Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 125exam2, Autumn 06
Previous: Instructions
- Popper, LSD, ch. 1 and 2: choose one of the following
three statements and explain why you think it is right (I think all
three are defensible, though maybe not equally so): (a) Popper's
main point is to show that the ``problem of indication'' doesn't
have a positive solution, and to explain how we can nevertheless
learn something about universal laws. He discusses the ``demarcation
problem'' because of that main point. (b) Popper's main point is the
role of falsifiability in answering the ``demarcation problem.'' He
discusses other methodological issues and the ``problem of
induction'' because of that main point. (c) Popper's main point is
the relationship between science and the methodology of science. He
discusses falsifiability and the ``problem of induction'' because of
that main point.
- Popper, LSD, ch. 3: Explain why Popper's conception of a
``theoretical system'' (§16) might lead one to regard the axioms
as ``conventions,'' and why Popper wants to avoid that. Your
explanation should involve (at least) the following: theories (what
is a ``theory''?); axioms; definitions; ``strict'' universals.
- Popper, LSD, ch. 4: Explain one of the following
points about Popper's view (all of which are correct): (a) No
falsifiable theory forbids only a single basic statement. (b)
Forbidding (any number of) basic statements is not enough to make a
theory falsifiable. (c) A theory cannot, in general, be falsified by
a single accepted basic statement.
- Popper, LSD, ch. 5: What is ``Fries's Trilemma''? (Do
not quote from the text to answer this; you must explain in your own
words.) How is Popper's view on ``basic statements'' supposed to
resolve it? How is this connected with his reason for rejecting all
versions of ``protocol sentences,'' including even the version
Carnap (in ``On Protocol Sentences'') claims to have taken from
Popper?
- Popper, LSD, ch. 10: Explain why Popper's view (as
opposed to the view he describes as ``inductivist'') makes it hard
to understand why we rely on corroborated theories. How
would Popper respond to this objection?
- Neurath, Putnam, Lakatos: Choose one of the following examples
and explain why (according to one or more of the three authors) it
causes a problem for Popper: Newton's derivation of Kepler's laws;
the discovery of Neptune; the orbit of Mercury. How might Popper
respond? Is the response satisfactory?
- Kuhn, SSR, ch. 1-5: On p. 34, Kuhn claims that three
activities (``determination of significant fact, matching of facts
with theory, and articulation of theory'') make up all the
experimental and theoretical work of normal science. Explain what
each of these activities is, using examples where helpful, and
explain why, according to Kuhn, they could not be motivated
by a desire to test theories, to uncover unexpected novelties, or to
be useful, but could be motivated by a desire to solve
``puzzles.''
- Kuhn, SSR, ch. 6-8: Discuss either the discovery of
oxygen or the discovery of X-rays, focusing on the role of
``anomalies'' and the ways in which the nature and role of such
anomalies, according to Kuhn, are both like and unlike the nature
and role of falsifying instances/hypotheses as described by
Popper. Explain further how the process in question is supposed to
resemble the kind of ``theoretical'' crisis described in ch. 7.
- Kuhn, SSR, ch. 9-10: How might a ``positivist'' (as
described by Kuhn, beginning around p. 98) tell the story of
Galileo's discoveries about the behavior of pendulums? How would
such a positivist argue that these discoveries were not incompatible
with older theories? (See especially what Kuhn finally notes on
p. 124: that Aristotelians didn't discuss swinging stones at all.)
Why is the positivist's description wrong, according to Kuhn? Give
at least two reasons. (Discuss what goes wrong in this particular
case, but with reference to some of the supposed general facts about
the ``nature and necessity'' of scientific revolutions--to quote
the title of ch. 9--which guarantee that all such stories will be
wrong.)
- Kuhn, SSR, ch. 11-13: On p. 149, Kuhn says: ``The
laymen who scoffed at Einstein's general theory of relativity
because space could not be `curved'--it was not that sort of
thing--were not simply wrong or mistaken.'' This might be taken to
mean that laymen are better placed to criticize new developments in
science that we usually tend to think. Is that the moral Kuhn would
want us to draw? Explain why or why not.
- Hacking: On p. 12, Hacking remarks that certain
``reflections'' of Kuhn's ``do not show that a non-rational change
of belief might not also be a switch from the less reasonable to the
more reasonable doctrine.'' This is questionable: what would Popper
say about the suggestion that a non-rational method would lead to a
``more reasonable doctrine'' (hint: see again the Addendum at the
end of ch. 10 of Popper's LSD). Getting back to Hacking,
however: what ``reflections,'' or arguments, of Kuhn's is he
referring to, and why, from Hacking's point of view, does it seem
like they must have a crucial role in any Kuhnian attack on the
rationality of science? Since they ``do not show'' what such an
attack apparently ought to show, what does Hacking suggest as an
alternative understanding of Kuhn's strategy?
Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 125exam2, Autumn 06
Previous: Instructions
Abe Stone
2006-11-30