catholic, now had to choose between fighting Protestants or tolerating them. Fighting would mean raising armies and using them internally, not abroad; toleration would mean losing the crucial political support of Catholic nobles. After the St. Bartholomew’s massacre of the Huguenot leadership of 1572, kings typically issued edicts of toleration only when their resources had been stretched too thin from battling Protestants. Vulnerable paucity, though, was fairly common. Kings relied heavily upon the nobility, to whom they sold offices for revenues and armies, and enjoyed the support of only that faction whose favor they could curry at any one time. Ideas created conflict; conflict sapped the king’s resources.

But the same conflict gave rise to the idea—the politique idea—that proved its solution. After thirty years of war had destroyed civic unity and prevented an active foreign policy, the politique option gained in stature and made possible the accession of Henry of Navarre, a quintessential politique. As King Henry IV, he signed the compromise Edict of Nantes, granting Huguenots liberty of worship in specified regions, but not universal toleration. The politics of toleration was not intrinsic to either side’s ideals. Although some Calvinists called for religious toleration, many others, including Calvin himself, sought a uniformly Reformed state. In opposition, orthodox Catholics fought to

78 Porter (fn. 24), 73.
79 Dickens (fn. 66), 164–87; Elliott (fn. 77), 116–25.
preserve the France of “un roi, une loi, une foi.” The politiques still desired religious uniformity yet countenanced toleration in the interests of social peace, to avoid ruin. The foreign policy counterpart of politique doctrine was *raison d’état*, also an expression of toleration and a privileging of state security. In place of lingering fealty to Christendom and the Habsburgs, France would pursue a sovereign states system, an arrangement that would curtail transnational authority and allow it to achieve the balance of power that would best preserve its security. This new stress on security as an end and Westphalia as a means arrived through religious war.80

The second way in which Calvinists influenced French policy was through their continued struggle for toleration, since they were discontented with the terms of Nantes. The kings’ ability to fight the Habsburgs always depended inversely on Huguenot strength: when Huguenots surged, armies were diverted inward; when Huguenots were quelled (by royal force) or contented (with a new edict of toleration), kings could fight the Habsburgs more vigorously. The defeat of the Habsburgs and the advancement of a system of sovereign states, then, required two conditions: a politique in office and the Huguenots in abeyance. Illustrating the first condition, French foreign policy closely followed the ideology of the most powerful faction in the government during the next half century. When traditional papist *dévots* held power between 1610 and 1624, France remained sympathetic to the empire but militarily uninvolved in the growing continental conflict between Catholics and Protestants. In 1624, though, the politique Cardinal Richelieu took office as chief royal adviser and architect of foreign policy and sought to change course. But before he could commit France irrevocably to the struggle against the Habsburgs, he had to defeat a Huguenot revolt in the mid-1620s. By the 1630s he was ready to pursue war with Habsburg Austria, Spain, and the empire, seeking a comprehensive design for a community of sovereign states to replace the Holy Roman Empire—an aim that no French king had ever before pursued. In France, then, the Reformation’s influence was more indirect. It created not a confessional Protestant state, but a politique ideology that called for a system of sovereign states.81

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81 Richelieu (fn. 16); Church (fn. 16).
THE REST OF EUROPE

In detailing the cases of France and Germany, I have shown how Protestant ideas, in their two roles, elicited an interest in Westphalia via two distinct historical pathways. While France was alone in its politique pursuit of sovereign statehood, other polities such as the Netherlands corresponded to the German model of Reformation from below. There, the ruling nobility decided to declare independence from Spain in 1581 only reluctantly and amidst pressure from revolting Calvinists.82 Transylvania’s sixteenth-century Reformation was closer to the German model and allied itself with the anti-imperial forces in the Thirty Years’ War.83

A third pathway is simpler and can be more easily described: Reformation from above. Here, the monarch, without strong incentives from below, exercised the social power of his position to make the Reformation official in the churches (thereby furthering conversion), seize Catholic lands and powers, and support the Reformation elsewhere in Europe. Even in these cases conversion still occurred across societal sectors, and converts wielded social power from their defiant practice and participation in the armed forces. Figure 1 shows this reciprocal support and empowerment. So monarchs did not act alone, but in comparison with other cases, they exercised much more power and initiative.

Sweden is archetypical. The Lutheran Reformation was officially established by King Gustav Erikkson in the 1520s with the cooperation of, but hardly pressure from, theologians, clergy, and the urban populace. Sweden came to support the sovereignty of German princes shortly thereafter, allying with them diplomatically during the 1540s. A century later, in 1630, Sweden entered the Thirty Years’ War against the empire, led by the devout Lutheran king Gustav Adolph.84 In England, Henry VIII largely initiated the Reformation in the 1530s, acting far more instrumentally than Gustav Adolph would later on, but also benefiting from the societal spread of Protestantism. Though England’s own civil wars kept it out of the Thirty Years’ War, its foreign policy closely followed confessional lines. As long as its monarchs were Protestant, it generally gave economic aid, arms, and assistance in dy-

82 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 126–68; idem, Spain and the Netherlands, 1559–1659 (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1990), 52–53; Lynch (fn. 77); Geyl (fn. 10); Israel (fn. 10), 106–230.
83 Parker (fn. 13), 155.
nastic intrigue to its Protestant brethren in the Netherlands and Germany, while it consistently opposed the empire, even defeating the Spanish armada in 1588.\textsuperscript{85} Denmark followed a path similar to Sweden’s. There, a Lutheran Reformation succeeded by the mid-1530s and was followed quickly by alliances with warring German Protestant princes.\textsuperscript{86}

Obversely, in those polities that fought for, or at least aligned with, the empire, the Reformation never managed to make so much as a chink in Catholic piety, practice, and authority. I have noted that in Germany, officially Catholic polities aligned with the empire from the inception of the Reformation up through Westphalia. Most striking is Spain, whose dynastic links with the empire and zealous advocacy of Catholic uniformity in Europe made it the most pro-Catholic polity on the continent. It was the European polity least penetrated by the Reformation. The Reformation mostly failed, too, in the Italian city-states, which remained aligned with the empire during most of the wars of the Reformation. The Italian link is not diminished by the fact that Italian city-states themselves constituted an effective system of sovereign states during the fifteenth century. My argument is not for the necessity of the Reformation in eliciting any system of sovereign states but for its necessity in eliciting Westphalia, a system that the Catholic, post-Renaissance Italian states did virtually nothing to bring about. Finally, Poland and Habsburg Hungary, too, were enduringly Catholic and enduringly loyal to the empire. Poland intervened on the imperial side several times during the Thirty Years’ War. Although the Reformation spread significantly within these realms, it never captured the crown or sparked a social crisis like that in France. They complete the continental correlation between Reformation crises and interests in Westphalia.

**The Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War**

The social power of Protestants, then, was coincident with and plausibly connected to the development of an interest in sovereign statehood in all of the polities that together defeated the empire during the Thirty Years’ War. But the explanation is incomplete without an account of how these polities actually achieved Westphalia once they had developed an interest in it—through ultimate military victory. Virtually every historian of the Thirty Years’ War agrees that ongoing disputes between Catholics and Protestants in Germany and Bohemia were the

\textsuperscript{85} Cameron (fn. 51), 381–88.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 272–74.
original cause of the war, even as religion became intertwined with other stakes: the ambitions of the military entrepreneur Wallenstein, who amassed immense wealth and lands fighting for the Habsburgs, the fate of Spain as a great power, the sea power of the Netherlands, and the strategic position of Sweden. Most historians would agree, too, that by the last decade of the war religious passions were spent and rulers continued to fight on for wealth and territory. But how states entered into the conflict in the first place is inexplicable apart from the power of Protestant ideas.87

SKEPTICISM OF PROTESTANTISM’S SOCIAL POWER

Structural material explanations challenge the assertion “no Reformation, no Westphalia.” The prominence of these explanations makes skepticism of the Reformation significant; that is, it is plausible that ideas were superfluous. But, as I argue, the ultimate inadequacy of these explanations leaves our proposed counterfactual claim about the Reformation intact.88 The discussion of the German case considered one version of materialism based on skepticism about motives. A more compelling alternative to ideas would not focus on motives, however, but would propose a different sort of social power that better explains the timing and geography of interests in sovereign statehood. It would look instead toward how over the course of centuries states accrued military, economic, and extractive bureaucratic power and saw the growth of their treasuries and their systems of commerce and law. Here, the story of Westphalia is the story of the state, how it grew, and how it triumphed over rival institutions—the Holy Roman Empire, the Hanseatic League, and the Italian city-states.89 The Peace of Westphalia merely ratified this victory.

Most of the many social scientists who have told the story of the state identify its origins in changes in economics, organization, military technology, or the international distribution of power and in the very activity of war. Here, I do not want to assess the relative merits of these accounts; rather I treat them as a common source of skepticism about the social power of ideas. If the growth of the state turns out wholly to explain the system of sovereign states, then the exact causes of this growth can be debated. But a general statist account can be taken to hold that in a grand historical trajectory running from the High Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, France, England, Sweden, Prussia, other

87 For histories of the Thirty Years’ War, see fn. 13.
88 See Tetlock and Belkin (fn. 25), 21–25.
89 Spruyt (fn. 1), 22–33.
German states, and the Netherlands grew into statehood and adopted an interest in a sovereign states system through some combination of material forces. Certainly, there is significant truth in this epic. State growth began well prior to the Reformation, and theorists of state building explain much of it with scant reference to the Reformation. But did the rise of the state power and institutions alone bring about Westphalia? To make this case, such accounts must show that state growth steamed ahead inexorably until the day when polities adopted their interests in a Westphalian system. The Reformation, meanwhile, occurs on the sidelines, its social power redundant or irrelevant.

Returning to Table 1, column 4 shows that the growth of state institutions generally fails to correspond with interests in Westphalia. Over the course of the fifteenth century, admittedly, state institutions across Europe secured stable power over their citizens and notable autonomy from the church, following civil war and conciliar controversy. But the momentum abated. The period between 1500 and the end of the Thirty Years’ War is one that several leading early modern historians characterize as one of crisis, war, and monarchical trepidation.90

Despite their claims to godlike status, monarchs were continually assailed by aristocrats who revolted and often resisted the extraction of their revenue. In the first half of the seventeenth century the central state apparatus did expand somewhat in France and Sweden, but revolts and calamity also continued, especially in France. It was not until after the Thirty Years’ War that “bureaucratic-military absolutism,” epitomized by Louis XIV, finally developed. It was then that the military revolution—itself brought on by the Thirty Years’ War—elicited the sharp expansion of the state in France and Prussia and that monarchs came to enjoy the stability and state apparatus which their forebears desired.91

But contrast this timing with the development of their interests in a system of sovereign states. In Germany state institutions grew gradually over the sixteenth century, but it was not until the latter half of the seventeenth century, after the Thirty Years’ War, that absolute monarchy developed, most prominently in the Brandenburg-Prussia of Frederick the Great. German rulers adopted their interest in Westphalia in

91 Downing (fn. 47).
the 1530s. Sweden mimicked Germany, achieving the zenith of its power between 1670 and 1718, long after its interest in sovereign statehood had been realized. Similarly, the Netherlands’ golden age of commerce and rapid military expansion began in the 1590s, after its declaration of independence.

In France the politique vision of raison d’état not only inspired France’s contribution to Westphalia but also called for building the crown’s powers within the realm. After its civil war died down, the French state grew in its financial and tax-raising apparatus and in its military might. Under Richelieu, its armed forces increased from twelve thousand men in 1629 to two hundred thousand during its intervention in the Thirty Years’ War. Yet even then, the crown was weakened by the nobles’ constant opposition to reform and taxation and by several uprisings during the 1630s and 1640s. It was not until the reign of Louis XIV and his minister Colbert after Westphalia that France experienced its military revolution and succeeded in raising revenues from the nobility to wage hegemonic war. This was decades after it had developed an interest in a sovereign state system.

The notion that Westphalia is a mere corollary of the Leviathan’s bursting forth stumbles in the face of history’s timing. Bodies politic were interested in Westphalia before their institutions experienced their dramatic adolescent growth. But the problem of timing is also one of suddenness, not merely sequence. In each case where rulers came to advocate Westphalia, little such talk had been heard even a generation earlier. If the gradual growth of states over centuries explains Westphalia, then why did not their interests also grow gradually, alongside

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92 Ibid.; Gagliardo (fn. 10); Barraclough (fn. 10), 376–80; Carl Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Glasgow: William Collins Sons, 1974); Gerald Strauss, Law, Resistance, and the State: The Opposition to Roman Law in Reformation Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Moeller (fn. 60); Carsten (fn. 75), 165–78.

93 Parker (fn. 47, 1976), 206; Roberts (fn. 16, 1967), 78.


their institutions? This abruptness suggests another form of social power at play.

Even more damning than timing is Spain. Like other European states, Spain gained strength in the fifteenth century, unifying its territory and experiencing, by some measures, the earliest and most rapid growth of any contemporary European state. It expanded its military from 20,000 troops in the 1470s (smaller than England’s or France’s) to 150,000 in the 1550s (three times that of France), established an overseas empire that fed it hordes of silver and gold, and enlarged its treasury and royal bureaucracy.96 Yet the Spanish colossus never sought or fought for a Westphalian system of states and was indeed its arch-opponent, regarding it as heresy. If state growth leads to an interest in Westphalia, then why did not early modern Europe’s strongest state develop such an interest? The Spanish state’s legitimacy was bound to what remained of medieval Europe: it was pervasively Catholic and the imperial ruler of the Netherlands, its king was the Holy Roman Emperor for the first half of the sixteenth century, and afterward it was still closely tied to the imperially linked Habsburg dynasty. This geographic comparison, too, challenges the story of Westphalia as a mere spinoff of the state’s coming of age.97

Not only does the state’s growth fail to supplant the Reformation as an explanation for Westphalia, but, as this period’s embattled politics reveal, this growth itself was deeply shaped by the Reformation. From 1530 to 1648 armed conflict raged continuously at least somewhere in Europe. Most of these conflicts were caused in large part by the dispute between Protestants and Catholics—the most prominent crisis of the period. In most European polities that experienced it, the crisis itself was the chief brake on state growth. In the Netherlands, Prussia, and France it even wrought civil war. It was as a solution to this chaos that leaders embraced the strong secular state. It was also amidst religious war that technological developments led states to expand their militaries, necessitating in turn the need for state institutions to raise the money and the troops to support it. The military revolution, an imminent source of absolutism, arose from wars caused by the Reformation.

Admittedly, factors besides the Reformation helped to bring about Westphalia. During the first half of the seventeenth century Spain suffered bankruptcies and decline, Sweden rose, the Netherlands flour-

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96 Parker (fn. 47, 1976), 206.
ished economically, and the empire became overextended, fighting not only Protestants but also the Turks. But if ideas were not a sole cause, they were more than just another of many, inextricably interwoven causes. The tightness of the geographic and temporal link between ideas and interests in Westphalia, the pathways that expose the cogs and pinions of the influence of ideas, the weak connection between structural material trends and political interests, the partial effect of ideas upon these trends—together, these factors argue that without the Reformation, an international system would have arrived at a very different time, under very different circumstances, in some alternative historical universe.

**The Significance of the Argument**

The world of sovereign states that emerged at Westphalia was one that realists from Hobbes to Waltz would so enduringly describe, one in which the campaigns of polities to alter religious practice and belief within the borders of other polities came to appear strange, even difficult to imagine. Religion itself, of course, was far from a permanently spent force in international politics; many analysts point to a recent resurgence. Religious conflict appears strange, rather, only in its early modern role, as a major challenge to the legitimacy of the modern international system. Perhaps this strangeness helps to account for the materialist cast of most contemporary social scientific accounts of how this world came to be. But if what I have argued is correct, the realist world itself did not evolve solely from material factors. It was the result of much more: a new conception of humanity’s relationship with God.

The case for this new conception has implications for the field of international relations. It adds to a growing corpus of work that asserts the influence of ideas, culture, and norms in shaping international politics. It aims to prove the power of a very large and powerful idea, the Protestant Reformation, and to propose pathways of influence through which the Reformation shaped polities’ interests in Westphalia—their adoption of it and their ability to achieve it. The deeper importance of the argument, though, lies in the importance of the event about which it argues. That Westphalia is the founding moment of the international system is old wisdom here renewed. An explanation of this moment is

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an explanation of the revolution that so enduringly constituted the international social world.

As Westphalia today becomes riven, insights into its origins are all the more momentous. If ideas were a crucial source of the system of sovereign states, they could well be the source of contemporary trends away from sovereignty such as internationally sanctioned intervention and the expansion of the European Union. We can imagine hypotheses: intervention results from the growth of human rights and democracy during the cold war; European integration originated in the post–World War II popularity of European federalism, itself rooted in Christian Democracy and Catholic social thought. Of course, there are material explanations for both trends, so the role of ideas would have to be established. If proven, however, the influence of ideas in both cases would be significant not only for causal debates but also as a case of historical return. In both cases sovereignty becomes restricted on behalf of values that are universal and transcendent—precisely what was lost at the Peace of Westphalia.