



Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and Rural Territorial Development in the Andes

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Summary. — Social movements have been viewed as vehicles through which the concerns of poor and marginalized groups are given greater visibility within civil society, lauded for being the means to achieve local empowerment and citizen activism, and seen as essential in holding the state to account and constituting a grassroots mechanism for promoting democracy. However, within development studies little attention has been paid to understanding how social movements can affect trajectories of development and rural livelihood in given spaces, and how these effects are related to movements' internal dynamics and their interaction with the broader environment within which they operate. This paper addresses this theme for the case of social movements protesting contemporary forms of mining investment in Latin America. On the basis of cases from Peru and Ecuador, the paper argues that the presence and nature of social movements has significant influences both on forms taken by extractive industries (in this case mining) and on the effects of this extraction on

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rural livelihoods. In this sense, one can usefully talk about rural development as being co-produced by movements, mining companies, and other actors, in particular the state. The terms of this co-production, however, vary greatly among different locations, reflecting the distinct geographies of social mobilization and of mineral investment, as well as the varying power relationships among the different actors involved.

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1. INTRODUCTION: MINING EXPANSION AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

The 1990s saw significant shifts in global investment flows in mining, an effect of changes in national regulatory frameworks in over 90 countries worldwide (Bridge, 2004; Holt-Giménez, 2007). One of the many consequences of these changes has been that an increasing share of investment has flowed to South America. During 1990–2001 twelve of the 25 largest single capital investments in mining were made in South America, two in Peru, nine in Chile, and one in Argentina (Bridge, 2004, p. 412, 413). Four of the top ten target countries for mining investment were Latin American: Chile (ranked 1st), Peru (6th), Argentina (9th), and Mexico (10th). Chile and Peru have been particularly favored by neo-liberal reforms, receiving more investment than might otherwise have been predicted on the basis of their geological attributes alone (Bridge, 2004). Such surges and shifts in global investment geographies are mirrored at a national level. In Peru, for instance, by 2000 three departments¹ had between 30% and 50% of their terrain under mining claims, and a further seven had between 20% and 30% (Bury, 2005). Claims are particularly concentrated in highland departments characterized by historically neglected agrarian economies and significant indigenous and campesino populations.

Accompanying this growth in investment in extractive industries has been an equally remarkable surge in social mobilization and conflict (Bebbington, 2007a, 2007b). For example, in 2005 a report to the Peruvian Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman's Office) recorded 33 separate conflicts related to mining (Ormachea, 2005). The nature, scope, and extent of this mobilization and these conflicts vary across space, however, as does the mineral investment itself. Indeed, the intersections of these two distinct geographies—one of investment and the other of social mobilization—go a long way

in determining the uneven geographies of the relationship between mineral development and patterns of rural territorial change.

This observation is the starting point for this paper. We explore the claim that the level and nature of social mobilization elicited by the presence of mining investment serve as critical intervening variables in the relationship between investment, rural development, and livelihoods. Posing and exploring this claim is a potentially fruitful line of enquiry that offers the prospect of complementing existing literature on rural social movements, in which relatively little attention has been paid to the question addressed in this paper—namely the roles of rural social movements in mediating the effects of large scale capital investment on rural livelihoods and territorial change. The question is also important for discussions of rural territorial development (RTD) that have gained increasing prominence in multilateral agencies (Schejtman & Berdegué, 2003).² At its core, the argument for RTD emphasizes that rural development requires both productive and institutional modernization, as well as conscious efforts to articulate these modernization processes with a conception of space that recognizes linkages between urban and rural economies, between on and off-farm activities and between socially constructed ideas of territory and administrative conceptions of territorial governance.

At the same time as serving as an analytical framework for understanding the relationships between economic transformation, institutional change, and livelihoods in given rural spaces, RTD also has a more normative edge as a policy lens for fostering forms of rural development which connect economic growth with institutional arrangements and ensure that the rural poor are able to participate in this growth process. However, the role of conflict in affecting these relationships has received less attention than has the role of collaboration and coordination. To focus on the effects of social mobilization on relationships between mining and rural development might therefore

contribute to deepening reflection on the role of conflict in RTD.

With these antecedents, the paper proceeds as follows. The first section outlines elements of a conceptual framework for exploring possible links between political and economic context, livelihoods, RTD, and social mobilization. This serves as a basis for the research questions that underlie the empirical analysis. The second section presents the contexts of each case study, one from Peru and the second from Ecuador, while the third analyses the relationships between mining investment, social movements, and RTD that have occurred in each case. The final section offers a comparative analysis of these two cases, and suggests both movement and contextual factors that determine the effects that social mobilization has on processes of RTD.

2. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND THE CO-PRODUCTION OF TERRITORY

In this section, we suggest possible relationships between the political economy of RTD and forms of social mobilization. The case studies in the following section will be discussed in the light of these possible relationships. In particular, we suggest that social mobilization can be understood as a response to the threats that particular forms of economic development present, or are perceived as presenting, to the security and integrity of livelihoods and to the ability of a population in a given territory to control what it views as its own resources. We also suggest that the extent to which this mobilization modifies subsequent economic development depends greatly on the relative power of movements and economic actors (in this case mining companies). This relative power is determined partly by the roles assumed by other actors (in particular the state) and to a great extent by the relative strength or weakness of the social movements themselves. The second subsection considers in more detail some of the factors and relationships internal and external to movements that might determine their relative strength.

(a) *Livelihoods, dispossession, and social mobilization*

Livelihoods are a function of assets and structures, and a source of subsistence, income,

identity, and meaning (Bebbington, 1999; Moser, 1998; Scoones, 1998). Some social movements seek to expand people's asset bases. Others, however, emerge to contest patterns of resource control and access, and to challenge the institutions, structures, and discourses that determine the social distribution of assets, as well as their relative productivity, security, and reproducibility (Bebbington, 2007b).³ Indeed, the emergence of movements might be understood in terms of their relationship to two distinct types of accumulation: "accumulation by exploitation" and "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey, 2003). The former, workplace centered form of accumulation has historically generated labor movements, trade unions, and related political organizations. Conversely, "resistance to accumulation by dispossession (as with the 'privatization' of land and water) has tended to take the form of 'new' social movements, around issues such as land and minority rights" (Hickey & Bracking, 2005, p. 853).

In this reading, resistance is understood as a defense of livelihood, in which movements emerge to protect assets by challenging the structures, discourses and institutions that drive and permit exploitation and dispossession.⁴ At the same time, threats to livelihood might also elicit mobilization motivated by the cultural and psychological losses that might arise when livelihoods are disarticulated (Bebbington, 2004). Habermas has argued that social movements are apt to emerge when people's lifeworlds—their domains of everyday, meaningful practice—are "colonized" by forces which threaten these lifeworlds and people's ability to control them (Habermas, 1987; Crossley, 2002). In the face of this colonization, he suggests that social movements emerge to defend and recover threatened forms of life and social organization (a similar view to that of Escobar (1995, pp. 222–226), even if the theoretical basis is distinct). While Habermas was more interested in the role of the modern, bureaucratic state in this process of colonization, the incursion of new forms of investment in rural environments, the accelerating effects of cultural modernization on traditional practices, and the disarticulation of existing moral economies (Ballard, Habib, Valodia, & Zuern, 2005; Edelman, 2005; Scott, 1976) might similarly be understood as colonizations of the lifeworld.

When movements have emerged to contest the development of extractive industries, they

might be understood in these terms: as vehicles for contesting *both* the colonization of lifeworlds *and* the material threats to livelihood that flow from Harvey's two processes of accumulation. Historically, the strongest movements around mining have emerged to address issues of exploitation: for example, the mine workers' union in Bolivia, on the strength of whose mobilization a large part of Bolivia's 1952 revolution was crafted (Nash, 1993).⁵ Such workplace mobilizations continue today—as in the protests during 2006 around workers compensation and benefits at the BHP Billiton-owned La Escondida mine in Chile (BBC, 2006).⁶ However, as technology increasingly substitutes for labor, formal employees become more skilled, and low-skilled employees are recruited on short-term contracts, so conflicts between mine and labor unions have steadily become less prominent and more localized than was the case in earlier decades.⁷ At the same time, however, technological changes have turned many once uninteresting mineral deposits into technically exploitable and commercially viable propositions. As part of this process, open-pit techniques have become progressively more important. These techniques greatly increase the surface footprint of the mine. As a result of these different technological changes, the potential frontier for mining has been pushed deep into areas already occupied by humans as well as into new drainage basins and areas of already threatened ecologies.⁸ This brings new threats to the material and cultural bases of livelihood in these and adjacent⁹ areas, eliciting new types of movement—ones that contest issues of dispossession and colonization rather than workplace conditions.

The dispossession threatened by this new mining takes various forms. The most obvious is the dispossession of the land under which minerals are deposited. Here movements protest against loss of territory and forced land sales at low prices. A second is the dispossession of the resources themselves, where movements protest the loss to private (generally foreign) capital of what they perceive to be a national asset. In each of these instances, dispossession is a question of loss in both the *quantity* of people's assets (land, water courses, grazing, and minerals) and the *quality* of these assets (water and air pollution). Dispossession might also be understood as loss of a way of life, and a certain set of taken-for-granted assumptions about livelihood and develop-

ment. Finally, dispossession can be understood as the loss of an exchange value that occurs through the tax and royalty advantages and exemptions that companies enjoy at a time of rising commodity prices.

While movements might share a broad concern about dispossession in a *general sense*, there can still be considerable diversity among and within movements as to the *specific* types of dispossession they are contesting. Likewise, different actors within movements may offer distinct critiques of the issues that they are addressing, and different proposals for alternative policies (*cf.* Perreault, 2006). These alternatives can range from complete rejection of resource extraction and these new modes of resource governance, through to demands for greater participation in decision-making regarding resource management and more equitable distribution of the economic benefits derived from resource exploitation. Some groups within movements might be open to deal with resource extraction companies, others not at all (and *vice versa*). Some may prefer strategies of negotiation, others of confrontation and direct action.

These differences have implications for how we conceptualize movements and understand their relative coherence. They also have implications for the influences that movements may have on patterns of territorial development in mining-affected areas. We might hypothesize that the positions and strategies that dominate within movements will have distinct implications for the types of negotiation and articulation that ultimately occur between movements and resource extraction industries, and thus for the types of development that ensue from these articulations. At one extreme one can imagine the existence of movements with unified and forceful positions reflecting their sense that they are being dispossessed both of a way of life and of exchange value, and who are unwilling to negotiate. When successful, such movements can prevent extractive industries from operating. However, when confronted by an equally intransigent mining company and a state willing to allow the use of force, such movements are likely to be unsuccessful and ultimately repressed and destroyed. At another extreme one can hypothesize movements whose concern is to negotiate compensation for dispossession and/or guarantees against dispossession of asset *quality* and who would withdraw contestation once the mining company had put in place plans for environmental remediation and social

compensation. When successful, such movements are able to negotiate favorable compensation for a broad base of their membership; when unsuccessful, the leadership of such movements can be corrupted or be manipulated into clientelistic relationships, in which they ultimately gain little more than trinkets in return for acquiescence. Among these different options, the type of articulation that ultimately occurs depends much on the relative strength of movement and mining company, the vulnerability of movement leaders to cooptation, state postures regarding mining development, freedoms of association and the right to protest, and on the positions assumed in these conflicts by public authorities, NGOs, churches, the media or Chambers of Commerce.

(b) *Sources of strength and fragility in social movements*

Social movements fail to deliver on their agendas as often as they succeed. This propensity to failure reflects an inherent fragility in movements, one that has to be understood in terms of their internal dynamics and of the contexts within which they operate. How far movements are able to manage and overcome their inherent fragilities goes a long way in determining how far their presence will influence patterns of RTD and livelihood change.

We take the notion of social movement to refer to processes of collective action that are sustained across space and time, that reflect grievances around perceived injustices, and that constitute a pursuit of alternative agendas (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Escobar, 1995). These processes are frequently multilocal and sometimes transnational, and are sustained more by shared grievances and discourses than by any clear form of articulating social structure. In this sense, movements are much more than individual organizations. However, organizations *are* an important part of movement processes. Indeed, movements frequently depend on formal organizations—in particular because their actions require financial, human, informational, social, and other resources that more localized and/or informal social networks are unable to mobilize (Andrews, 2001; Ballard *et al.*, 2005, p. 627; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1988; McAdam, Tarrow, *et al.*, 2001). Such resources can almost only be channeled by formal “social movement organizations,” SMOs (McCarthy & Zald, 1977)—organizations such as NGOs,

churches, student bodies, formal peasant or ethnic associations, and university groups. Furthermore, just as movements might be multilocal and transnational, so these SMOs may also exist at a range of geographical scales. This is certainly the case in contemporary movements contesting extractive industries. Even when their campaigns are focused on territorial transformations in a given location, these movements often bring together local, national, and international actors (*cf.* Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Such actors play an important role in keeping movements “moving”—by maintaining debates, supporting events nurturing leaders and sustaining networks during those periods when movement activity has slowed down. Such organizations also play important roles in forming movement discourses, although if different SMOs have distinct ideas of how movement discourse should evolve they can end up pulling a movement in different directions (*c.f.* McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

Movements are thus constituted by distinct currents, groupings of actors, local leaderships, and SMOs. This breadth is a source both of weakness (because of the tensions and coordination problems it can lead to) and of power (because it increases the reach and geographical presence of movements). In particular, given the different ways in which groups might understand and be aggrieved about dispossession, and the distinct views they may have on what ought to be done to remedy such dispossession, holding a movement process together around a shared agenda and vision is an immensely difficult feat and always a fragile achievement.

These internal sources of weakness can be compounded by external factors. In particular, while many livelihoods might be threatened by mineral development, others will stand to gain, some quite significantly as mineral development can create new livelihood opportunities. These opportunities may be created through local sourcing of supplies and services, through increasing levels of demand in the local economy fostered by mine staff expenditure, through companies’ social responsibility programs, or through fiscal transfer programs (Barrantes, 2005). Within a given territory, then, the growth of a mining economy changes the opportunity structure for a wide range of livelihoods, with some seeing opportunities where others see dispossession.

These quite differing views of the role of the mine in improving livelihoods can easily lead to situations in which the social mobilization

that emerges to contest mineral development exists alongside quite distinct forms of mobilization that seek to defend and support the mine (and that may well receive direct support and encouragement from the mining company itself). Very often, these two, quite distinct types of mobilization enter into open conflict. The recent history of Perú has many examples of this phenomenon, and it is present in both our cases. For instance, in 2005, at the same time that local and national movements were criticizing the Australian company BHP Billiton for the adverse effects of its Tintaya mine (in the department of Cusco), Tintaya's own employees marched in the cities of Cusco, and Arequipa in support of the mine. More recently (August/September, 2006), employees of Minera Yanacocha in Cajamarca, Peru (one of our cases) marched through the city in opposition to the community groups, NGOs, and civic associations that were criticizing the mine.

To the extent that such pro-mine mobilization exists—or at the very least that there exist a significant number of livelihoods benefited by the growth of a mineral economy—then the fragility of social movements becomes even more of a constraint on the extent to which their presence will affect patterns of territorial change. Critical here is the relative power of these different actors, and the relative importance of the extractive industry within both the national and territorial economy. Where the industry is that much more important, one would expect state and other social forces to be more determined to question, delegitimize, and repress movements and more generally expose their internal fragilities. Likewise the greater the resources at the disposal of other economic actors, the more able they will be to deepen the inherent fractures in the movements. At a more general level of abstraction, in this triad of relationships among movement, business, and state, it may well be that the outcome of conflicts—and thus of the types of RTD processes triggered by the mining activity—hinge around how far state agencies ultimately identify with one set of claims over another. The position taken by the state depends in turn on the relative importance of mining in the national economy and the effectiveness with which it itself is lobbied by pro- and anti-mine lobbies.

3. CASE STUDIES

To explore these questions, this study deliberately selected two sites in which the outcomes

of mineral development projects had been radically different, yet which shared similar time lines and even a number of key social actors. The rationale for this choice was that the comparison would enable identification of core differences between the two experiences that might help explain these distinct outcomes. This would help the study draw attention to factors that have a causal effect on the ways, in which social movements and mineral development interact with each other and ultimately influence patterns of territorial development.

The first of the two cases comes from the department of Cajamarca in the Northern Peruvian Andes. More specifically we consider the case of the Yanacocha mine, whose operations are located in the high Andes some 35 km. to the North of the city of Cajamarca in an area of traditionally peasant populations organized in communities¹⁰ (Figure 1). The mine—which we refer to as MYSA¹¹—is jointly owned by Newmont Mining Corporation (a US-based multinational with head offices in Denver, Colorado) with a 51.35% share in the ownership, the Peruvian Compañía de Minas Buenaventura with 43.65%, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) with 5%. MYSA is a particularly significant mine, not only because it is the largest gold mine in Latin America, but also because it was the first large scale foreign direct investment in Peru following the decade of the 1980s lost to hyperinflation and civil war. While exploration was underway during the 1980s, the first significant investment was made only in 1992 and the first gold presented to the public in 1993. While initially the company insisted that the mine would be small, it has grown steadily ever since and currently MYSA employs some 8000 workers (only 2,243 of whom are regular staff). In the first half of 2006 the Central Reserve Bank of Peru estimated that MYSA's sales reached US\$936.5 million, and in 2005 the mine produced 3.3 million ounces of gold, 45% of national gold production.¹²

The second case comes from the county (*canton*) of Cotacachi, located some two hours' drive to the North of Quito, Ecuador and covering both high altitude grassland (with a dominantly Quichua population) and humid tropical valleys (with a colonist and mestizo population). This humid sector, known as Intag, is also the site of a copper deposit commonly referred to as the Junín deposit (Figure 2), and identified during the 1980s under a




Figure 1. *Cajamarca and Minera Yanacocha.*




Figure 2. *Cotacachi and Ascendant Copper.*

geological exploration agreement between the Ecuadorian and Belgian governments. In 1990, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) financed more thorough exploration by the Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ) that confirmed the existence of a large and potentially profitable deposit. In 1993, the exploration of the deposit passed to the company Bishi Metals, a subsidiary of Mitsubishi. However, Bishi Metals abandoned the site in 1997 as a result of escalating conflict, and the concession remained idle until 2002 when it was once again purchased. By 2004 the concession had been acquired by Ascendant Copper Corporation, a “junior” mining company incorporated in British Columbia, Canada,¹³ and in 2005 Ascendant transferred ownership of the property to its subsidiary Ascendant Ecuador (Ascendant Copper Corporation,

2005). Though still not developed, this is intended to be—like Yanacocha—an open-pit mine. Unlike MYSA, however, this (potential) mine operates in a context in which mining is still unimportant in the national economy, in which there is little history of mining, and in which the economy—though far from dynamic—is not emerging from a collapse of the type that occurred in Peru in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Both Cajamarca and Cotacachi have become important and emblematic sites in Peruvian and Ecuadorian debates over the relationships between extractive industries, rural development, and social conflict. Both promised in their early years to help re-dynamize (in the Peruvian case) or dynamize (in the Ecuadorian case) moribund mining sectors, both are open-pit projects located in hydrologically sensitive areas, both

involve deposits in already occupied and farmed land, and both have elicited processes of social mobilization that have become important within wider national environmental movements questioning extractive industries. In each instance the mining industry has argued that external, politically motivated elements are to be blamed for these levels of social mobilization; local actors have developed links with international actors, in particular those linked to the networks of Friends of the Earth International and Bay Area environmental groups; mobilization has led to acts of violence against property and persons; national human rights groups and indigenous peoples organizations have become involved; the local conflicts have become a topic in the respective national media¹⁴; and central government agencies have been drawn into the conflicts. Furthermore, partly reflecting the presence of international networks (c.f. Keck & Sikkink, 1998), the processes of social mobilization in the two sites have over time become linked, with exchange visits and sharing of information among activists and organizations working on the two cases.¹⁵ And yet, the investment dynamics and processes of territorial change could hardly have been more distinct. Today, MYSA reaches across 10,000 ha of the Cajamarca highlands, an extension exceeding that of the city of Cajamarca,¹⁶ while the Junín mine in Cotacachi is still no more than a base camp and an imagined project. Cajamarca's regional economy has been transformed by MYSA, whereas Cotacachi's revolves around other economic activities.

These following two case studies ask how such radically different processes over the same 15–20 year period might be explained, and how much of this difference is due to the processes of social mobilization that have emerged in the two sites?

(a) *Cajamarca: multiple mobilizations and mining-led territorial transformation*

The acquisition of land is central to the success of an open-pit mine for the obvious reason that such operations require that the mine possess surface as well as sub-surface rights. Land, however, has long been a point of political contention in the Andes and, indeed, MYSA's land acquisition program triggered the first rumblings of discontent with the mine. Interestingly, however, the rumblings were less due to asset loss *per se*, but rather the conditions under which land was being acquired. Complaints be-

gan to emerge about prices paid, undue pressure exercised on families to sell their land, people selling land to the mine that belonged to absent owners rather than them, and inflationary pressures in the local land market. The first stop for these complainants was the parish church in the area most affected by the early activities of the mine. The priest served to link the complaints up with the Diocesan human rights office as well as other human rights organizations in Peru—organizations which in turn presented the complaints to MYSA as well as Newmont headquarters in Denver.

While the local Church played the initial role in linking communities up to proto-social movement organizations, this soon came to an end when the priest was sent to Rome. At this point, however, another actor began to assume this articulating role. This actor was the nascent federation of *rondas campesinas*, peasant vigilante groups whose primary purpose had been to guard against cattle rustling and later assure community security more generally during the times of rural violence in Peru (Starn, 1999). A number of people active within the federation were affected by the expansion and land purchasing activities of the mine, and the federation became a vehicle for contesting these adverse impacts (Chacón Pagán, 2005). The federation (FEROCAFENOP) began to organize protests in Cajamarca itself and further developed its links to international environmental groups (in particular in the Bay Area of the US)¹⁷—links that also helped it engage in advocacy in the US. In the process, their complaints became more visible nationally and internationally, although federation activists of this period remember it as one when international support and involvement was far greater than support from urban Cajamarca for whom these rural grievances passed as largely invisible and irrelevant. Significantly, though, notwithstanding the grievances that peasants and the Federation had with the mine, the protest during this period was not so much oriented toward getting rid of MYSA¹⁸ as to demanding a different relationship between mine and communities: a relationship characterized by fair compensation, more civil treatment, and greater participation in the benefits that the mine was generating.

As the process of organization and mobilization was underway in Cajamarca, a similar process was occurring at a national level (De Echave & Pasco-Font, 1999)—a reflection of the rapid increase in mining investments and conflicts during the mid- and late-1990s. This

process culminated in the creation of a National Coordinator of Mine Affected Communities, or CONACAMI in Spanish (De Echave & Pasco-Font, 1999). Activists in Cajamarca were an important part of this process, and initially the idea was that the Federation of *rondas* would be the Cajamarca branch of CONACAMI. However, a series of conflicts between different interest groups, party political currents, and leaders (locally and nationally) meant that this alliance was short-lived, and CONACAMI was never able to establish a significant base in Cajamarca. Meanwhile, the struggles between different leaderships both within and among organizations in Cajamarca began to weaken both the Federation and the more general process of social mobilization.

Meanwhile, concerns about the mine were beginning to grow in the city of Cajamarca—not so much because of any sympathy with the plight of rural communities but rather because of the accumulating evidence that the mine was beginning to have adverse effects on the quality of the urban water supply (Ecovida, 2005; Seifert, 2003). A mercury spill from a mine-contracted truck in the village of Choropampa in 2000 further consolidated these concerns while also gaining far greater international attention, because of a highly successful video (supported financially and distributed by several international SMOs) that documented the spill and gave visual form to the less than sensitive ways, in which both mine and government responded to the complaints and mobilization of Choropampa's residents. Urban environmentalist groups that had begun to emerge at around the same time found themselves somewhat strengthened by these events, as did the coordinating group that had begun to work across these different organizations.

Around the same time as these publicly visible environmental failures of the mine, MYSA finally succeeded in channeling some its social responsibility program finance to FEROCAFENOP,¹⁹ the federation that had for so long been the main organized face of rural contention against the actions of the mine. When this became publicly known, the legitimacy and power of the federation rapidly weakened (and any remaining links with CONACAMI were cut by CONACAMI). As a direct consequence, the anchor of the social movement around the mine quickly shifted from rural to urban organizations, and from organizations based in rural community groups to ones based in urban intellectuals and professional groups. In the pro-

cess, movement discourses also began to change. While the rural movement of the 1990s had been openly confrontational, it had been neither an environmental movement nor an anti-mining movement. Instead it had been a movement that was more concerned to demand fair treatment and adequate compensation for the forms of dispossession that had occurred in rural communities, and a fuller inclusion of rural people in the mine's activities. In this sense, it might be argued that it sought a far clearer and more synergistic articulation of the mining economy and rural livelihoods—rather than the enclave and dispossession model of mining that dominated in the 1990s.²⁰ With the shift to an urban-led movement, the movement discourse became increasingly a mix of environmentalism and/or of calls for greater national and state participation in both the governance of the mine and the control of its profits. The politics of peasant protest (both populist and radical) were increasingly crowded out by those of an urban environmental left characterized by its own internal differences on the place of mining in the regional economy. This is not to say that peasant protest and mobilization disappeared—indeed, it continued to play an important part in future conflicts with the mine (see below). However, the actors who increasingly defined the debates within which these protests were interpreted were urban—intellectuals, NGOs, occasionally local authorities.²¹

Environmental concerns remained at the forefront of debate in Cajamarca during the early 2000s, as arguments emerged about whether mercury had seeped into the urban water supply or not, and over whether the overall quantity of this supply was being threatened (Ecovida, 2005). At the center of the latter discussion was an argument about MYSA's desire to expand operations into an area known as Cerro Quilish. Initial peasant protests against this expansion in the late 1990s had ultimately led to a municipal ordinance that declared Quilish a protected area on the grounds that it was the source of the cities' water supply. The ordinance was, however, contested by MYSA, and after drawn out legal proceedings, a Constitutional Tribunal concluded that the mine's rights to explore in Quilish preceded and were co-terminous with the powers of the municipality to declare it a protected area. In July 2004, on the basis of this judgment and an environmental impact assessment, the central government gave MYSA the right to re-commence exploration on Quilish. Immediately, protests erupted and

quickly escalated to the point that the city of Cajamarca and the mine were effectively paralyzed until the central government once more shifted its stance. Confronted with a situation in which its “social license to operate” seemed increasingly in the balance, MYSA withdrew its request for permission to explore in Quilish (though MYSA argues that in the future it may once again exercise this right). In an effort to take advantage of the situation movement leaders called for the creation of a negotiating table to which they committed to bring forward proposals for avoiding future conflicts. After several months, this demand was finally conceded, yet the movement was ultimately unable to exploit the opportunity it afforded. Because of differences of opinion among civil society actors, as well as stalling practices by state and mine, actors could not agree on who would sit at this negotiating table. Again, the movement lost the initiative.

While ostensibly the protests over Cerro Quilish were over water, some commentators argued that underlying the intensity of feeling among many of the protestors was a deeper grievance—an annoyance at the arrogant behavior of the mine and its employees and over the increasingly conspicuous consumption associated with mine employment and indicative of growing inequalities within the Cajamarca middle and upper-middle classes (Gorriti, 2004). In this sense, the mobilizations brought together groups motivated by quite different concerns: worries over threats to rural water; concerns for the supply of urban water; desires to see the mine subject to national ownership; annoyance at the relative loss of middle and upper-middle class status and authority; and annoyance at the seeming impenetrability of the mine and its unwillingness to listen. These positions ranged from anti-mining, to pro-mining, to commitments to distinct ways of governing mining.

As the process of social mobilization has unfolded in Cajamarca, it has incorporated a growing number of actors. These actors, while united by a general sense that MYSA has dispossessed them of something, differ in the specific nature of their concerns. In this sense, while the movement channels grievance it has not channeled any coherent, alternative proposal for livelihoods and territorial development, not least because the actors who make up the movement have quite different positions on if, and how, mining should proceed in the region.

The existence of these internal differences has not meant that the movement has had no effect on the relationship between mining, livelihoods, and development in Cajamarca. Indeed, the mine has changed some of its practices as a result of these mobilizations and protests. Furthermore, it appears to have been more responsive since the movement “urbanized”—viewing such urbanized protest as ultimately more threatening than purely peasant protest. Thus, during 1999–2004 MYSA’s investments in environmental remediation almost trebled while those in social responsibility increased almost ninefold (Morel, 2005).²² These programs have been shown to increase the financial and human capital asset bases of household livelihoods, while weakening their social capital (Bury, 2004, 2007).²³ Protest has also forced some rethinking of expansion plans, as evidenced in the mine’s withdrawal from Quilish. It has not, though, broken the pattern of combined social responsibility programs and practices that intimidate peasants, activists and others who appear to stand in its way, nor has it stopped the overall expansion of the mine. This expansion, which demands access to both land and water, continues to transform livelihood options in the areas directly affected, primarily through its effects on the natural capital assets on which many livelihoods depend. Meanwhile, and perhaps more importantly, the money spent by MYSA in local contracting and purchasing increased almost sevenfold over the same period—a direct response to urban criticisms that the mine operated too much as an enclave (*cf.* Kuramoto, 2004a, 2004b). This response increases greatly the urban stake in the continued activities of the mine.

(b) *Cotacachi: articulated movement and truncated mining*

While in Cotacachi the initial granting of mining concessions was—as in Cajamarca—a process that happened off-stage and in the capital city, in this case external actors became aware of these concessions before any significant mining development had occurred. They then passed this information to local actors, and slowly a process of social mobilization unfolded that preceded mining activity. Although this has ultimately proven to be critical in influencing subsequent territorial and livelihood dynamics in Cotacachi, it occurred largely by accident. A Bay Area environmental NGO had become aware of Japanese mining interests

in Northern Ecuador, and mentioned this to one of their Ecuadorian counterparts, Acción Ecológica (until recently a part of Friends of the Earth International). Acción Ecológica began to pursue the case and soon made contact with communities in the Intag zone of Cotacachi. They then began environmental education activities oriented toward making communities aware of the costs of mineral-led development and, indeed, toward generating strong local opposition to mining.²⁴ At the same time, as in Cajamarca, a parish priest began speaking of the risks of mining in the area both from the pulpit and in his activities with a local youth group. In parallel, though completely unrelated, a small-scale ecotourism entrepreneur and environmentalist had begun working with a different youth group on environmental issues (though not mining). Soon, however, these three processes converged and local actors began to speak more explicitly about mining and the risks it would imply for environment and society in Intag. Though not using a language of dispossession or colonization (*cf.* Habermas, 1987; Harvey, 2003), these groups began developing the argument that an irruption of mining into the area would colonize ways of life that residents had largely taken for granted and steadily dispossess them of a landscape, environmental quality, and form of society that they had until then taken for granted. With time a hard line emerged, further solidified by residents' personal experiences during Acción Ecológica-sponsored visits to other mining sites in Ecuador and Peru, the effects of which were to create a strong anti-mining sentiment among participants.

This process led to the formation of the first explicit SMOs in Intag: DECOIN, an NGO that brought together the two youth groups, the priest and the ecotourism entrepreneur and environmentalist; and a community-based organization in the areas most directly affected by the mine concession. In 1997, this committee ultimately decided to attack and burn down the mine camp. This event not only led Bishi Metals to withdraw, it also pulled both the central and local state more deeply into the conflict. A ministerial visit led to a central government position that—unlike the Cajamarca case—did not automatically assume a pro-mine stance. Meanwhile, the local government played a role of intermediary in the conflict at the same time as it created spaces that ultimately allowed this incipient movement to become stronger.

As in the case of the arrival of Acción Ecológica to Intag, there was an element of serendipity surrounding the relationship between the process of social mobilization and the local state. In 1996, the national indigenous movement decided to present candidates for municipal elections. On the wave of the increasing strength of the movement, and the increasing visibility of indigenous issues in national political debate, several of these candidates won mayorships. One of these was Cotacachi,²⁵ and the elected mayor (still in power in 2008) initiated a model of municipal governance that emphasized participatory planning and the steady incorporation of a range of social actors into municipal affairs. A centerpiece of this model was the creation of the Assembly for Cantonal Unity (AUC in Spanish), a non-governmental counterpart of the municipality that was designed as a vehicle to monitor local government, foster organized links between the municipality and the canton's population, and host a range of social change initiatives in the canton. One of these activities revolved around environmental issues, and the AUC hosted a newly created Committee for Environment Management (CGA in Spanish). This space was partly created and then assertively taken by DECOIN and other groups in Intag. Through this space they succeeded in getting Cotacachi to pass a municipal ordinance declaring itself an "ecological canton" that, *inter alia*, rejected any place for mining in territorial development activities.²⁶

In 1996 the electoral position of the mayor of Cotacachi (Auki Tituaña) was neither environmental nor anti-mining. However, by creating vehicles for organized participation in municipal affairs he allowed the emerging environmental movement to move beyond Intag and project itself canton-wide. This in turn allowed it to develop links and promote its agenda with both urban and highland groups such that by 2005 71% of the canton said that mining was prejudicial to nature and people, and only 29% felt that mining should be allowed in the canton (Ospina, Larrea, Arboleda, & Santillana, 2006). Just as importantly, highland indigenous organizations in the canton and the province of Imbabura began to offer their political support should Intag ever need it to resist the entry of mining. Partly as a consequence of such changes—as well as any of his own personal convictions—the mayor began to assume a more clearly environmental position in subsequent electoral campaigns.

The departure of Bishi metals in 1997, and the absence of any mining-related actions until 2002, gave these movement organizations the chance to consolidate themselves, develop a series of national and international links, mobilize resources, and also elaborate proposals for forms of rural development that would not be based on mining. In this process, they were helped by the fact that Cotacachi was a nationally and internationally visible canton as a result of the local governance experiments underway there. These experiments attracted NGOs and volunteers to the canton, and so increased the availability of financial and technical resources. The links to Acción Ecológica also helped to make the case more visible nationally and internationally (as did books published by local residents: *Fluweger, 1998*), though the lead activists in DECOIN and later in the AUC also dedicated considerable effort to opening up these links. The willingness in later years of the mayor to publicly assume visible positions critical of mining, and to write directly to international groups on the same issue, also helped.

These linkages served a range of specific purposes which, taken as a whole, sought to prevent mining from taking root in Cotacachi. Some links were developed in order to pursue legal actions against mining, others to build solidarity relationships, and others to mobilize funds to support local development initiatives. Indeed, both SMOs and the municipality invested considerable resources in this period to develop new economic activities in Intag, in particular organic coffee production and marketing, handicrafts, and community managed ecotourism. The rationale for this work was the notion that “we are convinced that, if we are to block mining, we must offer practical productive alternatives . . . that generate employment.” Throughout the process—and in particular *via* the activities of the AUC—all this was combined with a sustained program of environmental education in schools and communities. This time spent consolidating organizations and generating a more or less shared view of territorial development that was grounded in rural livelihoods rather than mining was something that SMOs in Cajamarca did not enjoy. Thus, when in 2002 the mine concession was once again activated, and when in 2004 it was acquired by Ascendant Copper, both SMOs and the environmental movement more generally were consolidated and enjoyed a far wider set of local, national, and international linkages than they did in 1997.

Once Ascendant acquired the concession it sought to re-commence exploration activities. As part of its entry strategy it began a program of community relations that sought to develop the community links on which access to the exploration site depended. While this generated some local support (and thus also conflict with anti-mining organizations and activists), the companies’ own financial limitations meant that it was unable to operate a social investment program at anything like the level of MYSA. Nor was it able to do any significant local sourcing of services or inputs. Consequently, it has not yet had any significant effects on local or urban livelihoods, and there are very few people whose livelihood opportunities depend in any measure on the existence of the mine. This has made it easier for movement organizations to keep the social movement and its shared environmental agenda relatively coherent and intact—as reflected in the figures quoted above on the level of anti-mining sentiment in the canton.

This situation—along with the need for investment capital—has made it vital that Ascendant raise finance on the stock market (up to late 2005 its resources were limited to those of its Directors). This capital is necessary not only to develop mining operations, but also to create the incentives that would lead at least an important part of the local population to see their livelihoods as depending on the mine. To do this it began proceedings to get itself listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in order to sell shares. This elicited a response from SMOs in Cotacachi, the US, Europe, and Canada that sought to challenge the accuracy of Ascendant’s stock offering prospectus and thus prevent it from acquiring the approval necessary for it to be listed on the Toronto market. While this effort succeeded in slowing down this approval it ultimately failed and in November 2005 Ascendant’s first shares were sold (*Ascendant Copper Corporation, 2005*). Less than three weeks later, members of the settlements located near to the proposed mine once again attacked and burnt down the mine’s center of operations (*Canadian Press, 2005; DECOIN, 2005*).

To date, though conflict continues, there is still no significant exploration underway.²⁷ In this sense, movement processes have so far resisted any forms of dispossession that might otherwise have accompanied mining. Mining has, however, already transformed Intag. Activists and community leaders alike speak of the fact that they now have to live the rest

of their lives knowing that there are potentially exploitable mineral resources under their feet, and that such exploitation may one day become a reality. In this sense, the very idea of mining, and the possibility that at some future date In-tag may become a mining district, has colonized people's lifeworlds in a way that is, to all intents and purposes, permanent. Their certainties and ideas about the future will never be the same again.

4. CONCLUSIONS: CO-PRODUCTION, DISPOSSESSION, AND MOBILIZATION

Accumulation dynamics have led to the experience of dispossession in Cajamarca, and the threat of dispossession in Cotacachi. In each instance, lifeworlds have been irrevocably changed: in Cotacachi because, with or without a mine, residents will forever live with the knowledge that dramatic landscape and economic change may be just around the corner; and in Cajamarca, because the dispossessions and opportunities afforded by the mine, and the prospect of more mines in the relatively immediate future, have changed the meaning and experience of life in the region.

One of the consequences of these experienced and threatened dispossessions in the two regions has been the emergence of social movements contesting and seeking to rework the lifeworld and territorial transformations associated with extractive industries. These movements have had clear effects on the nature of rural territorial development and in each case have become an important actor in the co-production of territory and livelihood (*cf.* Bebbington, 2000). The emergence of these new actors reflects the very distinct projects and visions for development co-existing within these territories. As such they constitute efforts to defend territories and pursue alternative agendas and politics in a way that Escobar and others have suggested lies at the core of what social movements are (Escobar, 1995). The conflicts that have ensued remind us that while the co-production of territory and livelihood *might* be based on synergies and complementarities (Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996), it is just as likely to be grounded in conflict. The conflicts also make clear that any concept of co-production has also to be linked to one of power, for the post-1990 dynamics of co-production in Cotacachi and Cajamarca have been quite different, primarily because of the different power relationships between social

movements and mining companies. These distinct power relationships also reflect the quite different ways in which the local dynamics of accumulation have become part of national and international dynamics.

The distinct trajectories of territorial change in the two cases reflect differences in the relative power of the mining company, the relative fragility and power of the social movement, and the role of government. In both cases, the relative power of the mining companies is defined, obviously, by company size and the resources that it can use to manage and dissipate conflicts. However, it is also the case that the resources currently available to MYSA for social programs are a direct effect of the growth in its operations. Back in 1992 MYSA had few spare resources for social investment—in that sense, at that time its situation was not greatly different from that of Ascendant's today. This points to other important differences between the two cases: the ways in which events have been sequenced and the relative importance of mining in the two national economies. MYSA's current power owes much to the fact that it constituted the first important foreign direct investment after an extended period of crisis in Peru. This gave it singular popularity during its early years and allowed it to become an established local and national actor prior to any significant social mobilization. This—coupled with urban and metropolitan indifference to the implications of the mine for rural livelihoods—meant that MYSA was able to initiate a process of accumulation through dispossession that subsequently generated the resources it later required to finance social responsibility and other additional expenditure needed to protect its accumulation strategy. Furthermore, the importance of the mining sector within the Peruvian economy, as well as the specific importance of MYSA's gold as a source of tax income and foreign currency, has meant that the state has rarely spoken out against MYSA or in support of social movements. Indeed, the last two years in Peru have seen a clear hardening of its position against movements that question mining—a hardening in which state military and intelligence services have mobilized to resist and investigate such movements. On those few occasions when parts of the state have been critical of forms of mineral expansion, such criticisms have come from regional politicians seeking political advantage, or from parts of the Ombudsman's office (Bebbington, 2007a). Meanwhile, the financial support that MYSA provides to the local forces

of law and order enhance its leverage over the state.

In Cotacachi, each of these factors is distinct. Ecuador's economy depends far more on hydrocarbons than on minerals. Ascendant is a small junior company struggling to raise capital from sources other than its own Directors, and the process of social mobilization preceded the arrival of the company leaving a heritage of memories of successful resistance among the bases of the movement. While the central state has provided strong support neither to company nor to movement (its messages have varied over time and depending on the ministry in question), the municipal government has become progressively more supportive of the movement's agenda. As noted, this is partly an accident of history, in which a candidate of the national indigenous movement won the mayoralty in 1996, proved to be a skilled manager and for both personal and political reasons became increasingly concerned about the environment. More importantly, this mayor and his commitment to participatory forms of governance allowed SMOs to colonize parts of the local state and to place their agenda on the municipal agenda. At the same time, municipal initiatives and support have helped SMOs craft defensible economic alternatives to mining. If in Cajamarca the social movement lacks serious state-political patrons, in Cotacachi the mining company lacks these allies.

Perhaps most critical, however, is that in Cotacachi actors within the movement have been able to manage internal differences and so retain a coherent, shared agenda on territorial development and the place of mining within it. In the process they have been able to recruit progressively more support in areas not directly affected by the proposed mine (a process greatly assisted by their leverage within municipal government). In Cajamarca this has not occurred. The movement has been characterized by more struggles over leadership and by the presence of different currents with quite distinct views on development, politics and the place of mining in the regional economy. Also, the forms of non-agrarian (largely urban) opportunity promoted by the existence of MYSA has meant that a large part of the urban (and significant elements within the rural) population are in favor of mineral-led territorial development. The wealth of the mine has also meant that through its social programs and its subcontracting practices it has been able to cultivate support, creating a series of incentives that movement actors

find hard to contest. Indeed, they may often respond to these same incentives themselves as for instance when FEROCAFENOP accepted MYSA funding, or when staff of organizations critical of the mines end up accepting employment with the mine.²⁸

Transnational linkages have been of great importance for both movements. In addition to the financial resources that these have made available, they have also facilitated access to spaces of debate with company head offices (in the case of MYSA), with investors, with North American lawyers, and with broader solidarity networks. These contacts serve as sources of moral support and encouragement for local activists, and occasionally also as sources of additional human and financial resources, as well as vehicles for advocacy activities. While this endorses arguments about the importance of transnational linkages in contemporary environmental and human rights politics (Keck & Sikkink, 1998),²⁹ the comparison also suggests that such transnational relations have not been the central factor in determining outcomes in the two cases. They are equally present in the two cases, and indeed many of the networks are similar (those of Friends of the Earth International, Oxfam America and Bay Area environmental networks)—yet the outcomes in Cotacachi and Cajamarca are distinct. The implication is that national and local factors, the unique political economies in which each case has unfolded, and the dynamics internal to local movements, each continue to be at least as important in determining the extent to which social movements are able to refashion patterns of development, and thus in determining the forms and outcomes of co-production that come to dominate territorial restructuring and livelihood transformation. By the same token, while analytical attention to the roles played by international groups is important, this should not distract attention from the continuing importance of national environmental and human rights organizations and individuals. In both our case studies, these groups and persons have provided important technical, legal, and moral support to movement processes, have helped raise the visibility of these conflicts in national debates, and have provided information and training to more locally based social movement organizations. While themselves often linked to international organizations, these actors are far more than mere appendages within transnational networks. Their own histories, agendas,

relationships, capacities, and positions have important effects on the trajectories of local conflicts over mining and development.

The cases have various implications for RTD—understood as both a concept of and a proposal for rural development. Here we highlight three. First, while a focus on *territorially* based dynamics is very welcome (indeed three of us are geographers), it must come together with a sensitivity to relationships of *scale*. Territories cannot be understood independently of the scaled economic, political, and social relations in which they are embedded and which, indeed, have significant influence on the very social processes through which a particular territory is constituted. Second, while the focus on institutional transformation is also welcome, it is important to avoid using a language of institutions as a way of eliding attention to politics and relationships of power. These cases make clear just how contested rural development is, and how far power relationships influence the models of development that ultimately rise to ascendancy. Third, it is critical not to speak of development in the singular. The cases make evident the sense in which—within a territory—competing models and concepts of development coexist in relations sometimes of conflict, sometimes of synergy. Indeed, one of the lessons from such conflictive cases as these is that a viable RTD is likely to be one that is able to accommodate a range of quite distinct visions and one that builds the social relationships and institutions that are necessary for mediat-

ing the conflicts that will *inevitably* arise among these distinct visions.

We close by returning to our opening reflection on livelihoods, RTD, and social movements. The analysis here makes clear that the institutions, structures, and discourses that govern asset distribution, security, and productivity are not pre-given. They are struggled over, re-worked, and co-produced through the actions and interactions of a range of market, state, and civil society actors. While new forms of capital investment and market integration are particularly influential in these processes of co-production, our cases make clear that social movements also co-determine the forms taken by the institutions, structures, and discourses that structure RTD and livelihoods. These movements have forced debate on the desirability of mineral-led forms of rural development, and the institutional and livelihood changes that these would necessarily require; they have struggled to protect certain institutions while challenging others; and they have elicited changes in accumulation dynamics and processes of dispossession. Their emergence embodies the existence of subaltern and contentious views on rural development, and modifies the material nature and meanings associated with the forms of rural development that ultimately unfold. It therefore behooves analysts and activists alike to understand how the presence (and absence) of movements affects—and will affect—the new territorial dynamics currently unfolding in Latin America.

NOTES

1. These are the departments of Cajamarca, Cusco, and Huancavelica. Peru is divided administratively into departments (now referred to as regions), which are in turn subdivided into provinces, districts, and yet more local level administrations. Ecuador is divided administratively into provinces, which are in turn subdivided into *cantons* which in turn are composed of parishes.

2. RTD was referred to, for instance, in the World Bank's 2008 World Development Report on agriculture, occupies a central place in the Inter-American Development Bank's current rural development policy and strategy, and is prominent in discussions in IFAD.

3. Many phenomena might fall under this category of institutions, some more formal, others more social and relational. The former might include land tenure rules,

subsoil ownership rights, environmental regulation standards, rules governing access to, and provision of health care and education. The latter (which interact with the former) may include relationships of race, ethnicity, gender, region, and class that also have significant implications for access, control, security, use, and reproduction of resources.

4. For the specific case of the Peruvian Andes, Gavin Smith has explored in dense ethnographic and historical detail the many ways in which resistance and livelihood are linked (Smith, 1989). For a slightly more general discussion of this link see Bebbington (2004).

5. In Peru, Long and Roberts (1984) also dealt with such labor disputes in the central highlands.

6. BBC, 2006. "Chile copper miners' strike ends" <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5304404.stm>. Accessed on September 1st, 2006.
7. This point needs some qualification, however, because during 2007 in Peru, mine worker union conflicts became more frequent and in at least one instance national strike action was called for. However, it may also be that this spurt in militancy occurred as unions took advantage of—or became part of—the more general increase in national concern about the extraordinary profits being made by mining companies as a result of mineral price rises.
8. A further technical change in the high Andes is the "mineral duct," a mining version of oil and gas pipelines. These ducts run from the high altitude mine site down to the coast to ore-treatment plants and ports from which the ore is exported. This is the case, for instance, in the Antamina mine in Peru, which *Bridge's survey* (2004, p. 413) concludes was the world's single largest mine investment during 1990–2001. Here a duct runs 302 km to the coast (http://www.antamina.com/02_operacion/En_concen_03.html). A similar duct has also been discussed for the very contentious Majaz/Rio Blanco project in Piura (see *Bebbington, Connarty, Coxshall, & Williams*, 2007). These ducts run through farmed land and can trigger other conflicts along their course.
9. In those instances where mineral expansion threatens water sources for downstream populations.
10. These communities are generally not as strong as those in the Central and Southern Andes of Peru. Also their members are Spanish-speaking and tend to identify themselves as "campesino" rather than "indigenous" (*Chacón Pagán*, 2004, p. 363).
11. This is for its acronym in Spanish, *Minera Yanacocha Sociedad Anónima*.
12. *El Comercio*, 29th August, 2006 page B1.
13. Its main office is, however, located in Lakewood, Colorado.
14. Albeit much more so in the case of Cajamarca than that of Cotacachi.
15. Again, for reasons of transparency it must be noted that some of this interaction derived from this study. However, there had already been exchanges between the two cases.
16. In addition, it owns 1386 km² of mineral rights, and has explicit plans to continue expanding. Data are from Bury (2005), Yanacocha (2005), and www.yanacocha.com.pe.
17. Especially the now-defunct *Project Underground* (2003, 1999).
18. Though at one point, there appears to have been a plan to attack the mine site—*Project Underground* dissuaded the federation from pursuing this option.
19. We remain unable to explain how this occurred. It is a case so full of mutual recriminations that it is difficult to know what actually happened. What is clear is (i) that the mine had already invested (through its hiring practices) in finding ways into social movement organizations and (ii) that at least some of the leaders of the federation were always more of a mind to ensure adequate community compensation for the mine rather than the closure of the mine. These two postures certainly helped make this financial flow possible.
20. Even more forgiving studies, in part supported by MYSA, viewed the mine as something of an enclave (*Kuramoto*, 2004a, 2004b; see also *Dirven*, 2006).
21. *Chacón Pagán* (2004, p. 3) puts it far more forcefully and cynically. Speaking of protests in *Bambamarca*, a community near *Cajamarca*, and the *Choropampa* protest itself, he states (our translation): "in general, the terms of debate are defined by the latter, specifically provincial political authorities and intellectuals, while the former, above all the *rondas campesinas*, sound the initial bell, and then serve as the sacrificial lamb."
22. However, MYSA profits also grew significantly over the same period.
23. Bury draws particular attention to the weakening of community-based organizations and of household social networks and relationships of trust.
24. *Acción Ecológica* is opposed to mineral development in Ecuador.
25. Another was *Guamote*, discussed in *Bebbington*, 2000.
26. See *Municipalidad de Santa Ana de Cotacachi*, 2000.
27. In September 2007, the Ministry of Energy and Mines required Ascendant to suspend all its activities on the grounds that it did not have the support of the Municipality of Cotacachi. This does not suspend the

concession, and the Minister left open the possibility that the company could return if it could reach a negotiated agreement to do so with the communities and local government. However, this decision can be seen as a further “win” for the social movement in Cotacachi.

28. For instance, a member of Grufides in Cajamarca went to work for MYSAs’s social development program in 2005.

29. As well as the efforts of transnational activists.

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