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Note: this assignment, due Dec. 4, is for students in Group IV (Rowe, Spielman, Conrad) only.

Please respond to the following question in approximately two pages (double spaced). (Needless to say this should be your own original work.)

In §49 of the Ideas, p. 110, Husserl discusses a possibility which he calls the ``annihilation of the world,'' in which my experiences would no longer have the coherence necessary to make them experiences of one self-consistent reality. Obviously, in that case, the contents of my consciousness would be different than they now are (Husserl says the would be ``modified''): whereas they are now orderly, coherent, characterized by a background ``general positing'' of natural reality, etc., they would then be chaotic and lack any long term positing of transcendent objects. Why doesn't this show, according to Husserl, that consciousness is dependent on the world? Why does it not contradict what he says in §88 (pp. 215-16): that after the ``bracketing'' or ``exclusion'' of the entire world (so that only consciousness is left as a ``residuum''), ``everything, so to speak, remains as of old''?

Abe Stone 2008-11-20