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- (Transcendental Deduction, part I) A deduction,
according to Kant, establishes the legitimacy or “objective
validity” of a concept -- that is, it explains how we know that the
manifold of appearances can be synthesized (by the imagination) in
such a way as to be unified by that concept. Explain (1) why,
according to Kant, we don't normally need a deduction of empirical
concepts; (2) why, if we do want a deduction of an empirical concept,
it will be what Kant calls an “empirical deduction” -- that is,
roughly, an account of how we acquired the concept in the first place;
and (3) why an alleged empirical deduction of a pure concept
(for example, of one of the categories) would not be a deduction at
all.
- (Transcendental Deduction, part II) Assume that the representation “I
think” (which is at least potentially part of every representation of
mine) doesn't, in itself, contain sufficient conditions to ensure that
a single object is thought (determined, made the target of
reference) in it. If that is nevertheless a priori necessary, what are
the additional conditions which ensure it? (Hint: how is this related
to the pure form of sensibility and the a priori capabilities of the
imagination?) Explain why this could be expressed by saying that the
analytic unity of apperception depends on a prior synthetic unity.
- (Schematism) Explain why an empirical concept, such as the
concept dog, does not apply directly to sense impressions --
in particular, does not apply directly to images of dogs. What
role does the faculty of imagination play in allowing such a concept
to be applied? (In what way does the imagination “produce” an
image?) How does this involve a “schema”? Give another example which
shows the role of the imagination and its schemata in the case of
mathematical concepts. Why is there a special problem with there being
schemata for pure concepts of the understanding, such as the
categories?
- (System of Principles) The Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments
is, roughly, that the appearances must be such that they can all be
thought together as mine (in the unity of apperception). What does
this have to with the categories, and with the schemata of the
categories? How does it rule out certain synthetic judgments as, not
self-contradictory, but empty? Why do such purported synthetic
judgments undermine themselves, even though the predicate (more
generally: the knowledge or rule) in them does not contradict the
subject (more generally: the condition on which they apply the rule).
- (Phenomena and Noumena) The Transcendental Analytic has shown
that all the objects of our knowledge are phenomena: that is, they are
objects (of a cognitive faculty) only insofar as they appear (are given in sensible intuition). Kant (as I understand
him) then entertains an objection along these lines: doesn't this mean
that we do, after all, know something about noumena: that is,
about things which are objects of our understanding directly, without
the mediation of a sensible intuition? Explain why this objection
might arise: that is, why the conclusion of the Transcendental
Analytic might seem to have that implication. Explain further why, if
this were correct, it imply that the categories have, not only a
transcendental meaning, but also a transcendental employment.
- (Amphiboly) Consider the concepts of identity and difference. Explain why we must be able to apply them to objects if
we are to think of those objects under concepts (for example, to think
of an object as cinnabar, or as some cinnabar, or as
this cinnabar). How, according to Kant, can we actually apply
these concepts (of identity and difference) to objects: that is, what
makes two objects different? (Hint: how is space involved?) Why would
that not work, according to Kant, if the objects of our knowledge were
noumena?
Next: About this document ...
Up: Phil. 106exam1b, Autumn 13
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Abe Stone
2013-12-19