

Your name: _____

Metaphysics Exercise 3

Phil. 93, Winter 2006

1. What happens when Bucephalus dies, according to Aristotle (as understood by our authors)?

- a. The substance of Bucephalus remains, but with a new quality (of deadness).
- b. The substance of Bucephalus remains, but Bucephalus' essence is gone. Now the matter of his substance has no essence, and so it is dead.
- c. The matter of Bucephalus remains, but Bucephalus' form is gone. In its place is the form of a new substance (or the forms of new substances).
- d. The earth and water that were in Bucephalus remain, but the fire that was in him escapes. Therefore although his form remains, his matter now has a quality of cold rather than of heat, and he dies.
- e. The form of Bucephalus remains, but his matter begins to lose quantity, so he rots away.

2. As far as you can tell from our reading, which of the following statements would Aristotle and Plotinus *disagree* about?¹

- a. A fire can be called a "substance" for (roughly) the same reason that a picture of a horse can be called a "horse."
- b. A fire has essential characteristics—characteristics such that, if you remove them, the fire ceases to exist.
- c. A fire is a sensible substance.
- d. The sensible world is composed of sensible substances.
- e. True substances (in the primary sense of "substance") are composed (wholly or partly) of accidents.
- f. (a) and (b).

3. As far as you can tell from our reading, which of the following statements would Plotinus and Porphyry *disagree* about (in the above sense of "disagree")?

- a. The problem of the categorical status of the differentiae arises in Aristotle because Aristotle's theory of sensible substance is incorrect.
- b. Heat in water is an accident; heat in fire is not an accident.
- c. Heat is an accidental characteristic of water, but an essential characteristic of fire.
- d. The term "quality" applies univocally to the heat in hot water and the heat

¹By "disagree" here I mean that one of them would assert the statement in question and the other would deny it. If they would both assert the statement (or would both deny it), but would mean different things by the words in it, then that counts as *agreeing* for these purposes.

which is a differentia of fire.

e. (a) and (b).

f. (a), (c) and (d).

4. It is a proprium of substance that it is receptive of contraries, and cold is the contrary of heat. According to Porphyry, why can't fire receive cold?

a. Fire is not, strictly speaking, a substance: it is called "substance" only equivocally.

b. Heat in fire is not a quality, but an essential quantifier.

c. Fire does not "receive" heat at all; therefore, it doesn't "receive" cold, either.

d. Heat in fire is a "substantial quality." Fire receives the contraries of its accidental qualities, but not of its substantial qualities.

e. (c) and (d).

5. In our reading, John Philoponus bases his theory of "substantial quantity" on Porphyry's theory of "substantial quality." But (as far as I know) Porphyry himself never mentions "substantial quantity." Assuming the idea occurred to him, which of the following might be a reason for Porphyry *not* to have gone in that direction?

a. It would go against Plotinus's statement that substances are composed of qualities and matter.

b. It would go against Aristotle's statements that the differentiae of substances are qualities.

c. It would go against Aristotle's statement that quantities are accidents.

d. Aristotle never mentions "substantial quantity."

e. Unlike Philoponus, Porphyry holds that snow is white, for example, because of its shape. Therefore he holds that some bodies are three-dimensional qualities, not quantities.

f. (b), (c) and (d).