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- What, according to the authors we've read, is the relationship
between (some or all of): (1) science; (2) philosophy of science;
(3) philosophy (in general); and (4) history of science? Are some
just subfields of the others? What, if at all, distinguishes one
from the other(s)? Subject matter? Methodology? Something else?
Which needs or can use the results of which other(s) to do their
work? Which is most rational, most authoritative, most free? Which
do our authors take themselves to be doing and why?
- A related issue (but not exactly the same): from what, according
to our authors, is science to be ``demarcated''? To what field or
discipline does it belong to make this demarcation, and/or from what
point of view do we make it, and/or who is authorized or has the
requisite knowledge or ability to make it? How can we tell if the
demarcation has been made correctly or not, and/or in what terms can
we criticize a suspect or incorrect demarcation? Why, if at all, is
such demarcation important? (E.g., what characteristics of science
make it important that we not confuse it with something else?) Would
something go wrong if we made the demarcation incorrectly or not at
all, or is this just a matter of intellectual interest?
- What, according to our authors, is the proper relationship
between (what Quine calls) the ``conceptual side'' and the
``doctrinal side'' (of science, epistemology, philosophy or history
of science, and/or whatever seems relevant)? Which is prior, and/or
more important, and/or more relevant to ``demarcation'' (or to some
other problem), and/or more fruitful to talk about? Has this proper
relationship mostly been maintained (by scientists and/or
philosophers), or has it sometimes or often been gotten wrong,
either in theory or in practice? What can we learn from the history
of philosophy, especially from Hume and/or Kant, about this
relationship? How and why do our authors disagree in their
interpretation of that history?
- Discuss the meaning of and/or relationship between some of the
following things, according to authors we've read: (scientific)
theory, observation(s), common or everyday knowledge, experience,
sense data. How (if at all) do they define them? Which do they
consider most certain/reliable, or more justified, or otherwise
better, and why? Do they think that some of these things are not well
defined, or not relevant to science, or don't exist at all? Which of
them depend on or change along with our scientific theories,
practices, standards, methodological decisions, and/or ways of
``seeing''? How and on what grounds do our authors disagree with each
other about these issues? (How, if at all, is it possible to disagree
about the definitions? Can't everyone define the terms as he
or she likes? What would our various authors say about that?)
- A more general suggestion, which to some extent overlaps with
some of the above: pick a difference or debate between two authors and
explain what the real disagreement is (as opposed to what one
might have thought it was). You can try to decide who ``wins,'' if you
want, but I don't particularly recommend this.
- What was really important to Popper, and what wasn't? How does
this explain the adjustments in his project as time went on, and/or
his response to (one or more of) his critics? To write on this you
should probably look at least at Popper's respones to his critics
and/or to Kuhn in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. Schilpp
(on the recommended reading list and on reserve at Regenstein, parts
also on e-reserve). (You could also try doing the same thing with
Kuhn--the ``Postscript'' to SSR might be useful here, but
I'll try to suggest some more stuff if people are interested.)
- Carnap was an Old Left democratic socialist, Neurath was a
Marxist, Quine was an extreme right wing conservative (though, I've
been told, perhaps not so extreme earlier on), Putnam was (in the
period when he wrote ``What Theories Are Not'' and ``The
`Corroboration' of Theories'') a New Left activist, and Popper was a
anti-Marxist liberal democrat (probably more information than you
want on that is available in his books, The Poverty of
Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies). (I
unfortunately don't know much about Goodman, Lakatos, or Kuhn's
politics.) Discuss the relationship between the political views of
these authors (i.e., one or more of them) and their views in
philosophy of science. (I hinted at some things about this in class,
but there's a lot more to be said.) (Note: to do this well you need
to understand and deal carefully with the philosophy of science
aspect, not just take off on the politics.)
Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 125paper2, Winter 06
Previous: Instructions
Abe Stone
2006-03-05