Note: this assignment is for students in Group III only (see syllabus for a list of group assignments).
Due, as an attachment, via the Assignments tool on
ecommons, by midnight Thurs., Apr. 24.
Please respond to the following question in
two pages or less (double spaced). (Needless to say this should be
your own original work.)
On pp. 15765, Lewis discusses two problems with the
descriptive power of the alleged worldmaking language required by
the position he calls linguistic ersatzism. (Recall that, according to
linguistic ersatzism, what exists is not unactualized possible worlds,
but only complete descriptions of such worlds in some worldmaking
language; not parts of unactualized possible worlds, but complete
descriptions of unactualized possible individuals.)
Both of the problems involve taking the things that meet some description and, so to speak, renaming them such that they still meet the description.
In the first case, it is possible individuals: in the
eternal recurrence world with infinite quasi-Napoleons, say whatever
you want about one of them (Blapoleon conquers such-and-such
countries, Blapoleon lives after an infinite number of quasi-Napoleon
predecessors, Blapoleon is part of a world where XYZ
In the second case, it is possible worlds with alien properties
(properties such that nothing in the actual world has them): say
whatever you want about one of them (Blorld contains a property
called blavor that does so-and-so, and a properity called blolor that
does so-and-so, etc. etc.) and it will be true of the other; i.e.,
just rename the other one Blorld and its alien properties
blavor, blolor, and so forth, and what you said will still be
right. (See especially the discussion of Ramsified descriptions,
pp. 1614.)
You might say, very roughly, that the first case involves changing the
extension of a predicate (in the case of a proper name: changing the
one thing that it names), whereas the second involves changing the
intension of a predicate (why by virtue of what property
it names the things it does).
Explain why, according to Lewis, the first problem is only a problem
about possible individuals within a world, whereas the second
is only a problem about possible properties at different
worlds. (Hint: look around where he says It is otherwise for
properites, p. 159, and see more generally his discussion of the
harmless versions of each problem, p. 157 and pp. 1589.)
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