Chapter 7

The Princ(ipal)

On March 3, 1983, President Ronald Reagan appeared on American television to announce the end of the nuclear threat. A new military program, designed to protect the country against the threat of a first-strike attack by Soviet nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, was about to be launched. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars" as it was almost immediately tagged by its detractors, was proffered to an increasingly-restive public as a means of overcoming the moral dilemma inherent in Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD): The holding hostage of one's people to potential nuclear annihilation as a means of preventing the Enemy from even contemplating such an attack. This particular dilemma had already created political disorder throughout Europe and America, manifested most clearly in the Nuclear Freeze movement, the Catholic Bishops' statement on nuclear weapons, and massive anti-nuclear protests throughout Western Europe (Meyer, 1990; Wirls, 1992). Reagan, seizing on citizens' fears of nuclear war, offered SDI as an alternative means of protecting them, thereby attempting to render ineffective and impotent the arguments of Freezniks, Bishops and other anti-nuclear activists.

There were numerous critics of SDI. Most chose not to contest the program on moral grounds but, rather to launch an attack on its technological (in)feasibility (see, e.g., Drell, Farley & Holloway, 1985). This, they hoped, would blast to bits what some saw as a dangerous and destabilizing attempt to gain a viable first-strike capability against the Soviet Union, a capability that might trigger the very eventuality that everyone wished to avoid. But here SDI's critics faced an insoluble dilemma: Inasmuch as one could never prove conclusively that an effective shield could not be built, how could one justify halting a project that promised such an enticing vision? Ultimately, the defense sectors of the United States and its allies managed to absorb tens of billions of dollars in a largely-fruitless attempt to develop the required technologies, although this has not deterred various parties from continuing to argue that a strategic defense system is both feasible, desirable and necessary (Rowny, 1997; see also Mandelbaum, 1996).

What was largely ignored in the long-playing, choleric exchange over SDI was its essentially moral purpose. SDI became a tool of the American state in providing an impenetrable shield not so much against missiles and accidental nuclear launches (whether from friend or foe) as to oppose notions of détente, disarmament and other indicators of declining determination and credibility vis-à-vis the USSR. In offering SDI, Ronald Reagan was promising to build a barrier that would redraw the wavering lines between the Free World and its Unfree Duppleganger, between democracy and totalitarianism, between the "Evil Empire" and the "City on the Hill." Indeed, SDI was a moral statement but, more than that, it was also a reimagining and reinforcing of the borders between nations, between liberal and socialist nationalisms, between what was to be permitted and what was absolutely forbidden.

In this chapter, I explore these matters. I begin by describing the features of the moral-
state, as I call it, and review briefly the antecedents to this phenomenon, beginning prior to 1648 with a specific focus on the ways in which states, as constituted following the Thirty Years War, also functioned as moral authorities. In historical terms, this authoritative role was first expressed through the person of the sovereign. Following the collapse of the universal moral authority of the Roman Catholic Church, the sovereign's mandate to rule the state invoked God's authorization. Although most contemporary democracies do not seek legitimacy through theocracy, these deeply-buried roots nevertheless retain considerable influence.

This is seen, in particular, in the emergence of nationalism--the "civil religion" of the state--as a new source of moral authority, a topic I address in the second part of the chapter. The emergence of state-centered nationalisms was a product of the secular Enlightenment--many of whose acolytes nevertheless subscribed to the authority of "Nature" and natural law (see Noble, 1998). The state now came to provide bounded containers of moral authority within which some practices were prescribed in the name of national solidarity while others were proscribed on pain of ostracism or expulsion. At the limit, as discussed in Chapter 6, some national elites found it expedient to eliminate whole classes and categories of people within their states' borders, or to engage in large-scale civil warfare in order to establish domestic moral discipline.

In the third part of the chapter, I examine the emerging contradiction between the moralities of nationalism and the rise of liberal individualism, especially as it developed after 1945. As I argued in earlier chapters, containment of the "Free World" and the "Soviet Bloc" throughout the Cold War specified the perimeters of two dominant orders and thereby united two great polities, each within its own "sphere of moral influence." Populations were disciplined not so much by the threat of physical punishment--although this was forthcoming in certain situations--as the fear of being cast outside the Circle of Order into moral ambiguity (and damnation?). President Reagan's invocation of the "Evil Empire" was thus as much an allusion to Satan and his legions as Stalin and his. More recently, the United States has attempted to reimpose its global moral authority by way of what I called, in an earlier chapter, "disciplinary deterrence," both at home and abroad, via public relations, demonstration and, if necessary, public punishment.

Finally, I address the collapse of state-centered moral authority in the New World Order of global liberalization. As I argued in Chapter 2, old (b)orders have dissolved under the pressures of the global market which, in turn, has become a sink for, rather than a source of, moral authority. The ever-more-frantic search for new sources of moral authority therefore proceeds through a great number of channels--social, political, economic, ethnic, identity--based--but none is likely to provide the means for re-establishing borders and order. I conclude with a discussion of efforts to restore (b)orders, and speculate on the implications of such an impossible task for 21st century global politics.

Real-state or Moral-state?

The end of the Soviet Union destroyed utterly and finally the conceptual border between
the good of the Free World and the evil of the Bad Bloc, thereby exposing the American people
to all sorts of pernicious, malevolent and immoral forces, beliefs and tendencies. It should be no
cause for wonder, consequently, that the domestic politics of morality, especially in the United
States, have become so pronounced and full of inconsistencies ("get the government off of our
backs but into the bedrooms of teenage mothers") and have been extended ever more strongly
into the international arena.  Paradoxically, perhaps, the fundamental causal explanations for
these contradictions are to be found not in domestic politics, as is conventionally thought;
Rather, the roots of this phenomenon lie in the very nature of the nation-state itself, in its
somewhat uncertain place in the so-called international system, and in the spread of the norms
and practices of political and economic liberalism, a point I have argued in earlier chapters. Far
from being amoral, as is so often claimed, state behavior, as encoded in the language and prac-
tices of realism, nationalism, state-centricity and anarchy, exemplifies morality in the extreme,
with each unit representing a self-contained, exclusionary moral-state.

How can this be? In contemporary international relations theory, the conventional per-
spective on the nation-state is largely a realist, functionalist one. The state serves to protect itself
and its citizens against external enemies, and to defend the sanctity of contracts and property
rights from internal ones. Morality, as George Kennan (1985/86) and others have never tired of
telling us, should play no role in the life of the real-state, for to do so is to risk both safety and
credibility. But can the state stand simply for the protection of material interests and nothing
else (Hirschman, 1997; Hirsch, 1995; Ellis & Kumar, 1983)? After all, the essential constitutive
element of the nation-state--the nation--represents the eternal continuity of specific myths,
beliefs and values, usually with a teleological character. Conversely, the defeat of those
elements, whether in war or peace, represents a mortal wound to nation as well as the authority
and legitimacy of the state that protects it.

This aspect of the state is largely ignored by the conventional wisdoms of both realism
and liberalism (not to mention marxism). Their advocates fail to historicize the state, seeing it as
having no genealogy and thereby omitting from their stories of international politics one critical
element: The European state, as heir to the authority of the Catholic Church, was originally
constituted as a moral order, defining a prescriptive standard of legitimate authority through
containment of its citizens within well-defined physical and moral (b)orders. And, with some
changes, this remains practice today. The legitimacy of the state does not grow simply out of
material power; it also rests on the presumption that the state's authority is both good and right
(Brown, 1992:ch. 2-3). And, although legitimacy is normally addressed only within the context
of domestic politics (if then), history from the Thirty Years War on nonetheless illustrates that
domestic legitimacy matters in international politics, too.

One might argue, of course, that that was then and this is now. The contemporary state
no longer fulfills this moral role, and has not done so for many decades. Contemporary threats to
state and polity are almost wholly material: Terrorists throw bombs, illegal immigrants take
resources, diseases trigger illness. I argue to the contrary: The modern nation-state acts not only
to protect its inhabitants from threatening material forces, it also acts to limit their exposure to
noxious ideas by establishing boundaries that discipline domestic behavior and beliefs. After all, what is a "terrorist" but someone with bad ideas? What is an "illegal" immigrant except someone who knowingly violates public norms? A state that cannot maintain such (b)orders becomes a prime candidate for disorder. And, as I shall argue below, it is in no small part the collapse of these moral borders that is responsible for much of the political disorder throughout the world today.  

More specifically, the *kulturkampf* that has wracked the United States (and other countries) since the end of the Cold War, and probably longer, is a struggle over where, and on whom, these moral borders should be inscribed. It is not a simple matter, however, of the moral versus the immoral (or amoral) within the confines of the 15 members of the European Union, the 50 American states or the world's 190-odd countries. Rather, the question is more properly understood as: Are the borders of our contemporary moral community to be national or global? If pernicious forces have free reign across formerly impermeable borders, how can the struggle stop at the water's edge? And, if such miscreants threaten to penetrate the body politic with their black helicopters, Gurkha troops and Soviet tanks, how can we not carry the culture war into the international realm (as Samuel Huntington and others have done)?

Consequently, on the one side of this struggle are those who would re-inscribe the national, excluding or expelling all who do not live up to the moral standards of the Founding Fathers of the United States (there are no Founding Mothers), and extending the borders of that morality abroad through example and discipline (U.S. Congressional prohibitions on family planning funds to certain countries and the Helms-Burton Act come to mind here). On the other side are those who, for better or worse, by virtue of choice or via the chances of change, find themselves swept up or away by the disintegration of national and moral (b)orders. This latter group is not identical with those captive to the contemporary events that give rise to refugees, migrants and the casualties of wars and markets; its members freely make choices among and in support of difference in ways that the culture warriors resolutely abjure. And, as I noted above and in Chapter 4, these struggles are not restricted to the domestic domain; in the global realm, moral conflict, disguised as "cultural" or religious difference, has come to replace the ideological blocs of the Cold War. In these struggles, the United States has taken on the role, not of World Policeperson, as it is often said, but Global Dominatrix (both Mistress and Princ(ipal)). But how can this be?

**What was Westphalia?**

For most international relations (IR) scholars, and for mainstream IR theory, the defining moment of contemporary world politics was 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia brought an end to the Thirty Years War. As David Campbell critically observes, accounts of this history "offer nothing less than an edifying tale of modernization in which we witness the overcoming of chaos and the establishment of order through the rise of sovereign states" (Campbell, 1992:47). There is good reason to believe that the signers of Westphalia, and its predecessor, the Treaty of Augsburg, had nothing of this sort in mind at the time. It is only through the contingent and
contextual lenses of subsequent centuries that such an orderly meaning was imposed on those
events.

Today, this teleological story of the state offers two central signifiers: anarchy and
sovereignty. Through anarchy, we are told, the Princes who put their names to the two treaties
agreed that a universal authority--the Roman Catholic Church--would no longer stand over them.
Through sovereignty, each Prince would come to constitute the highest authority within each
state and, enjoined from interfering in the affairs of any other, would have no authority anywhere
outside of his state. This state of affairs, with its the distinction between domestic "order" and
the interstate "non-order," was subsequently reified through realist Hobbesianism, that is, hard
interpretations of the writings of Thomas Hobbes and others (Walker, 1993).

The Princes were probably not very concerned about this particular inside/outside
distinction; we might say that, in 1648, there was more concern with Affairs of Family than
Matters of State. Indeed, if we look at a map of 16th and 17th century Europe, we discover that
relations between polities were much more intrafamilial than international. Moreover, relations
within domestic orders--often scattered about the continent in discrete tracts--had as much to do
with which branch and member of a family ruled over a specific territory as with each branch
and individual's religion (a point best illustrated by the intrafamily wars among British royalty
and nobility; see Elias, 1994).

Hence, while Westphalia did not put an end to these intrafamily squabbles, it did for the
most part do away with the remaining vestiges of feudal authority, replacing a confused
medieval order with a clear hierarchy that placed Prince or King above Duke and Lord, and
invoked the moral authority of God, whether Protestant or Catholic, to bless and legitimate these
new arrangements. 4 Westphalia, in other words, was a social contract for European society with
an embedded morality defining "good" behavior. It lacked many of the elements of domestic
orders, to be sure, including a sovereign, but it did provide moral principles in place of an actual
ruler. Those principles were frequently violated (although probably more often observed than
not), but they did form the basis for a continent-wide society.

Not altogether unintentionally, most late 20th-century mainstream IR theorists have been
little concerned with the domestic implications of anarchy and sovereignty and have, instead,
addressed the functional significance of the two practices for relations among states. Anarchy is
said to imply "self-help," or self-protection, while sovereignty is said to imply "self-interest" or,
in its modern mode, accumulation (Inayatullah, 1996). I will not belabor these two points,
inasmuch as they are the staple of every IR text published over the past 150 years (Schmidt,
1998). I will point out, however, that as practices, both presuppose modes of transnational
regulation rather than the absence of rules and norms so often associated with them. 5 More than
this, both sovereignty and anarchy can be regarded as expressions of a state-centric morality that
presumes a legitimate order within and illegitimate disorder without.

The first point is best seen in Kenneth Waltz's well-known (albeit flawed) invocation of
the market as a structurally-anarchic parallel to international politics (Waltz, 1979). In invoking
the headless market, Waltz draws on Adam Smith's famous "invisible hand" to explain outcomes
of relations between states but fails to recognize that the "invisible foot" of international politics
might well produce results quite unlike the orderly outcome posited by Smith. The error
committed by Waltz is to regard both markets and international politics as self-regulating, driven
by no more than self-interest or power (Smith, by contrast, hoped that religious beliefs would
constrain people's appetites; see Hirsch, 1995).

As social institutions, markets are subject to both implicit and explicit regulations. The
market is governed, first of all, by the command "Thou shalt not kill." Other rules follow.
Walter Russell Mead (1995/96:14) makes a similar point about airports and air travel when he
argues that, "Cutthroat competition between airlines coexists with common adherence to traffic
and safety regulations without which airport operations would not be possible." So it is between
states. The two principles of anarchy and sovereignty are both constitutive of the international
system as it is conceived and regulative of it, and they constitute moral boundaries for the state
that preserve the fiction of international (dis)order and domestic order (Brown, 1992:ch. 5).

On reflection, it also becomes clear that sovereignty and anarchy have moral and, in
consequence, legal implications for domestic politics, too. As Hobbes (1962:132) put it,

[T]he multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin
CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more
reverently, of that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and
defense (emphasis added).

By establishing borders between states and permitting rulers to be sovereign within them,
Princes were granted the right to establish within their jurisdictions autonomous systems of law
with both functional and moral content. These systems enjoined certain activities in order to
prevent consequences that would be disruptive of the order of the state—that is, order as the way
things should be, according to the individual Prince's vision. Or, as Hobbes (1962:113) argued,
"But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no
other than the not performance of covenant." Violation of the covenant is, therefore, not simply
the breaking of the law; it is repudiation of the underlying moral code of the society.

Hobbes argued that coercive power, entrusted to Leviathan, was necessary to ensure
"performance of covenant" and the safety and security of each man who subscribed to that cov-
enant. But even though the 17th century was quite violent, overt coercion was still relatively
uncommon. Rather, it was the possibility of discipline and ostracism by the state (and the other
subscribers to the covenant) as a result of a violation of order—not repeated day-to-day
punishment—that kept subjects from violating the Prince's laws or the covenant (and continues to
do so today). Most, if not all, of the legal systems of the time acknowledged, moreover, the
hegemony of Christianity—later manifested in the "divine right of kings"—even if they disagreed
on which particular version of the religion was to be practiced. Hence, although Princes
opposed a universal morality or empire that could impose sanctions on them against their wills, they sought to foster such an order within their own jurisdictions, based on their right to do so under God.

The fact that war and interstate violence among Princes did not cease after Westphalia does not mean, however, that morality was absent from their relations or that combatants were motivated by merely functional needs or appetites. The moral basis of a political entity—its ontology—provides a justification for its existence as well as the implication that other entities are morally illegitimate if they reject the ontology of the first. John Ruggie (1989;28) argues that Westphalia defined who had the "right to act as a power," thereby including within its purview the numerous small and weak German territories. The treaty acknowledged both a right of existence for these units and the right of each Prince to impose his morality on his subjects.

Westphalia did not, however, command that each Prince recognize, accept the rule, or adopt the morality of others. War could thus be understood both a moral and material event. To be conquered was punishment for immoral domestic beliefs and practices; to conquer was reward for moral domestic beliefs and practices. By agreement, therefore, although Westphalia commanded domestic morality and international amorality (the latter a rule rather than a condition), this did not prevent Princes from trying to extend the boundaries of their domestic morality to engulf the domains of other, immoral Princes.

The original Westphalian system lasted only about 150 years, if that long. Although the royal sovereign was invested with authority via a mysterious God, Enlightenment efforts to introduce rationalism into political rule succeeded all too well, especially in Western Europe. Whereas some of the early empirical scientists, such as Newton, saw their work as illuminating the workings of a universe created by God (Noble, 1998), others took a more physicalist view. Gradually, religious morality was undermined by scientific experimentation and explanation, and philosophers and theorists sought to justify political order by reference to Nature (which some still equated with God, albeit a distant one; a somewhat exaggerated view of this change can be found in Saul, 1992). From this tendency there emerged what came to be called "nationalism."

From corpus christii to corpus politicum

The first true nation-states, it is usually agreed, were Britain and France. In Britain, the modern "nation" emerged out of the Civil War of the 17th century, as Parliament fought with the King over the right of rule and the power of the purse. The Puritan Revolution represented an effort to impose on the state a moral order that was both Christian and a forerunner of capitalist individualism but which nonetheless had no external sources or referents of authority apart from God. Hence, the Puritans portrayed Rome and its adherents (including, putatively, any Catholic English sovereigns) as mortal enemies of Cromwell's Commonwealth and England.

This effort to purify the body politic of religious heresy was doomed to fail, however, so
long as heretics could not be expelled from the nation's territory or eliminated through extermination (a familiar problem even today). The Restoration, which put Charles II on the British throne, was as much a recognition of the intractability of the moral exclusion of a portion of the body politic itself as a reaction against the harshness of the Commonwealth and its attacks on certain elites. The emergence of the British nation during the following century--and the renewal of war with France during the 1700s--redrew the moral boundaries of society at the edges of the state, and established loyalty to King and Country as a value above all others.

In France, the Revolution launched a process whereby the source of state legitimacy was transferred from an increasingly discredited (and eventually dead) sovereign to the "people." The French nation did not, however, attempt to establish a new moral order; that was left to the various and successive leaderships in the two centuries that followed. But the French Revolution did mark a major change in the ontology of the moral order of the state. Whereas the Princely state derived authority from God, the new French state derived its authority from a "natural" entity called the "nation." Enlightenment rationalism sought explanations for the workings of the universe in science; even Hobbes looked to Nature to explain politics and provide a model for the Commonwealth. What could be more logical than to look for the origins of the nation in Nature? By the end of the 19th century, even though the very concept was less than a century old, nations had been transmorgrified into constructs whose origins were lost in the dim mists of antiquity but whose continuity was attributed to their connections to specific territories and the "survival of the fittest" (Dalby, 1990; Agnew & Corbridge, 1995).

As I have noted in earlier chapters, this new age of moral imperialism was rooted in Darwin's ideas about natural selection, but extended from individual organisms as members of species to states (Darwin, himself, had no truck with these ideas). Members and leaders of Nations that 50 years earlier had not even been imagined (Anderson, 1991) now competed to see whose history was more ancient and whom had survived greater travails for longer periods of time. This became a means of establishing greater legitimacy and authority (a process that continues, even today, in places such as Kosovo, Rwanda and Israel/Palestine). A more antediluvian history, in turn, established the moral right to occupy particular territorial spaces, and delegitimated the rights of all others to remain in those spaces (Berend & Ránki, 1979:80-96).

Inherent, too, in such national organicism was a notion of "purity," not only of origins but also of motives. Long-term survival could not be attributed simply to luck; it had, as well, to be a matter of maintaining one nation's moral distinctiveness from those who were not of the nation and accounting for survival with a teleological national mythology. Maintenance of such distinction through culture was not, however, enough; there also had to be dangers associated with difference. These dangers, often as not imagined into being (rather than being "real" in any objective sense), made concrete those borders separating one state from another. Those living in borderlands were forced to choose one side or the other. Anyone on the wrong side of such a border were, often as not, forcibly made to migrate across them, as with Native Americans during the 19th century, Greeks and Turks after World War I, Germans after World War II,
Hindus and Muslims in 1947, and Palestinians on the wrong side of the moving "Green Line" between 1947 and 1949. Once again, a form of moral order was invoked and moral purity maintained.

The apotheosis of this politics of danger took place during World War II in those areas of Europe that fell under Nazi rule. To the National Socialist regime, guardian of the moral and biological purity of all Germans, whether within the Third Reich or not, races of a lower order were threats to both (Pois, 1986). The Nazi moral hierarchy could live with Slavs restricted to their place (although it intended eventually to eliminate them or force them to move further to the East). It could not tolerate Jews, Gypsies and homosexuals, all of whom tended toward high mobility across social, geographical and sexual borders, and who treated with what the National Socialists regarded as "impure" ideas and practices (e.g., "Jewish science"). Inasmuch as containment in ghettos and camps was insufficient to protect the German nation from these impurities, extermination came to be seen as a necessity. And, so, millions died.

Ethnic cleansing thus serves a double purpose. Whereas forced transfer leaves alive aggrieved populations whose territorial claims might, at some time in the future, gain international legitimacy and recognition, genocide does not. Not only does it remove contenders for title to property, it also eliminates all witnesses to the deadly actions of the "moral community"—and, at times, as in towns and cities in ex-Yugoslavia and other partitioned or cleansed territories, all physical traces, too. Any who are left behind will testify to the evil intentions of those Others who have so conveniently been eliminated or erased from the scene.

Nothing succeeds like success

In the United States, attacks on "liberals," right-wing violence against the Federal government and the "New World Order," and conservative and religious fervor for "family values" (Bennett, 1998) can be understood as an attempt to re-impose a nationalistic moral frame on what some think is becoming a socially-anarchic society (Lipschutz, 1998b; Rupert, 1997). The kulturkampf at home is paralleled by the transformation of state practice from military-based to discipline-based behavior, especially where U.S. foreign policy is concerned (see Chapter 4). A closer look suggests that the two are of a piece, as in the convergence of a draconian welfare policy with an increasingly vocal movement against immigrants--whatever their legal status--and their countries of origin.

Welfare is deemed to sap the moral vitality of the poor, to foster promiscuity and illegitimacy and, more generally, to be a form of immoral "theft" from righteous citizens. Although statistics suggests that most welfare recipients are U.S. citizens, much political ire and fire has been directed at immigrants, whose moral claim to be in the United States is deemed to be weak or non-existent (a sentiment held by some against immigrants in other countries, too; see Crawford & Lipschutz, 1998). The film Independence Day, in which a disciplinary environmental sensibility (RECYCLE!) complements a plot warning of "aliens stealing our resources," nicely illustrates how domestic and foreign policy have come together around the
extension of morality from the private (domestic) to the public (international) sphere (and further into the Solar System and even interstellar space). 

How can we explain such behaviors? While the demise of social (and moral) discipline has been instrumental in the erosion of the citizen-state relationship (Drainville, 1995; see also Chapter 8), this is a proximate rather than a primary cause. To explain the sources of social disorder--in this instance, the decline of the state's moral authority--we must again look back to the immediate post-World War II period and the establishment of the Bretton Woods regime, which put in place the basis for the current social crisis. As I proposed in earlier chapters, the fundamental contradiction in the American and British goal of liberalizing the world economy was that the interests of citizen and state would coincide so long as there existed a threat against which only the state could protect the citizen. By extending the American economic system abroad, throughout the "Free World," but pointedly drawing lines around the always-threatening Soviet Bloc, this arrangement generated broad support among Western publics and largely eliminated the security dilemma inside of the Free World's borders.

At the end of World War Two, of course, the "Free World" was not yet "free," inasmuch as the Soviets had not yet been definitively tagged as the new enemy. Harry Truman's felicitous doctrinal phrasing concerning "free peoples everywhere" provided the label; the imperialism of the dollar and the fear of Reds did the rest. As the ex cathedra pronouncements of politicians, pundits and pastors and novels and films such as The Manchurian Candidate and Invasion of the Body Snatchers suggested, communism was a pathology of Nature, not an ideology of men; it took you over, you did not take it on (Lipschutz, 1997:ch. 3). Keeping the enemy out and contained meant, therefore, not only imposing secure boundaries around the world but also imposing limits on one's own self and behavior.

The domino theory was not only about the fall of states; any rupture of containment could breach the individual self and expose it to evil. As I noted in Chapter 3, the success and survival of the Free World depended on extending boundaries around a natural community (Stone, 1988) that had not, heretofore, existed. But in order to maintain its sovereignty and autonomy, this natural community had to be juxtaposed against another. Thus, on one side of the boundary of containment was to be found a unit (the Free World) whose sovereignty depended upon keeping out the influences of unit on the other side (the Bloc). The Free World could never have existed without the corresponding "Unfree World."

Within the borders of the Free World, however, there remained a problem: the protection of state sovereignty and autonomy--heretofore regarded as the Natural order of things--threatened to undermine the integrity of the whole. This was especially difficult from the American point of view, as illustrated in the famous confrontation between so-called isolationists and internationalists. The solution to the dilemma was a form of multilateral economic nationalism (Ruggie, 1983; 1991; 1995). Inside the boundaries of the Free World, states were granted the right to manage their national economies, but only so long as they agreed to move toward and, eventually, adopt the tenets of an internationalized liberalism. With respect to the
area outside the boundaries, however, the Free World would, to the extent possible, remain neo-
mercantilistic and self-contained, antagonistic to those who refused to "come in from the cold"
(Pollard, 1985; Lipschutz, 1989; Crawford, 1993).

Already in the late 1950s, the morality of this arrangement, and the security strategy
based on nuclear "massive retaliation," was being challenged by so-called peace movements
opposed to the threat-based logic of East-West relations (Deudney, 1995). By the early 1980s,
the Free World social contract was becoming fragile as a result of détente, a growing
international emphasis on human rights, and the economic troubles that had begun during the
1970s. The former two threatened to undermine moral order within the Free World by turning
friends into enemies and vice versa; the latter--especially inflation--threatened to undermine
moral order within the United States. It required the renewal of a really cold Cold War during
the 1980s to re-establish the moral polarities of East and West, and to excuse the vile behaviors
of American allies in the name of meeting the greater moral threats of Soviet adventurism and
loss of faith in America.

Alas, to no avail! The subsequent collapse of Communism, and the much-trumpeted
triumph of liberalism and democracy, fully undermined the moral authority of the West,
inasmuch as there was no longer a global "evil" against which to pose a global "good." As
earlier chapters have shown, the efforts of some to re-establish a moral divide--as, for example,
Samuel Huntington (1993; 1996) with his clashing civilizations--have not, so far, been
conspicuously successful.

To restore its moral authority in Times to Come, the nation-state must redraw the
boundaries of good and evil, replacing disorder with new (b)orders. The United States
government is attempting to restore order at home and abroad in two ways. First, the notion of
"democratization and enlargement," offered during the first Clinton Administration, represents
an attempt to expand the boundaries of the "Good World" (see Clinton, 1997). Those who
follow democracy and free markets subscribe to a moral order that makes the world safe for
Goodness (which, in turn, supports the now-conventional wisdom that democracies never go to
war with each other; but see Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). Second, as described in Chapter 4,
disciplinary deterrence is being directed against so-called rogue states, terrorists and others of
the "Bad Bloc," who are said to threaten the Good World even though they possess only a
fraction of the authority, influence and destructive power of the latter. Ordinary deterrence is
aimed against any state with the capabilities to threaten or attack. Disciplinary deterrence is
different. It is an act of national morality, not of national interests.

**Bondage, Domination, Discipline**

To repeat the point made in Chapter 4: Disciplinary deterrence is warfare by other means:
through demonstration, through publicity, through the equivalent of corporal punishment. The
difficulty with disciplinary deterrence is that there is no there there, and it does not work very
well. It is largely conducted against imagined enemies, with imaginary capabilities and the
worst of imagined intentions. Two men with explosives or cults with gas hardly pose a threat to the whole of the physical body politic; it is their ability to undermine faith in state authority that is so fearsome to those in power. And, as pointed out in earlier chapters, where "rogues" and other such enemies might choose to issue a challenge, or why they would do so, is not at all evident (see also Lipschutz, 1999b). But that these enemies represent the worst of all possible moral actors is hardly questioned by anyone.

Disciplinary deterrence is not, however, limited to renegades outside of the United States; it has also been extended into the domestic arena. For most of the Cold War, the threat of Communist subversion, and the fear of being identified as a Pinko Comsym in some police agency's files, were sufficient to keep U.S. citizens from straying too far from the Free World straight and narrow. Red baiting continued long after the Red Scares of the 1950s--one can even find it today, in the excoriation of so-called liberals (San Francisco Chronicle, 1997) and marxist academics (Lind, 1991)--although the language of discipline and exclusion has become somewhat more sophisticated with the passage of time. Still, since the collapse of the Soviet Union it has been difficult for political and social elites to discipline an unruly polity; that things can get out of hand without strong guidance from above is the message of South Central, Oklahoma City, Waco and Ruby Ridge.

Consequently, warnings routinely issued from on high that the "world is a dangerous place" serve to replace the disciplining threat of communism (Kugler, 1995). Such warnings are, however, unduly vague. We are told that weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, biological, chemical--could turn up in a truck or suitcase (Myers, 1997). We are informed that laptop cyber-terrorists are skulking around the Internet. We are instructed that some country's missiles are bound, eventually, to land in Alaska, Hawaii or even Los Angeles. Therefore, we must rely on and trust the authorities to prevent such eventualities, even though the damage done by one or several such devices would never approach the destructive potential that still rests in the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states.

Unnamed terrorists--often implied to be Muslim--are discussed and dissed, but some of the most deadly actors turn out to be the "boy or girl next door" (Kifner, 1995). The Clinton Administration further sows paranoia, seeking funding to track such neighbors by

creating] a special computer tracking system to flag, or 'profile,' passengers and identify those with suspicious travel patterns or criminal histories.... The names addresses, telephone numbers, travel histories and billing records of passengers would be run through a giant database that might lead to a search of the luggage of those deemed suspicious (Broeder, 1996).

In a move reminiscent of CONTEILPRO, the FBI establishes "counter terrorism task forces" in a dozen major U.S. cities which, according to a draft memorandum, are "dedicated full time to the investigation of acts of domestic and international terrorism and the gathering of intelligence and [sic] international terrorism" (Rosenfeld, 1997). The Justice Department disseminates funds for
cities to prepare for biological terror attacks. Domestic police departments acquire military-type
guns and armored vehicles and, as events in New York, Los Angeles and elsewhere suggest, take
on the role of occupying army. And the fearful Mayor of New York City, convinced that he
might be a target for foreign malcontents, barricades City Hall so that no citizen can enter
without official permission. Clearly, disorder knows no borders.

Every wo/man a state!

The state possessed by the siren song of its own moral efficacy is not yet an artifact of
history; as illustrated by international indignation over Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, the acts of
purification required by extreme nationalism are not so willingly accepted in today's world as
they once might have been. Interventions--on those rare occasions when they do take place--are
still usually explained, however, by old statist moralities--the "balance of power" or some such--
rather than humanistic ones. At the same time, moreover, a new phenomenon has emerged to
challenge the logic of realism: The morality of the market has begun to displace the morality of
the state. One might easily say, of course, that the market has no morality. Driven by an ethic of
self-interest, the individual is motivated only to consume as much as possible, within the
constraints of the combined limit of her debit and credit cards. And yet, and yet....

There is a quite explicit morality associated with discourses of market liberalism and
economic growth. According to Smithian principles, the behavior of individuals in free
exchange, when taken together, leads to the collective betterment of society without the
intervention of politics or power. The market is often offered as a "natural" institution, whose
organic expansion is not unlike that of the Darwinian states of yore. Indeed, the contemporary
mantra of economic competitiveness fuses the Social Darwinism of geopolitics with the Social
Darwinism of the market: As always, only the fittest will survive. Those old welfare state ideas
of community are not only passé, they are the sure path to failure (see, e.g., Cohen, 1997).
Hence, the unfettered market generates an unequivocal good that, logically, must also be morally
desirable. Conversely, the intervention of politics or power obstructs this generation of good by
being "inefficient," and such meddling must therefore be immoral. The paradox that follows is
that any equity brought about by politics comes to be regarded as bad (and immoral), while the
inequities consequent on marketization are deemed regrettable but the natural consequence of
human nature and good for those who get the short end of the stick (Himmelfarb, 1995; see also
Szerszynski, 1996).

In his 1973 biography of Eisenhower's first Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
Townsend Hoopes (1973:286) wrote that Dulles believed that "American economic and
technical superiority rested in large part on the moral superiority of the free enterprise system"
(emphasis added). This was not an isolated belief, then or now. According to the President's
Material Policy Commission (1952:1)--the Paley Commission--established by President Truman
in 1952 to examine the problem of raw materials supplies:

The United States, once criticized as the creator of a crassly materialistic order of things,
is today throwing its might into the task of keeping alive the spirit of Man and helping beat back from the frontiers of the free world everywhere the threats of force and of a new Dark Age which rise from the Communist nations. In defeating this barbarian violence moral values will count most, but they must be supported by an ample materials base. Indeed, the interdependence of moral and material values has never been so completely demonstrated as today, when all the world has seen the narrowness of its escape from the now dead Nazi tyranny and has yet to know the breadth by which it will escape the live Communist one--both materialistic threats aimed to destroy moral and spiritual man. The use of materials to destroy or preserve is the very choice over which the world struggle today rages (emphasis added).

Such ideas, originating with the Calvinist notion of the elect, have been repeated again and again in countless political jeremiads (Bercovitch, 1978) and Presidential speeches, of which Bill Clinton's 1997 Inaugural Address is only one recent expression (and which his successor will, undoubtedly, repeat on January 21, 2001).

There is a difference between Calvinism and consumerism, however. In times past, one's material success was indicative of one's moral superiority; today, one's material consumption is indicative of one's contribution to the moral uplifting of the world. Indeed, we might say that, in the emerging global moral economy, consumption becomes not only an individual good, but a collective moral and utilitarian "good," too. Consumption fosters prosperity, prosperity improves people's well-being and contentment with the status quo, and the resultant stability of social relations is a morally-desirable outcome. As President Clinton (1997) put it in "A National Security Strategy for a New Century,"

As we enter the twenty-first century, we have an unprecedented opportunity to make our nation safer and more prosperous. Our military might is unparalleled; a dynamic global economy offers increasing opportunities for American jobs and American investment; and the community of democratic nations is growing, enhancing the prospects for political stability....

Or, modifying slightly the late Deng Xiaoping's dictum, "It is good to consume."

The dissemination throughout the world of liberal market principles, including liberalization, privatization and structural adjustment, thus begins to acquires the character of a teleological moral crusade rather than the simple pursuit of national- or self-interest. Public ownership and welfare spending are condemned as inefficient and wasteful and proscribed by international financial bodies and investors. Venal and bloated governments expend resources on projects that contribute to corruption and indolence, and undermine individuals' efforts to improve their own position and status by dint of moral reasoning and good works. The discipline of the market rewards those who hew to its principles, whether state, corporation or individual. And those who cannot or will not do so must be left to suffer the consequences of their economic apostasy.
It's the economy, stupid!

Stephen Gill (1995) has written perceptively about the ways in which the "global panopticon" of liberal markets act to impose their peculiar morality on both the credit-worthy and credit-risky. As I argued above, as the nation-state and nationalism have lost the moral authority they once commanded, such authority has shifted increasingly to the market and its disciplines (Strange, 1996). And there is more religion to the market than meets the eye. Those who don't adhere to the standards of the credit-givers (and takers!)—whether individual or state—are cast out of the blessed innermost circle of the global economy. To be readmitted requires a strict regimen of self-discipline, denial and re-establishment of one's good name.

But even those with Triple-A credit ratings and Platinum plastic are not free of this moral regime. Inundated daily with bank offers of new credit cards and below-market interest rates, the credit-worthy are kept to the straight and narrow by fear of punishment should they violate the code of the credit-rating agencies. The proper response to such offers is, of course, "Get thee from me, Satan!" (although not everyone can rise above such temptation; ballooning consumer debt and growing numbers of bankruptcies in the United States indicate that backsliding is on the increase). Nonetheless, we see here the true genius of a globalized credit system. Whereas Church authority was akin to statist regulation—the same rules for everybody, with damnation bestowed through the collective judgement of the community—market-based morality relies on self-regulation (and self-damnation). Pie can be had now (none of that "By and by in the sky" stuff) and temporal salvation is keyed to individual capacity to carry the maximum credit load that s/he can bear—different strokes for different folks. As many of us know from experience, however, self-regulation is a weak reed on which to base a social system. Moreover, the desire to consume to the maximum of one's individual credit limit does carry with it a larger consequence, the domestic social anarchy that arises from self-interest as the sole moral standard to which each individual consumer hews.

Faced with this New World Morality, can the nation-state recapture its moral authority and reimpose the borders of order? In some places, such as the former Yugoslavia, the agents of virulent ethno-nationalisms have tried, but only with limited success. More recently, in places such as Israel and Guatemala, the lure of riches in the market have come to outweigh the certainty of riches by forced appropriation (Lipschutz, 1999a). In other places, such as the United States and Europe, culture wars have become the chosen means to discipline those who would deviate from "traditional" social norms, in a forced effort to bring the heretics back in. But hedonism, cultural innovation, and social reorganization are hallmarks of the market so loved by the very conservatives who have launched these very domestic battles (Gabriel, 1997; Elliot, 1997).

Short of reimposing a kind of quasi-theocratic autarchy on their societies—which, in any case, would be vigorously opposed by the cosmopolitan economic elites that benefit from globalization, and lead to disruption and upheaval on a massive scale—the nation-state has little
to fall back on in facing this new world. National borders might be guarded by armies, navies
and police armed to the teeth, but the borders of nationalist moralities, drawn in the minds of the
"nation," have always been fluid and difficult to demarcate. And imagination knows no
boundaries. Carried to an extreme, the market will turn each of us into a nation of one, every
man and woman a state, a world of 10 billion atomized countries. Then, indeed, will we enter
into the "borderless world."