Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 106exam2, Spring 12
Previous: Instructions
- (Intro to the Dialectic/Concepts of Pure Reason) [under
construction; last year's question was bad].
- (Concepts of Pure Reason) According to the “highest
principle of all synthetic judgments,” “every object stands under
the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold intuition
in a possible experience” (A158/B197, p. 194) -- where
“synthetic unity” is the function of the understanding
(A79/B104, p. 112). Very briefly: what actually guarantees that
objects fulfill these conditions? In a transcendental illusion, what
kind of guarantee does reason demand instead (hint: it is a kind of
thing)? Why does this mistaken demand lead the understanding
to apply the categories in a transcendent way. That is: why
does it lead the understanding to try to think, through the
categories, something which could, in principle, never be an object of
experience?
- (Paralogisms) Consider the syllogism on p. 371 (B410-11). Kant says
that it involves a sophisma figurae dictionis: that is, a
fallacy of equivocation. Give another example of a syllogism which
displays this fallacy. Where is the equivocation in your example?
What phrase, then, in Kant's example, must contain the term that is
being used equivocally? (You should be able to identify the
phrase where the equivocation must be just on the basis of the
form of the syllogism.) Why, based on Kant's text, might you think
that the specific term used equivocally is “thought”? If you
can, make a case that the term used equivocally is actually
“subject.”
- (Antinomies) According to the Thesis of the Third Antinomy,
p. 409 (A444/B472), “it is necessary to assume that there is,”
in addition to natural causality, “also another causality, that of
freedom.” Explain how “freedom'' is defined here, and explain why,
according to Kant, reason (in its argument for the Thesis) demands the
existence of a “free” cause (in that sense of free). On the
other hand, how can we tell, based on the conclusions of the
Transcendental Analytic (in particular, the Second Analogy), that this
demand could never be fulfilled by any object of experience,
i.e. that we can never experience anything which is in that sense
“free”? (Note: of course the argument for the Thesis of the Third
Antinomy contains a mistake, according to Kant, since the Antinomy as
a whole, both Thesis and Antithesis, is a product of transcendental
illusion, as are all the Antinomies. So your explanation of “why
reason demands” this will incorporate the mistaken step or steps. The
inconsistency of the conclusion with the Second Analogy will then show
why Kant must think there is a mistake somewhere.)
- (Solution to the Third Antinomy) Freedom (more precisely:
transcendental freedom) would seem to be inconsistent with
determinism, for the following reason. Suppose I freely choose how to
act at time t
. According to determinism, whatever happens after t
must be completely determined by what happened long before t
(i.e.,
only one course of future events can be compatible with that course of
past events). Therefore, I can only choose one way, i.e. can't choose
freely. What would Kant say about this argument? (Note that this is a
contemporary argument which Kant does not address directly. You can't
answer this question by just summarizing the Solution to the Third
Antinomy; you will need to think about how Kant would respond to a
question that no one actually puts to him.) (Hint: if I am free, is my
free choice something that happens at a time? Is there more
than one way I can choose? What is my “intelligible character”?)
- (Ideal) What is (supposed to be) the concept
of an ens realissimum? Explain what makes this concept an
“ideal,” as Kant defines that term on p. 485 (A568/B596):
explain, that is, why this is the concept of an individual
object. How, according to Kant, is this concept related to the
totality of all possible things? In particular: why does reason's
demand, that a thing be known as possible by seeing it as one among
all the possible things, i.e. by comparing it to the sum of all
possibilities, end up being a demand that everything be thought by
comparison to the ideal of the ens realissimum? How does the
argument depend on the principle that realities cannot oppose each
other, i.e. that the only thing opposed to reality is negation?
- (Impossibility of the Proofs) Suppose we have a concept, C
,
and we already agree that C
's are possible. Suppose I now tell you,
further, that some C
's are actual (i.e., that there actually are
some C
's). How, according to Kant, would this be different from
telling you (for example) that some (or all) C
's are extended, or
that some (or all) C
's are heavy? In particular, if C
is an
empirical concept, what am I adding to the claim that C
's are
possible when I say that at least some are actual? Explain using the
example of the 100 thalers (dollars). How is this related to what Kant
says about the modality of judgments at the bottom of p. 109
(A74/B99-100) and about the categories of modality, at the
beginning of the “Explanation” of the Postulates of Empirical
Thought, on p. 239 (A219/B266)?
- (Canon) Explain the difference between a pragmatic law and a
moral law, according to Kant. How is each related to happiness?
(Explain what “happiness” means, according to Kant.) Explain further
why, given these definition (of moral law and of happiness), and given
that the “supreme good” (or ``supreme derivative good'') is as Kant
describes on pp. 640-41 (A813-14/B841-2), our only hope for the
supreme good would be to assume that God exists. What is the definition
of “God,” as the term is used in the conclusion of this argument?
Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 106exam2, Spring 12
Previous: Instructions
Abe Stone
2012-06-06