Note: this assignment is for students in Group III only.
Due Tuesday, Rocktober 25th
Please respond to the following in
two pages or less (double spaced). (Needless to say this should be
your own original work.)
In the addition (Zusatz) to §107 (p. 170),
Hegel apparently alludes to a dispute between Protagoras and Plato
about whether the human being or God is the measure of all things,
and takes Platos side (see, in our translation, n. 35, p. 327). But
can Hegel argue at the same time that there is something right to what
Protagoras says, and that even a finite human ego can be rightly
described as a universal measure? Consider, in particular, this
passage from the Zusatz to §96 (p. 153): The most
familiar form of being-for-itself is the I. We known ourselves as
beings who are there [als daseiende], first of all
distinct from all other such beings, and as related to them. But
secondly, we also know that this expanse of being-there is, so to
speak, focused onto the simple form of being-for-self. Explain how
the ego (the I) might also be seen as a familiar form of
measure, i.e. how the focusing of the whole varied expanse
of the world into one consciousness could also be seen as a focusing
onto the simple form of measure. Recall that measure is the unity of
quality and quantity, just as being-for-itself is the unity of being
and being-there (Dasein). Why would Hegel nevertheless
prefer Plato to Protagoras? What has Protagoras missed about the
relationship between finite and infinite consciousness?
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