

Your name: _____

Your section (circle):

Mon. Tues. Wed. Fri.

Metaphysics Exercise 3

Phil. 93, Winter 2007. Due Thurs., Jan. 18

1. Why is Bucephalus mortal, according to our authors?
 - a. Because he is composed of form and matter: the matter has the potential to take on a different form.
 - b. Because he can be corrupted.
 - c. No sublunar bodies are eternal; they all eventually pass away.
 - d. His essence is a finite quantity.
 - e. All of the above.
 - f. (a), (b) and (c).

2. As far as you can tell from our reading, which of the following statements would Aristotle and Plotinus *disagree* about?¹
 - a. A fire can be called a “substance” for (roughly) the same reason that a picture of a horse can be called a “horse.”
 - b. No accident is in a substance as a part.
 - c. A sensible substance has both essential characteristics (characteristics such that, if you remove them, the substance ceases to exist) and accidental ones (ones that are not essential).
 - d. Sensible substances are material.
 - e. All of the above.
 - f. (a) and (b).

3. As far as you can tell from our reading, which of the following statements would Plotinus and Porphyry *disagree* about (in the above sense of “disagree”)?
 - a. The problem of the categorical status of the differentiae in Aristotle is solved by Aristotle himself, correctly interpreted.
 - b. There can never be a fire that isn’t hot.
 - c. Fire is composed of (among other things) matter and heat.
 - d. The differentiae of sensible substances are qualities (or perhaps quantities).
 - e. (a) and (c).
 - f. (b), (c) and (d).

¹By “disagree” here I mean that one of them would assert the statement in question and the other would deny it. If they would both assert the statement (or would both deny it), but would mean different things by the words in it, then that counts as *agreeing* for these purposes.

4. Which of the following best summarizes John Philoponus' (partly implicit) argument in our reading?
- a. Aristotle is wrong to say that body (a kind of quantity) can be prior to substance, because, as Porphyry points out, accidents are never prior to substance.
 - b. Porphyry is right to defend his theory of "substantial quality" against Plotinus by pointing out that it is also Aristotle's theory. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find that Philoponus' new theory of "substantial quantity" can also be defended.
 - c. Aristotle's theory of substance and accident is mistaken; it must be fixed by adding Porphyry's theory of "substantial quality." Therefore we should not be surprised if we also need to add "substantial quantity."
 - d. As Porphyry rightly points out, the qualities that are differentiae of substances must be "substantial qualities" (rather than accidents). Therefore we should not be surprised to find that there is also "substantial quantity."
 - c. As Plotinus rightly says, sensible substances are composed of quantities, qualities, and matter. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find that some quantities are "substantial."
 - e. Aristotle says that *body* is a substance and also that it is a kind of quantity. He says this because he had not discovered Philoponus' theory of "substantial quantity." A body is really neither a substance nor a quantity, but a "substantial quantity."