Metaphysics Exercise 14

Phil. 93, Winter 2006  Due Tues., Mar. 7

1. Which of the following is correct, according to Spinoza?
   a. When a body which has a mind is active to some extent, to that same extent its mind has adequate ideas.
   b. When a body which has a mind is active to some extent, that is because its mind, to that extent, has adequate ideas.
   c. Bodies are never active. Only minds, which have adequate ideas, can be active.
   d. Animal bodies are not active; only human bodies, which have minds containing adequate ideas, can be active.
   e. Some bodies have no minds but are nevertheless active.
   f. (a), (b) and (e).

2. Which of the following is/are argument(s) which Spinoza makes against Descartes’s views on the passions of the soul?
   a. There could not be such things as “animal spirits.” God has attributes of Extension and Thought, but not of Spirit.
   b. Animal spirits, which are bodies, could not act on the mind, because bodies are never active; only minds are active.
   c. Animal spirits, which are bodies, could not act on the mind, because bodies do not act on minds: only God acts on minds.
   d. The view that the mind can be determined both passively (pathologically) and actively (practically) makes no sense. If the mind is free at all, then it is always and completely free.
   e. There is no way to compare the power of the will to the power of an animal spirit (the power of an idea to the power of a motion). The view that they could struggle for control of the pineal gland, and the more powerful one would win, therefore makes no sense.
   f. The emotions should be understood, not derided and abused.

3. Which of the following best represents Spinoza’s view on the immortality of the soul?
a. The soul can continue thinking after the death of the body.
b. Insofar as the soul is a (logically) necessary consequence of the infinite and eternal essence of God, the soul is eternal.
c. The soul is the idea of the body, but the body is not the idea of a soul. Therefore the soul is eternal but the body is not.
d. A soul whose body is, to some extent, virtuous during this life is, to that extent, eternally blessed.
e. (b) and (d).
f. (a), (b) and (c).

4. In Part V of the *Ethics*, Spinoza first says that God does not love anyone (Cor. Pr. 17) and then later says that God loves himself (Pr. 35) and that God loves mankind (Cor. Pr. 36). How can these statements be reconciled?
a. They can’t. The first statement is Spinoza’s true view; he added the other two to avoid condemnation by the Church.
b. The first statement means that God does not love just “anyone.” God only loves himself and “mankind,” but not, for example, women and animals.
c. The first statement means that God does not love “anyone”: that is, any finite and contingent individual. He loves only eternal and universal things, such as himself and “mankind” (i.e., the human species as a whole).
d. In the first statement, “love” is understood as a transition from lesser to greater activity. In the two later statements it is understood as eternal activity.
e. In the first statement, “love” is understood as something finite and conditional. In the two later statements it is understood as something extensive and unconditional.
f. (d) and (e).