

***Parasitic Scope* (Barker 2007)**
Semantics Seminar
11/10/08

1. Overview

- Attempts to provide a compositional, fully semantic account of *same*.
- Elements other than NPs – in particular, adjectives – can be scope-taking items.
- Presents evidence that *same* can scope over non-NP triggers, and formalizes such interactions.
- Provides support for the use of continuations in modeling scope-taking.

2. The data

- *Same* has two basic readings:
 - Deictic *same*
 - (1) Bill read *the same book*.
= Bill read {the book under discussion, the book in the speaker's hand, etc.}

→ Only the context-dependent reading is available.
 - Sentence-internal *same*
 - (2) Anna and Bill read *the same book*.
= there exists some book x , such that both Anna and Bill read x separately

→ Only possible when the licensing NP *Anna and Bill* is interpreted distributively
→ Context-dependent (deictic) reading still available.
- Availability of sentence-internal reading depends on material outside of the DP containing *same*:
 - (3) a. The *same* waiter served John.
b. The *same* waiter served everyone.

→ Sentence (a) lacks the sentence-internal reading available in (b)
- On the sentence-internal reading, *same* can distribute over:
 - NP denotations (see (2) above)

- Events (or perhaps situations...)

- (4) a. John hit and killed the *same* man.
 ≠ John hit a man, thereby killing him
 = John hit a man, and also killed him (at some other time)
- b. John read the *same* book yesterday and today.
 ≠ John read book *x* for 48 hours straight.
 = John book *x* yesterday, and also read book *x* today.

- *same* requires type-identity, not token-identity:

(5) I drive a Ford Falcon and Enzo drives the *same* car.

→ Perhaps better characterized as a matter of degree (Lasnik 2000)

3. Previous approaches

- Non-compositional accounts of *same* as a (discontinuous) quantifier.

(6) [Anna and Bill] read [the *same* two books]



- *Anna and Bill...the same two books* treated as a discontinuous predicate, taking relations like **read** as an argument.
- Keenan (1992): formal proof that no compositional analysis of *same* as generalized quantifier(s) is possible.
- But *same* is an adjective! It's neither a determiner nor an NP; and it can take an intensifier (e.g. *the very same*).
 - No reason to expect an account in terms of generalized quantifiers.
 - If items other than NPs can take scope, then scopal properties of *same* can be explained without resorting to a generalized quantifier analysis.
- Non-compositional approaches disregard syntactic constituency → not 'directly compositional'
- Compositional accounts with pragmatically-controlled free variables.
 - Can the internal reading of *same* be reduced to the deictic reading?

- Deictic reading is always available.
- On a parallel with pronouns: variables that can be either pragmatically controlled (deixis), or bound sentence-internally.

$$(7) [same] = \lambda N. \lambda x \exists f : \{x\} = f(N) \wedge \forall c < C : Rxc \quad [\text{Dowty}]$$

- N is a (nominal) predicate
 - $f(N)$ is a choice function, returning a singleton set $\{x\}$ whose only member is in the denotation of N .
 - Contextual variables: comparison class C (of individuals), relation R (over individuals)
- But the contextually-determined comparison class C overgenerates possible readings of sentences containing *same*:

(8) The men discussed a house. John read the *same* book.
 \neq John read the same book that the men read.

- C / R also fail to generate available readings

(9) The men or the women read the same book.

C : {the men}, {the women}, {{the men} \cup {the women}}

\rightarrow No choice of C will provide the correct (disjunctive) truth conditions for (9).

(10) Ann read and Bill reviewed the same book

$\rightarrow R$: **read, review, read-and-review**

\rightarrow No choice of R will provide the correct truth conditions for (10).

- Suspicious regularities:
- If either C or R gets its value from an element in the clause containing *same*, so does the other variable...
 - ...and on the internal reading, R is the *full* portion of the clause that remains after removing the element from which C is taken.

(11) Anna and Bill must have read the same book.

$R = \text{must-have-read}$

$R \neq \text{read}$

- Carlson (1987): sentence-internal reading requires distributing over multiple events
 - But NP-internal *same* allows for sentence-internal reading with only one event.

(12) [Two men with the *same* name] are sitting in this room.

- Suggests changing the precondition to distributing over *multiple situations*.

4. Denotation for *same*

- *same* is essentially quantificational.
 - Shows a “truth-conditional sensitivity to mere existence” that is characteristic of existential quantification (419):

(13) Two men with the *same* name are sitting in this room.
(can be true without a specific name in mind)

- Can be captured with a choice function:

(14) $\exists f_{\text{choice}}. \text{two men with the } f \text{ name are sitting in this room.}$

- f_{choice} takes a predicate P as an argument and returns a singleton set whose only member is in the denotation of P
 - E.g. $f_{\text{choice}}(\text{name}) \rightarrow \{\text{Fauntleroy}\}$
 - Similar choice function present in Dowty (1985) denotation for *same* in (7).

- Denotation for *same*:

(15) $[\text{same}] = \lambda F_{\langle \text{Adj}, \text{N} \rangle} \lambda X_e. \exists f_{\text{choice}} \forall x < X : Ffx$

- f_{choice} : takes the denotation of a property $P_{\langle e, t \rangle}$ (i.e. a set of individuals of type e), and returns a different a property $H_{\langle e, t \rangle}$, which holds of exactly one member of $\llbracket P_{\langle e, t \rangle} \rrbracket$.
 - f_{choice} returns a property of type $\langle e, t \rangle$, rather than an individual of type $\langle e \rangle$, because *same* N co-occurs with a determiner, and determiners take arguments of type $\langle e, t \rangle$.

- X : a variable ranging over plural individuals, i.e. ‘non-atomic entities’
 - Builds distributivity properties of *same* into its denotation ($\dots \forall x < X_e \dots$)
 - x is a proper subpart of non-atomic individual X
 - After function application $\llbracket same \rrbracket (F_{\langle Adj, N \rangle})$, we’re left with a λ -expression denoting a property of type $\langle e, t \rangle$, holding of non-atomic individuals, than can serve as an argument for a generalized quantifier.
 - E.g. $\llbracket two\ men\ with\ the\ same\ name \rrbracket =$
 $two(\lambda X. \exists f \forall x < X : [\mathbf{with}(\mathbf{the}(f(\mathbf{name})))(\mathbf{men})](x))$
- No reference to events, as suggested by NP-internal uses of *same* like (see (12) above)

5. *same* and nominal scope

- Where does *same* take scope?
 - If we allow *same* to take scope outside its containing DP – e.g., at the clause level – we derive inappropriate truth conditions:
- (16) John met **fewer** than three men with the **same** name.
- scope: *same* >> *fewer*
 - $\exists f$. John met fewer than three men with the f name.
 - Truth conditions are too weak: (15) predicted to be true if there is any name (e.g. Fauntleroy) such that John has met fewer than three people with that name.


- Expected if NP is a scope island, as in Barker (2002) and elsewhere.
- So *same* takes scope at the level of the nominal: [three men with the same name]



- Barker assumes a categorial grammar (discussed in more detail in §7 below):
 - Categories $A \setminus B$ and B / A are constructed from atomic categories $\{NP_e, N_{et}, S_t\}$
 - Slashes lean towards the expected argument.
 - Categories $A \setminus B$ and B / A are of type $\langle A', B' \rangle$


- LIFT
 - Basic type-shifting operation.
 - Expressions of category A are also expressions of category B/(A\B)
 - $NP \rightarrow S/(NP \backslash S)$
 - $\langle e \rangle \rightarrow \langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$
 - Individual-denoting NP \rightarrow generalized quantifier
 - Non-scope-taking \rightarrow scope-taking
- Not all LIFTed NPs have a (lexical) semantics that interacts with scope-taking properties of generalized quantifiers.
 - Some raising of LIFTed NPs will be semantically vacuous.
- Adjectives are of category N/N (i.e. $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$)
 - LIFT (Adj): $N/N \rightarrow N/((N/N) \backslash N)$
 - LIFT (noun): $N \rightarrow (N/N) \backslash N$

(17)



- Quantifier Raising (QR)
 - In direct object position, generalized quantifiers give rise to a type clash:


(18)



- Following Heim and Kratzer (1998), type clash is resolved by QR.
 - Adjoins the generalized quantifier in direct object position to its scope target (here, S)
 - Leaves a variable (trace) *in situ*

- The same variable is adjoined to the scope target
 - Prevents type clash from being repeated at the adjunction site.
 - Serves as a λ -abstract
 - Intermediate node created by this adjunction is category $NP \backslash S$, the appropriate category for an argument of the raised generalized quantifier.


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
- More generally, if the raised scope-taking element is of category $R/(P \backslash T)$ ($= q(P, T, R)$), then the intermediate node will be of category $P \backslash T$
 - $\langle P', T' \rangle$ is the correct type to serve as the argument of the raised scope-taking element, which has the type $\langle \langle P', T' \rangle, R' \rangle$.
- Just as with NPs, raising a LIFTed scope-taking element – like an adjective – only makes a semantic contribution if the denotation of the scope-taking element is quantificational.

- Raising *same*:

(20)



(21) Rough sketch of composition for *two men with the same name*:




- Note that *same* adjoins above the nominal *men* (at a node of category N) rather than above the determiner *two* (at a node of category NP)
 - *two* is the wrong category (NP) to serve as the scope-target of LIFTed *same* ($N/((N/N)\backslash N)$)
 - In principle, nothing prevents *same* from being lifted to $NP/((N/N)\backslash NP)$...
 - ...but the lexical semantics of *same* require an argument of type $\langle\langle et, et \rangle, et \rangle$ (i.e. $F_{\langle Adj, N \rangle}$), and adjunction at the NP node would give an argument of type $\langle\langle et, et \rangle, e \rangle$ (i.e. $(N/N)\backslash NP$)
- If *same* takes scope at some dominating N, why not at the N node that immediately dominates it (trivial scope)?
 - Consider **two same men*
 - “...the property denoted by *same men* would be true of a non-atomic entity *X* just in case there is some choice function *f* and every proper subpart of *X* is *f(men)*.” (427)
 - Let *same* take scope at *men*, and assume that $X = \llbracket Bill\ and\ Cam \rrbracket = \mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{c}$
 - $f(\mathbf{men}) = \{\mathbf{b}\}$ and $f(\mathbf{men}) = \{\mathbf{c}\}$, since *f* only returns singleton sets, and every $x < X$ must be in *f(men)*
 - But **b** and **c** are supposed to be distinct; here they are identical.


6. Parasitic scope

- LIFTed *same* takes scope by adjoining to some higher N node.
- QR of a generalized quantifier NP inserts a node of category N at the adjunction site.
- This N node, which *did not exist* until the generalized quantifier NP was raised, can now serve as the scope target for raising of *same* – hence the term ‘parasitic scope’

(22) *The same waiter served everyone.*



(23) Rough sketch of composition for *The same waiter served everyone*:



- Plural NPs are often the key ingredient that allows for a sentence-internal reading of *same* (compare (1) and (2) above)
- Assume that plural NPs are always LIFTed to scope-taking category $S/(NP \backslash S)$
 - LIFTing plural NPs is already needed to allow coordination with a generalized quantifier:

(24) *Every woman and the men* left.
 - Allows plural NPs to undergo QR, creating an intermediate adjunction site for (parasitic) raising of *same*.
- Same reasoning holds for singular NPs – but the result of QR on a singular NP would be incoherent!
 - Denotation of *same* makes reference to the proper subparts of its NP argument ($\dots \forall x < X \dots$), but singular NPs do not have the appropriate proper subparts.
- Is it a problem that *same*, which quantifies over non-atomic entities, interacts with *everyone*, which quantifies over atomic entities?
 - *Everyone* can occur with collective predicates generally

(25) #John gathered in the living room.
(26) Everyone gathered in the living room.
 - Barker assumes we can extend any analysis of (25) and (26) to cover *same* as well.


7. A cursory outline of Type Logical Grammar and continuations

- Type Logical grammar is a formal deductive system.
 - Expressions like NP, N, etc. can be thought of as *premises* or *assumptions*, which are used to draw conclusions.
 - Non-terminal nodes can be thought of as conclusions, derived from the nodes (i.e. premises) they dominate.
- Since the well-formedness of a natural language expression is often sensitive to linear order (*John left* vs. *left John*), so is TLG
 - $A \backslash B \Leftrightarrow A \rightarrow B$, and A must be to the left of $A \backslash B$
 - $B / A \Leftrightarrow A \rightarrow B$, and A must be to the right of B / A

- Notation:
 - • : the *product connective*
 - Neutral as to the linear order of its arguments.
 - Can be thought of as a placeholder for ‘/’ or ‘\’
 - Γ, Σ : arbitrary sets of formulas
 - $\Sigma[p]$: a formula containing a distinguished occurrence of the term p .
 - $\backslash L, \backslash\backslash L, /L, //L$ (‘left rules’): function application
 - $\backslash R, \backslash\backslash R, /R, //R$ (‘right rules’): λ -binding of a variable
- Underlining indicates which portions of the preceding line (i.e. which premises) are being used to derive (i.e. conclude) the following line.

- Underlining is akin to representing dominance:

$$\frac{\frac{NP \vdash NP \quad S \vdash S}{NP \bullet NP \backslash S \vdash S} \backslash L}{John \bullet left \vdash s} LEX$$



- Not an exact correspondence in Barker (2007); but see Barker (2003) for a simplified exposition of type logical grammar.
- In TLG, LIFT is a theorem, and need not be stipulated:

(27) LIFT

$$\frac{\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \quad B \vdash B}{\Gamma \bullet A \backslash B \vdash B} \backslash L}{\Gamma \vdash B / (A \backslash B)} / R$$

- Curry-Howard correspondence:
 - There is a direct mapping between syntactic and semantic composition.
 - $\{A \backslash B, B / A\} \rightarrow \langle A, B \rangle$

Logic	λ -calculus	TLG
formulas	types	syntactic categories
proofs	terms	syntactic derivation (= semantic composition)

(Barker 2003:7)

- So demonstrating that a sentence is syntactically well-formed (i.e. carrying out a derivation) is equivalent to determining the (non-lexical) meaning of the sentence.

(28)

$$\begin{array}{c}
\vdots \\
\frac{NP \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet book))) \vdash S}{NP \circ \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet book)))) \vdash S} \lambda \\
\frac{NP \circ \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet book)))) \vdash S}{\lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S} \Downarrow R \\
\frac{\lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S}{N/N \circ \lambda y \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S} \lambda \\
\frac{N/N \circ \lambda y \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S}{\lambda y \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet book)))) \vdash (N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)} \Downarrow R \\
\frac{\lambda y \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet book)))) \vdash (N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)}{(NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \circ \lambda y \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S} \Downarrow L \\
\frac{(NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \circ \lambda y \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S}{\lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet ((NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S} \lambda \\
\frac{\lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet ((NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \bullet book)))) \vdash NP \Downarrow S}{S \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S) \circ \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet ((NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \bullet book)))) \vdash S} \Downarrow L \\
\frac{S \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S) \circ \lambda x(x \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet ((NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \bullet book)))) \vdash S}{S \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S) \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet ((NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \bullet book))) \vdash S} \lambda \\
\frac{S \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S) \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet ((NP \Downarrow S) \Downarrow ((N/N) \Downarrow (NP \Downarrow S)) \bullet book))) \vdash S}{everyone \bullet (read \bullet (the \bullet (same \bullet book))) \vdash S} LEX
\end{array}$$

- Line 4 shows application of QR to N/N (ultimately *same*)
- Lines 5-6 show application of LIFT to *same*

- Continuations

- “continuations are nothing more than a perspective” (Barker 2002:5)
- Intuitively, the continuation for some expression P in a sentence S is the part of S that ‘remains’ when P is ‘removed’
 - “a continuation represents the entire (default) future for the computation” (qtd. in Barker 2002:4)
- *John saw Mary*
 - Default future of *John*: have the property of seeing Mary predicated of it.
 - So the continuation of **j** is $\lambda x. \text{ saw } (\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{x}) \dots$
 - ...and the continuation of *saw Mary* is $\lambda P. P(\mathbf{j})$

- A continuation of a term P (of type α) is thus a function from the type of P to $\langle t \rangle$, the type of sentences.
 - In general, a continuation on P_α – written as \underline{P} – is of type $\langle \alpha, t \rangle$
 - NPs of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ will have continuations of the type $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$ - the type of a generalized quantifier!
- Denotations can also be ‘continuized’: $\llbracket P_\alpha \rrbracket \Rightarrow \{ \{ P_\alpha \} \}$
 - $\llbracket P_\alpha \rrbracket$ is a function of type $\langle \alpha, t \rangle$
 - $\{ \{ P_\alpha \} \}$ is a function of type $\langle \langle \alpha, t \rangle, t \rangle$
 - E.g. a continuized VP is a function from VP continuations to truth values.
- There are multiple ways to ‘continuize’ a given expression:

(29) $S \rightarrow NP VP$

a. $\lambda \underline{p}. \{ \{ VP \} \} (\lambda P. \{ \{ NP \} \} (\lambda x. \underline{p}(Px)))$

b. $\lambda \underline{p}. \{ \{ NP \} \} (\lambda x. \{ \{ VP \} \} (\lambda P. \underline{p}(Px)))$

- This is equivalent to reversing the functor-argument relation between NP and VP, exactly what we do with type-shifting.
 - Corresponds to different orders of computation/evaluation/execution.
- Order of evaluation gives us scope relations, so writing truth conditions in terms of continuations automatically gives us:
 - Scope ambiguity, from distinct continuizations of the same expression.
 - $VP \gg NP$, if we interpret NP as providing the continuation for VP, i.e. VP is functor for argument NP (29a)
 - $NP \gg VP$, if we interpret VP as providing the continuation for NP, i.e. NP is functor for argument VP (29b)
 - Scope displacement.
- Since any syntactic category can be continuized, any syntactic category can participate in differing scope relations.
 - As before, the semantic consequences depend on the lexical semantics of the scope items.

- The generality of continuization, and LIFT, allows us to explain how *same* functions with non-NP triggers:
 - Requires generalizing lexical entry for *same*, using α , a metavariable over categories.

(30)

Old: $(NP \backslash S) // ((N/N) \backslash (NP \backslash S))$
 New: $(\alpha \backslash S) // ((N/N) \backslash (\alpha \backslash S))$

- Semantically, allow X in denotation to range over any type, not just $\langle e \rangle$.

(31) *John hit and killed the same man.*

- Set $\alpha = (NP \backslash S)/NP$, the type of a transitive verb.

(32)

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \vdots \\
 \frac{john \bullet (v \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet man))) \vdash s}{v \circ \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet man)))) \vdash s} \lambda \\
 \frac{\lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (N/N \bullet man)))) \vdash v \backslash s}{\lambda y \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet man)))) \vdash v \backslash s} \backslash R \\
 \frac{\lambda y \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet man)))) \vdash v \backslash s}{\lambda y \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet man)))) \vdash (N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)} \lambda \\
 \frac{\lambda y \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet man)))) \vdash (N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)}{(v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \circ \lambda y \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet man)))) \vdash v \backslash s} \backslash R \\
 \frac{(v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \circ \lambda y \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet (y \bullet man)))) \vdash v \backslash s}{\lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet ((v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \bullet man)))) \vdash v \backslash s} \backslash L \\
 \frac{\lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet ((v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \bullet man)))) \vdash v \backslash s}{s // (v \backslash s) \circ \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet ((v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \bullet man)))) \vdash s} \lambda \\
 \frac{s // (v \backslash s) \circ \lambda x(john \bullet (x \bullet (the \bullet ((v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \bullet man)))) \vdash s}{john \bullet (s // (v \backslash s) \bullet (the \bullet ((v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \bullet man))) \vdash s} \lambda \\
 \frac{john \bullet (s // (v \backslash s) \bullet (the \bullet ((v \backslash s) // ((N/N) \backslash (v \backslash s)) \bullet man))) \vdash s}{John \bullet (hit-and-killed \bullet (the \bullet (same \bullet man))) \vdash s} LEX
 \end{array}$$

- Line 4 shows application of QR to N/N (ultimately *same*)
- Lines 5-6 show application of LIFT.

8. Some remaining puzzles

- Definiteness: *same* must appear with the definite determiner *the*
 - But *same* doesn't have the existence presupposition characteristic of definite descriptions:
 - (33) John and Bill didn't read the long book.
 - (34) John and Bill didn't read the same book.
 - (35) Did John and Bill read the long book?
 - (36) Did John and Bill read the same book?

- Use of *the* might result from presence of f_{choice} in the denotation of *same*, which denotes a property $H_{\langle e, t \rangle}$ that in turn denotes a singleton set.
- Still unclear why existence presupposition of *the* is suspended in *the same NP* constructions.
- *Each* can co-occur with *same*, and allows a sentence-internal reading.
 - (37) *Each* student follows the *same* core curriculum.
 - (38) ...you can furnish *each* student with the *same* tessellating shape.
 - But *each* seems to require a predicate that holds of atomic entities only
 - (39) #Each person gathered in the living room.
 - Remember that *same* denotes a predicate that holds of non-atomic entities.
 - A possible solution: revise the denotation of *same* to make use of *covers*
 - Cover function $\text{Cov}(X)$ turns subgroups of atomic individuals into various non-atomic individuals.
 - Other scope-taking adjective, like *different*, seem to require covers:
 - (40) The men and the women gathered in different rooms.
 - So *each* forces an atomic cover – but why?
 - Moreover, *each* is the canonical overt distributivity operator – if we need to make use of covers here, why not everywhere else as well?
- Buying, selling, and *same*.
 - (41) John bought and Mary sold the same book.
 - (41) can only be read as describing two different events – so *same* treats buying and selling as distinct situations/events.

References

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