SYLLABUS

Schedule Of Readings And Reader Response Questions:

9/28: Course Introduction.

Week 1 (10/1, 10/3, 10/5): The Problem Of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism. Readings: MCI Introduction, Ch. 1, Armstrong, “Universals as Attributes” (MCR). Discussion Questions: 1.) Carefully explain how the paradox about the property “non-selfexemplification” is supposed to arise for the realist about universals (see MCI, pp. 30-1).  How should the realist about universals respond to this paradox? 2.) Carefully explain how the Parmenidean and Bradlean regresses are supposed to work and how they differ from each other (see MCI, pp. 31-36), and evaluate Loux’s responses to these regresses as objections to realism about universals.

Week 2 (10/8, 10/10, 10/12): The Problem Of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism/ The Problem Of Universals II: Nominalism. Readings: Russell, “The World of Universals” (MCR), MCI Ch. 2, Price, “Universals and Resemblances” (MCR), Quine, “On What There Is” (MCR). Reader Response Questions: 1.) Loux claims a “ceteris paribus” clause is required to translate the sentence “Courage is a moral virtue” into a semantically equivalent sentence making reference to only concrete particulars.  Why does he claim this and what problems arise because of this requirement?  Do you agree with Loux that the austere nominalist has no choice but to deny that ceteris paribus clauses are fully analyzable? 2.) Explain why Quine recommends that the debate between realism and nominalism be held at a metalinguistic level.  Should a realist about universals accept this recommendation?

Week 3 (10/15, 10/17, 10/19): The Problem Of Universals II: Nominalism/ Concrete Particulars I: Substrata, Bundles And Substances. Readings: Williams “The Elements of Being” (MCR), MCI Ch. 3, pp. 82-104, Max Black, “The Identity of Indiscernibles” (MCR), Albert Casullo, “A Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory” (MCR), James Van Cleve, “Three Versions of the Bundle Theory” (MCR).  Reader Response Questions: 1.) Evaluate Loux’s claim on p. 77 of MCI that since trope theory takes abstract terms such as “courage” to refer to sets of resembling tropes, and since sets have their members necessarily, then it is impossible that there be, for instance, “just one fewer courageous individual than there is.” 2.) According to Loux, the bundle theorist who is a realist about universals is committed by implication to some form of the identity of indiscernibles, and since there are counter-examples to this principle (e.g., Black’s two-sphere universe or Loux’s red balls Sam and Peter) any theory that implies it must be false.  But are these genuine counter-examples to the identity of indiscernibles?  Explain.

Week 4 (10/22, 10/24, 10/26): Concrete Particulars I: Substrata, Bundles And Substances /Propositions And Their Neighbors. Readings: MCI Ch. 3, pp. 104-117, MCI Ch. 4, 118-138, Frege, “On Sinn and Bedeutung” (Reader).  Reader Response Questions: 1.) On p. 109 of MCI, Loux claims Aristotelians think the multiple instantiation of a kind is “sufficient to secure the existence of numerically different particulars.”  Suppose Loux’s red balls Sam and Peter are instantiations of a single kind.  Would this fact alone ensure that Sam ≠ Peter, or are additional assumptions required?  Explain.  2.) According to Loux, both Sellars’ and Prior’s nominalist accounts of propositions fail to deal with sentences like “There are truths for which there is no linguistic expression” (see MCI p. 134).  Is this a serious problem?  Why or why not?

Week 5 (10/29, 10/31, 11/2): Propositions And Their Neighbors/The Necessary & The Possible. Readings: MCI Ch. 4, 139-148, Davidson, “The Individuation of Events” (Reader), Kim, “Events as Property Exemplifications” (Reader), MCI Ch. 5, Lewis, “Possible Worlds” (MCR).  Reader Response Questions: 1.) Compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of Kim’s and Davidson’s theories of events for the purpose of logically analyzing event statements like “Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.” and accounting for the role that events play in causal claims like “The collapse was caused, not by the bolt’s giving way, but the bolt’s giving way so suddenly.”  2.) What, according to possible worlds nominalists, are properties and propositions?  (MCI, pp. 157-162)  What problems does this nominalist account of properties and propositions face (MCI, pp. 168-9)?  Are these problems insuperable?  Why or why not?

Week 6 (11/5, 11/7, 11/9): The Necessary & The Possible. Readings: Lewis, “Counterparts or Double Lives?” (MCR), Plantinga, “Actualism and Possible Worlds” (MCR), Kripke, “Identity and Necessity” (MCR).  Reader Response Questions: 1.) State Lewis’ objections to transworld individuals and the concerns that motivate it, as well as the replies of Plantinga and Kripke.  Do you think these replies are adequate?  Why or why not?  Can you think of other more attractive ways to deal with these problems? 2.) In “Actualism and Possible Worlds,” Plantinga claims that the actual world is an abstract object (MCR p. 172).  Why does he do this?  What are the philosophical consequences of this position?

Week 7 (11/14, 11/16): Causation. Readings: MCI Ch. 6, Mackie, “Causes and Conditions” (MCR), Lewis, “Causation” (MCR).  Reader Response Questions: 1.) Do either Mackie or Lewis succeed in giving a non-modal account of causation?  Pick what you take to be the most successful account and explain why you think it succeeds or fails. 2.) What are Lewis’ responses to the problems of epiphenomena and causal preemption?  Are these responses adequate?

Week 8 (11/19, 11/21): The Nature Of Time. Readings: MCI Ch. 7, McTaggart, “Time” (MCR), McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time” (excerpt) (Reader), Dummett, ‘A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time’ (Reader), Smart, “The River of Time” (Reader), Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’ (Reader). Reader Response Questions: 1.) Do you think McTaggart’s argument proved time to be unreal?  Why or why not? 2.) Does time flow or not?  Do you think the A theorists are correct or the B theorists?  Why or why not?

Week 9 (11/26, 11/28, 11/30): The Nature Of Time/Concrete Particulars II: Persistence Through Time. Readings: Markosian, “How Fast Does Time Pass?” (Reader), Prior, “Changes in Events and Changes in Things” (Reader), Haslanger, “Persistence Through Time” (Reader). Reader Response Questions: 1.) Do you think it is plausible, as Prior claims, that changes in events are really changes in things?  What about the case of Queen Anne’s death becoming ever more past?  Does Prior account for this plausibly? 2.) Haslanger claims that endurantism could be compatible with eternalism and that perdurantism and exdurantism could be compatible with presentism, but how plausible or coherent is eternalist endurantism, presentist perdurantism or presentist exdurantism?

Week 10 (12/3, 12/5, 12/7): Concrete Particulars II: Persistence Through Time. Readings: Merricks, “Endurance and Indiscernibility” (MCR), Quine, “Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis” (Reader), Bernard Williams, “The Self and the Future”, Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity”. Discussion Questions: 1.) According to Quine, under what condition are two successive stages of the same river identical to two successive stages of the same water? 2.) Williams presents a puzzle about personal identity.  Briefly summarize the puzzle and state whether Parfit gives an answer to it.  Is this answer persuasive? Why or why not?