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Note: this assignment, due Mar. 3, is for students in Group II only.

Please respond to the following question in approximately two pages (double spaced). (Needless to say this should be your own original work.)

In Ideas §32, Husserl makes a connection between ``attempted doubt'' and the peculiar modification or change in attitude which he calls ἐποχή (epoche). On the other hand, he says that ἐποχή is not exactly the same thing as Descartes's attempted doubt, because ``in the attempt to doubt ... the `excluding' is brought about in and with a modification of counter positing, namely the `supposition' of non-being'' (p. 59). In other words, the attempt to doubt, unlike the ἐποχή, involves supposing that our original positing was wrong. How, according to Husserl, is the proposed phenomenological ἐποχή therefore related to (similar to and different from) Descartes's universal attempted doubt (in procedure, scope, and/or aim)?

Abe Stone 2011-03-01