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- (Introduction) Explain the distinction between ``a priori'' and
``a posteriori,'' and between ``analytic'' and ``synthetic.'' Why must
all analytic judgments be a priori? Give examples, other than Kant's
own examples, of judgments which are analytic, synthetic a posteriori,
and synthetic a priori, according to Kant. Why is it surprising that
some synthetic judgments (according to Kant) are also a priori? Why,
roughly speaking, does Kant think it important to show how such
synthetic a priori judgments are possible? (Give at least one rough
reason.)
- (Aesthetic) Explain, roughly speaking, Kant's distinction
between (human) ``intuitions'' and ``concepts.'' How does an
intuition, as opposed to a concept, relate to an empirical object?
What is the matter of our intuitions, according to Kant, and what is
their form? How does existence of a (pure) form of (human) intuition
explain why the laws of geometry, for example, can be known a priori
(by humans), and how does it restrict what they apply to?
- (Metaphysical Deduction) Using simple empirical examples (other
than Kant's own), explain the distinction between ``concepts'' and
``judgments.'' What role to concepts play in a typical judgment?
Explain why, according to Kant, the various fundamental types of
judgment correspond to fundamental pure concepts of the understanding
(categories): what role does the understanding play in both cases?
(You need not talk in any detail about the Table of Judgments or the
Table of Categories, although if you can discuss a specific
example of correspondence, that would be great.)
- (Transcendental Deduction, part I) A transcendental deduction,
according to Kant, establishes the legitimacy or ``objective
validity'' of a concept. Explain (1) why, according to Kant, we don't
normally need a transcendental deduction of empirical or mathematical
concepts and (2) why what Kant calls an ``empirical deduction'' (a)
could never serve as a transcendental deduction for any concept and
(b) is not available at all in the case of pure (a priori) concepts,
such as the categories.
- (Transcendental Deduction, part II) The transcendental unity of
apperception means (roughly speaking) the possibility of thinking the
whole manifold of appearances together as mine. What does that have to
do with the categories, according to Kant? What does it have to do
with the possibility of there being an object of
experience--that is (roughly speaking, according to Kant), the
possibility that something guarantees the appearances will agree with
each other according to a rule?
- (Schematism) Explain why an empirical concept, such as the
concept dog, does not apply directly to appearances (or
images) of dogs. What role does the faculty of imagination play in
allowing such a concept to be applied? How does this involve a
``schema''? Give another example which shows the role of the
imagination and its schemata in the case of mathematical
concepts. Why is there a special problem with there being schemata for
pure concepts of the understanding, such as the categories?
- (Analogies) The Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments is,
roughly, that the appearances must be such that they can all be
thought together as mine (in the unity of apperception). What does
this have to with the categories, and with the schemata of the
categories? How does it rule out certain synthetic judgments as (not
self-contradictory, but) empty? How does it make other synthetic
judgments a priori? Explain in particular, roughly, with respect to
the judgment that every event has a cause (Second Analogy).
- (Phenomena and Noumena) The Transcendental Analytic has shown
that all the objects of our knowledge are mere appearances. Explain
why this seems to mean that we do, after all, know something
about the way things are in themselves. Why might it seem to show that
things in themselves are substances (whose accidents we know)? Why
might it seem to show that things in themselves are causes (whose
effects we know)? Why, if either one of those were correct, would we
know something about noumena--that is, objects which an understanding
can think on its own, without sense?
- (Amphiboly) Consider the concepts of identity and difference. Explain, roughly, why we must be able to apply them to
objects if we are to think of those objects under concepts (for
example, to think that all objects of a certain kind are dogs, or that
some of them are). How, according to Kant, can we actually apply these
concepts (of identity and difference) to objects: that is, what makes
two objects different? (Hint: how is space involved?) Why would that
not work, according to Kant, if the objects of our knowledge were
noumena?
Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 106exam1, Spring 07
Previous: Instructions
Abe Stone
2007-06-04