Note: this assignment, due Nov. 6, is for students in Group I (Anyanwu, Grove) only.
Please respond to the following question in
approximately two pages (double spaced). (Needless to say this should
be your own original work.)
In §142 (p. 341), Husserl says that ``Of essential
necessity [germanprinzipiell] ... to every truly
existing object there corresponds the idea of a possible
consciousness in which the object itself is seized upon originarily and therefore in a perfectly adequate way.''
This repeats the doctrine we saw already in the Logical
Investigations, that the ``truth'' of a meaning-state refers to its
possible fulfillment (by an intuition ``adequate'' to its meaning).
As Husserl goes on to point out at the beginning of §143, however (p. 342), this appears to contradict what he said earlier (in §138), namely that--also ``of essential necessity''--``something physically real [germanein Dingreales] ... appears only `inadequately''' (p. 331, p. 286 in the original). How does Husserl resolve this contradiction? What are we intending when regard, for example, a judgment about germanDinge (such as: ``A blackbird is flying outside the window'') as true?