Questions

1. (Preliminary Conception) Assume that §§20-23 have the following structure: (α = §20) thinking as subjective; (β, γ = §§21-2) thinking-over (Nachdenken); ([δ] = §23) free thinking. Explain thinking-over as a shining-within-itself of subjective thinking (i.e., explain why it is a second moment), why it is thinking of an object (Objekt), and why this means getting at the essence of that object, or what really matters about it (the Sache). Finally, considering free thinking as the third moment (about moment of being-for-self), explain why the three moments taken together characterize thinking in the way appropriate to ``objective idealism.'' (as hinted at also in §24).

2. (Quality) Consider the following (partial) summary of Descartes's Second and Third Meditations: (1) the Second Meditation shows that I, a thinking thing, am (have being); (2) the Third Meditation discusses the heterogeneous objective being of my ideas (that they are ideas of qualitatively different ``something'''s) and (3) compares it with to their homogeneous formal being (that they are all my ideas). How might (1), (2) and (3) be correlated with the moments of quality: being, Dasein, and being-for-self? Use the correlation to help explain the transition to quantity (see the discussion of the difference between quality and quantity, §85Z, p 136), and also to explain in what sense Hegel agrees with Kant's doctrine that the category of quantity must be applicable to all objects because succession belongs to the form of inner sense (i.e., to the form of subjective experience).

3. (Quantity) Consider the following moments of quality: (1) becoming (third moment of being, §88); (2) the true infinite (third moment of Dasein, §95); (3) attraction (third moment of being-for-self, §98). Explain, first, why one might expect a correlation between those three and the three moments of pure quantity: continuous quantity, discrete quantity, unity (all described in §100, p. 160). Then show, using Hegel's definitions of quality and quantity (again, see §85Z, p. 136) and his description of the various moment involved, how the correlation works out in detail. How is continuous quantity an application of becoming, discrete quantity an application of the true infinite, and unity an application of attraction (roughly: the attraction of the many to the one), and what is the difference in each case -- what is added here the indifference of quantitative determination to the determined?

4. (Measure) In second short writing assignment, I asked about the sense in which Hegel might agree with Protagoras that ``the human being is the measure of all things.'' Now consider interpreting this statement as follows: there are no qualitative differences between things as they really are (what really exists is just qualitiless atoms); every quality (for example: sensible qualities such as white and hot) is only the result of the way someone perceives the atoms hitting her sense organs. (This, or something like this, is the interpretation of Protagoras which Socrates advances in the Theaetetus.) Explain, first, why Hegel might say that measure is the exact right determination to use in expressing this thought. Second, explain why he might think it was better to say (as he does in §107Z, p. 170) that God is the measure of all things. Third, explain how the judgment of the concept (§§ 178-9) corresponds to measure, and use that correlation to show why, according to Hegel, Protagoras's position about qualities entails, or goes along with, both moral relativism and relativism about truth in general.

5. (Essence as Ground of Existence) In the Remark to §125 (p. 195), Hegel discusses the difference between ``thing'' (Ding), a determination of essence, and ``something'' (Etwas), a determination of being (introduced in §90). How is the difference between being and essence supposed to explain the difference between having a property, on the one hand (thing as the unity of ground and existence), vs. being determined by a quality (something as the unity of determination and quality), on the other? Explain, then, based also on the difference between mere transition (passing-over), on the one hand, and ``shining,'' on the other, why the determination following ``something'' is ``limit'' (§92), whereas the determination following ``thing'' is ``appearance.'' In what sense is appearance to the thing as limit is to something?

6. (Appearance) Based on the discussion of the essential relationship (Verhältnis) of whole and part (§135), explain in what sense Hegel can say the following about his system. First, it is not wrong to see the system as a whole which consists of (besteht aus) parts. Second, on the other hand, this division into parts (Teile) yields the mere form of the system, which in a way is the precise opposite (Gegenteil) of a true understanding of its content. In fact, if we stop with this, we have the mere appearance of a system, and this is also why (see § 131Z) it is impossible to understand, from this point of view, how one can call a halt (Halt) to the further addition of new parts. Finally, this way of looking at the system is one which portrays it as dead; what is missing is precisely the determination of life.

7. (Actuality) Consider the following three accounts of the relationship between God, the world as possibility, and the world as actuality. (1) ``Before'' God created the world, it had no real possibility at all: it was ``merely,'' formally possible (§143), and, in creating the world, God added nothing at all to this mere possibility, other than the relationship to his actualizing will, nor was there anything in the content of the world which made that will necessary: the world is created by grace, and is purely contingent (§144). (2) The possibility of the world is the divine essence; God's ``creation'' of the world doesn't take him out of himself, or even express something about him which was merely implicit: God and the world are the same thing, considered as substance (= natura naturans) and as modes or accidents (natura naturata). (3) God is the cause of the world: the two are distinct, but, given the divine nature, the world necessarily follows. Explain in what sense Hegel can say that all three of these seemingly mutually inconsistent alternatives is correct, but that all regard the world as mere actuality, not as independent object (Objekt), or (which it to say the same thing) leave out the moment of divine purpose.

(should be three more questions, maybe next time :()