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- How do Hume and Kant use examples in their
arguments--how are the uses the same and how are they different? To
what extent do these similarities and differences follow from their
explicit views? In particular: to what extent do they follow from
their respective views on the role in ethics of ``empirical
anthropology''--the study of human nature as it's actually found to
be? (Notice this is tricky because it would be all too easy to prove
that, from Kant's point of view, all examples are useless. But he
nevertheless uses them. Why? One possible line of thought: what is the
importance for Kant of the appeal to ``common understanding''?) What
about the citing of ancient authorities (historians and/or moralists)
and biblical texts--how do Kant and Hume differ in this respect, and
why? (Are these the same or different from more abstract or
contemporary examples?)
- Consider a distinction between a moral philosopher, on the one
hand, and a moralist--roughly speaking, someone who tries to get
people to be moral--on the other. Is this distinction ultimately
valid, according to Hume or Kant or both, and if so how and why (i.e.,
why aren't these the same thing)? What methods should a moralist
(whether or not this is the same as a moral philosopher) use? That is:
(a) what methods will be effective; (b) what methods are legitimate
(permissible)? (Is there any distinction between questions (a) and
(b), for Hume or Kant or both? Is the goal, ``getting people to be
moral,'' the same for both Hume and Kant, or does it mean different
things for each?) In particular, should a moralist attempt to teach
people what morality is (``metaethics''), or what things are moral
(``ethics''), or both? If so, how, and how will the content of this
teaching be the same as or different from the content or moral
philosophy? Can we (again, according to Hume and Kant) be optimistic
that moralists will be successful?
- A related topic: one of the many motives that influence human
action is the motive of ``speculation'': i.e., people (at least some
people) are motivated to investigate matters of truth or falsehood
concerning certain (``interesting'') topics. How, according to Hume
and Kant, is this motive related to other motives, and in particular
to moral motivation? Is speculation, according to them, always
or sometimes (privately or socially) useful and/or moral, or, on the
contrary, is it always or sometimes pernicious and/or immoral?
Conversely: are moral truths and/or moral people, according to Hume
and Kant, always ``interesting'' in a speculative sense, or are they
(always or sometimes) boring? Given whatever problems may appear in
these areas, how (if at all) do Hume and Kant try to justify their own
investigations (as interesting and/or moral)?
- The concepts of universality and objectivity (being the same for
everyone, from every point of view) are important for both Hume and
Kant. To what extent do they play the same role in both systems, and
to what extent do they play different roles? Do they mean the same
thing? (Who is ``everyone''?) How do Hume and Kant's uses of these
concepts relate to such traditional formulae as ``Love thy neighbor as
thyself'' and ``Do as you would be done by''? (Can Hume and/or Kant be
seen as interpreting these sayings? As correcting them?) In what ways
would Kant say that Hume's analysis of morality, in terms of these
concepts, is correct, and exactly where would he say Hume has got
things wrong? What about Hume: what would he say about Kant in this
respect?
- What, according to Hume and according to Kant, would an
exemplary, ideally moral person be like? What kind of personality would such a person have (according to each)? How would
each judge the other's moral person? How would each of them judge
themselves? That is: how, based on their writings, do their own
personalities compare to those of their respective exemplary moral
people? (Can you think of another point of view from which both of
these exemplary moral people, and/or both Hume and Kant, might seem
deficient? E.g., what would Aristotle say, or Socrates, or Cervantes,
or Achilles?)
- Compare Kant's moral proof of the existence of God (in the Critique of Practical Reason) with the various proofs discussed by
Hume's characters in his Dialogues concerning Natural
Religion. In what ways is it fundamentally different from all those
proofs (and in what, if any, ways is it similar)? How, if at all, does
Kant evade the various dilemmas which Hume's characters explore (e.g.,
with respect to the ``anthropomorphist'' doctrine that God is similar
to humans versus the ``mystical'' doctrine that God's nature is
incomprehensible to us)? What would Hume think of this proof? How
would it look given Hume's ideas about morality, empiricism,
skepticism? (You might also consider bringing in some of the other
thinkers from last quarter--e.g., Leibniz, St. Anselm. But try to
focus mostly on Hume and Kant.)
- Compare Kant's argument, at the beginning of section I of the
Grounding, that the only absolutely good thing is a good will,
with Socrates' argument in the Meno that knowledge is the
good. How are these two arguments related? How does Kant think they
are related? (Note his explicit mention of Socrates and the Socratic
method towards the end of the section.) Does Kant think that Socrates
goes wrong somewhere in his argument (thus ending up with knowledge
rather than the will), and if so where would he say is the mistake? Or
can Kant understand Socrates in such a way as to agree with him? What
might Socrates say about Kant's argument, and how would Kant reply?
Next: About this document ...
Up: HUMA 11700, Spring 2003,
Previous: First Paper
Abe Stone
2006-01-18