Phil. 106: Kant

Take Home Final

Instructions

Answer any three of the following questions, 2–3 pages for each answer, for a total of 6–9 pages. You may hand in your answers early if you like, but all answers are due by 5:00pm Tues., June 12th, in my office (Cowell Annex A-106).

The questions are keyed to different reading assignments, with the idea that each question is raised most centrally in a certain part of the reading. However, you can and should use material from anywhere in the text where it’s relevant to the answer.

Because this is an exam rather than a paper, I will give priority to accuracy over originality in grading. However, all the questions do require some thought; they can’t simply be read out of the texts. Moreover, in many (if not all) cases the “correct” answer is unavoidably a matter of interpretation: in such cases it would be safest to reproduce what I said in class, but it will also be acceptable if you’re clearly following some other reasonable interpretation. And, of course, as usual, your answer must be “original” in the sense that it is your own work. (If you use any outside source—which I don’t recommend—you must cite it.)

Since we read the A edition almost exclusively, please base your answer on the A edition text (where there are differences), except in the case of the passage from the B Preface which is part of the last reading assignment. You can cite pages by the A- or B-edition page number (e.g., “A112,” “Bxxvi”).

Questions

1. (Intro to the Dialectic/Concepts of Pure Reason) Give an example of a categorical syllogism. Explain the various parts of the syllogism, as Kant understands them, using all of the following terms: major premise, minor premise, conclusion, rule, condition, predicate, subsume. Give an example of a prosyllogism which has the minor premise of the first syllogism as its conclusion. In what sense does the prosyllogism establish a “higher” condition—part of an “ascending” series of conditions? Explain the roles of the understanding and reason, in their logical employments, in drawing syllogisms and finding conditions.

2. (Concepts of Pure Reason) Explain, roughly, why, according to Kant, “experience” (that is: thinking an object through the appearances) must always involve a rule. Why does this mean that all objects of our knowledge
can (and must) be thought by the understanding, whereas reason cannot
directly think any object? Explain how this leads to the following two con-
sequences: (1) the objects of our knowledge are always “conditioned” (never
“unconditioned”); (2) when reason nevertheless demands that we think an
“unconditioned” object, the understanding is led to apply the categories
outside the realm of experience. (Note: you need not explain why reason
makes this demand, although if you could that would be nice.)

3. (Paralogisms) Explain, as precisely as you can, what Kant thinks goes
wrong in the syllogism on p. 333 (A348). What type of fallacy does it
involve? Where in it is the category of substance applied illegitimately, and
why?

4. (End of Paralogisms) On p. 358 (A391), Kant writes: “No one, however,
can have the right to claim that he knows anything in regard to the tran-
scendental cause of our representations of the outer senses.” Explain the
implications for the questions which rational psychologists want to answer
about the “communion” between the human soul and the human body.
What, however, is puzzling about Kant’s phrase, “the transcendental cause
of our representations”?

5. (Antinomies) According to the Thesis of the Third Antinomy, p. 409 (A444/
B472), “it is necessary to assume that there is,” in addition to natural
causality, “also another causality, that of freedom.” Explain how “freedom”
is defined here, and explain why, according to Kant, reason (in its argument
for the Thesis) demands the existence of a free cause. On the other hand,
how can we tell, based on the conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic,
that there must be a problem in this argument?

6. (Solution to the Third Antinomy) Freedom (more precisely: transcendental
freedom) would seem to be inconsistent with determinism, for the following
reason. Suppose I freely choose how to act at time $t$. According to deter-
minism, whatever happens after $t$ must be completely determined by what
happened long before $t$ (i.e., only one course of future events can be com-
patible with that course of past events). Therefore, I can only choose one
way, i.e. can’t choose freely. What would Kant say about this argument?
(Hint: if I am free, at what time do I choose? Is there more than one way
I can choose? What is my “intelligible character”?)

7. (Introduction to the Ideal) What is (supposed to be) the concept of an
ens realissimum? Explain what makes this concept an “ideal,” as Kant
defines that term on p. 485 (A568/B596). How, according to Kant, is this
concept related to the demand of reason, that a thing be known as possible by seeing it as one among all the possible things, i.e. by comparing it to the sum of all possibilities? (Note: to answer this properly, you will need to say something about the relationship between reality and negation.)

8. (Impossibility of the Proofs) Suppose we have a concept, $C$, and we already agree that $C$’s are possible. Suppose I now tell you, further, that some $C$’s are actual (i.e., that there actually are some $C$’s). How, according to Kant, would this be different from telling you (for example) that all $C$’s are extended, or that all $C$’s are heavy? In particular, if $C$ is an empirical concept, what am I adding to the claim that $C$’s are possible when I say that at least some are actual? Explain using the example of the 100 thalers.

9. (Canon) Explain the difference between a pragmatic law and a moral law, according to Kant. How is each related to happiness? (Explain what “happiness” means, according to Kant.) Explain further why, given these definition (of moral law and of happiness), and given that the “supreme good” (or “supreme derivative good”) is as Kant describes on pp. 640–41 (A813–14/B841–2), our only hope for the supreme good would be to assume that God exists.