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- (Intro to the Dialectic/Concepts of Pure Reason) Give an example
of a categorical syllogism. Explain the various parts of the
syllogism, as Kant understands them, using all of the following terms:
major premise, minor premise, conclusion, rule, condition, predicate,
subsume. Give an example of a prosyllogism which has the minor premise
of the first syllogism as its conclusion. In what sense does the
prosyllogism establish a ``higher'' condition--part of an
``ascending'' series of conditions? Explain the roles of the
understanding and reason, in their logical employments, in drawing
syllogisms and finding conditions.
- (Concepts of Pure Reason) Explain, roughly, why, according to
Kant, ``experience'' (that is: thinking an object through the
appearances) must always involve a rule. Why does this mean
that all objects of our knowledge can (and must) be thought by the
understanding? Explain how this leads to the following two
consequences: (1) the objects of our knowledge are always
``conditioned'' (never ``unconditioned''); (2) when reason
nevertheless demands that we think an ``unconditioned'' object, the
understanding is led to apply the categories outside the realm of
experience. (Note: you need not explain why reason makes this
demand, although if you could that would be nice.)
- (Paralogisms) Explain, as precisely as you can, what Kant thinks
goes wrong in the syllogism on p. 333 (A348). What type of fallacy
does it involve? Where in it is the category of substance,
and/or its schema (permanence in time) applied illegitimately,
and why?
- (Antinomies) According to the Thesis of the Third Antinomy,
p. 409 (A444/B472), ``it is necessary to assume that there is,'' in
addition to natural causality, ``also another causality, that of
freedom.'' Explain how ``freedom'' is defined here, and explain why,
according to Kant, reason (in its argument for the Thesis) demands the
existence of a free cause. On the other hand, how can we tell, based
on the conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic, that there must be
a problem in this argument?
- (Solution to the Third Antinomy) Freedom (more precisely:
transcendental freedom) would seem to be inconsistent with determinism,
for the following reason. Suppose I freely choose how to act at time
t. According to determinism, whatever happens after t must be
completely determined by what happened long before t (i.e., only one
course of future events can be compatible with that course of past
events). Therefore, I can only choose one way, i.e. can't choose
freely. What would Kant say about this argument? (Hint: if I am free,
at what time do I choose? Is there more than one way I can choose?
What is my ``intelligible character''?)
- (Introduction to the Ideal) What is (supposed to be) the concept
of an ens realissimum? Explain what makes this concept an
``ideal,'' as Kant defines that term on p. 485 (A568/B596). How,
according to Kant, is this concept related to the demand of reason,
that a thing be known as possible by seeing it as one among all the
possible things, i.e. by comparing it to the sum of all
possibilities? (Note: to answer this properly, you will need to say
something about the relationship between reality and negation.)
- (Impossibility of the Proofs) Suppose we have a concept, C,
and we already agree that C's are possible. Suppose I now tell you,
further, that some C's are actual (i.e., that there actually are
some C's). How, according to Kant, would this be different from
telling you (for example) that all C's are extended, or that all
C's are heavy? In particular, if C is an empirical concept, what
am I adding to the claim that C's are possible when I say that at
least some are actual? Explain using the example of the 100 thalers
(dollars).
- (Canon) Explain the difference between a pragmatic law and a
moral law, according to Kant. How is each related to happiness?
(Explain what ``happiness'' means, according to Kant.) Explain further
why, given these definition (of moral law and of happiness), and given
that the ``supreme good'' (or ``supreme derivative good'') is as Kant
describes on pp. 640-41 (A813-14/B841-2), our only hope for the
supreme good would be to assume that God exists.
Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 106exam2, Spring 09
Previous: Instructions
Abe Stone
2009-05-19