

Your name: \_\_\_\_\_

### Metaphysics Exercise 4

Phil. 93, Winter 2006. Due Tues., Jan. 24.

1. As far as you can tell from our reading, which of the following statements would Porphyry and Avicenna *disagree* about? (As on last week's exercise: if they would both say that the statement is true, or would both say it is false, then that counts as "agreeing," even if they would mean different things by it.)
  - a. The term "heat" applies univocally to the heat in hot water and in fire.
  - b. The term "quality" applies univocally to the heat in hot water and to the differentia of fire.
  - c. The term "quality" is used univocally when it is applied to the members of a certain genus (namely, the category, *quality*).
  - d. If something exists "in a subject," that is because its being is so deficient that it cannot exist on its own.
  - e. (b) and (d).
  - f. (b), (c) and (d).
  
2. Avicenna adds, to Aristotle's definition of "in a subject," the extra words: "another thing which has attained existence and species in itself." What effect do these extra words have?
  - a. They make it clear that not only accidents, but also differentiae, are "in a subject," because a species is defined by differentiae, so nothing "attains existence and species" without differentiae.
  - b. They make it clear that substantial form in matter is not "in a subject," because matter has not "attained existence and species in itself."
  - c. They make it clear that three-dimensional continuous quantity in wax is not "in a subject," because wax does not "attain existence and species" without three-dimensional continuous quantity.
  - d. They make it clear why an accident cannot be the differentia of a species of substances: the members of the species do not "attain existence and species" without the differentia; therefore, the differentia is not "in a subject."
  - e. (b) and (d).
  - f. (b), (c) and (d).
  
3. When earth is lifted into the air, it feels heavy. According to Avicenna, what is the correct explanation for that?
  - a. There is a greater quantity of matter in a given volume of earth than in the same volume of air. Therefore, earth is denser than air. Therefore, earth falls (sinks) in air.
  - b. The nature of the earth is a certain power which draws (attracts) things towards

its center (in the absence of “impediments”).

c. The nature of earth is a power which causes weight—that is, an actual inclination to move towards the center—when earth is out of its natural place (in the absence of “impediments”).

d. Weight, which is an actual inclination to move towards the center (in the absence of “impediments”) is part of the nature of earth.

e. Weight, which is an actual inclination to move towards the center (in the absence of “impediments”) is part of the form of earth.

f. (b) and (c).

4. As far as you can tell from our reading, about which of the following statements would Avicenna and St. Thomas *agree* with each other (in the above sense of “agree”), but *disagree* with Philoponus?

a. Matter, in itself, has no quantity.

b. Suppose this lump of wax is three inches wide. Then the three-inch-wideness is an accident in the wax (a member of the genus of quantity).

c. The indeterminate three-dimensional continuous quantity in this wax is an accident in this wax.

d. There could (conceivably) be such a thing as a fire which is not hot.

e. (c) and (d).

f. (a), (b), (c) and (d).

5. After the bread has been sanctified for use in the sacrament of the Eucharist, the accidents of the bread remain while (supposedly) the substance present is no longer the substance of the bread, but rather the body of Christ. According to St. Thomas, why is this *not* “deceptive”?

a. The accidents of bread are not “bread” at all, but something which normally accompanies bread. Our reason normally judges, correctly, that bread is there when our senses perceive those accidents. In this case our normal judgment would be wrong, but we are saved from deception by faith.

b. The accidents of bread are not “bread” at all, but something which normally accompanies bread. Our reason tends to jump to the conclusion that bread is there when our senses perceive those accidents, but that is a mistake: if we were more careful we would not be deceived.

c. Our senses do not perceive the bread itself (the substance of bread), but only the accidents. The bread itself is something supersensible which we perceive directly with our reason. Therefore, the fact that the accidents are still there can’t possibly deceive us.

d. We do not believe our senses or our reason when they go against faith. Only unbelievers, who follow reason rather than faith, can be deceived.

e. It is not customary, but horrible, to chew up a human being under its ordinary appearance.

f. (a) and (c).