

Sources of Neo-Nationalism and Resistance in Japan

Hiroshi Fukurai and Jon P. Alston*

This article focuses on non-conformity toward Japan's two most sacred nationalistic images, the nation and the Emperor. This is done through an analysis of the extent that Japanese school system provides the opportunity for their students to sing the national anthem and salute the national flag during the annual graduation ceremony.

Contemporary Japan seems to many to be a model industrialized society (Vogel, 1979). And, in fact, selected Japanese social structures and institutions are seen as ideal models for nations that are suffering from the ills of modernization, industrialization, and/or international economic competition (Krooth and Fukurai, 1990; Shoji, 1986a).

Many authors suggest that the Japanese educational system is superior to those in other countries (Reischauer, 1964; Vogel, 1979); that many Japanese managerial practices are superior to America's (Abegglen, 1973, 1984a, 1984b; Alston, 1986; Glickman, 1979); and even that Japan's criminal justice and law enforcement systems are some of the best when compared to those of other industrialized nations (Ames, 1981; Clifford, 1976).

Japanese society, in fact, does *seem* to be free of many of the ills common to other countries who have or are going through the process of modernization. The society is said to exhibit relatively few conflicts and strains based on social class inequality, racism, urbanization and rapid industrialization.

One reason for this picture of Japan as both ideal and stable is that social science research and its popularized counterpart (Ouchi, 1981) of Japanese society focus almost exclusively on the sources of harmony and its post-war economic successes (Reischauer, 1988; Vogel, 1979). Until recently, there has been very little research focusing on the negative aspects of Japan's economic development, though there are exceptions (Alston et al., 1990; Krauss et al., 1984; Sugimoto, 1980; Woronoff, 1982a and 1982b). In the main, social conflict in Japan has been ignored, though the post-war period has witnessed fist fights in the parliament (diet), years-long resistance to the building of Tokyo's international airport (Apter and Sawa, 1984), and various students,' teachers' and transportation workers' strikes, mass sit-ins, and riots (Shoji, 1986a).

*Boards of Studies in Sociology, University of California, Santa Cruz

*Dept. of Sociology, Texas A and M University

In addition, scholars have tended to ignore problematic areas of the Japanese society because on the surface, its citizens appear satisfied and do conform to the general expectations of their society. In Japan, conformity is strongly rewarded and non-conformity of any type is likely to isolate the deviant (Okimoto and Rohlen, 1986; Wagatsuma and De Vos, 1984); it is seldom rewarding to be different in Japan, as indicated by the saying, "the nail that stands out gets hammered" (De Vos and Romanucci-Ross, 1975).

The Japanese society is in many ways communal, and the Japanese are taught from childhood to subordinate individual desires to the benevolent group (Doi, 1974; Wolferen, 1989). In addition, the Japanese prefer to keep conflict from becoming overt; issues that may cause disagreement are discussed "informally" using a process called *nemawashi* ('taking care of the roots') until a consensus is reached. As a result, once a status quo is achieved, the Japanese work very hard to preserve what all members of a group accept and support on-going policy (Earhart, 1982).

In spite of this collective pressure supporting conformity, Japan's educational system since the end of the American occupation in 1952 has experienced a series of conflicts usually kept from the public's view. For instance, there have been numerous conflicts between teachers and their highly militant labor union (the Nikkyoso) and the central authorities. A major issue is the degree to which schools will indoctrinate students in various "moral" programs to develop nationalistic feelings among student that include a modern form of emperor worship (Buruma, 1989; Shoji, 1986b).

The issue of students' nonconformity toward patriotic activities is related to feelings of neo-nationalism and emperor worship which allegedly are increasing. Involved is the question of the function and purpose of education in Japan (Buruma, 1989). One traditional function of universal education has been the development of patriotism among future adults and their assimilation into the society as passive, obedient citizens (Smith, 1983).

The Emergence of Neo-Nationalism

The Japanese educational system historically reflected the government's efforts to indoctrinate people with the importance of nationalism and Shinto principles, such as filial piety and loyalty to the government and the Emperor (Morishima, 1982). To critical observers of Japanese society, for example, the recent actions (see below) led by the Ministry of Education were interpreted as attempts to resurrect the old nationalistic movement by bringing together the imperialist state and Shinto religion (Buruma, 1989). The actions by the Ministry of Education and their connection to the re-emergence of Japanese nationalism within the context of the Japanese educational system were recently made public to the world through two general sets of events.

First, the Ministry of Education attempted to re-write officially-sanctioned school history books which exonerated those involved in Japanese invasion of China and the conquest and colonization of Korea (Cho, 1987). The strong protest by the Chinese and Korean governments delayed Japanese ministry actions that were

designed to solidify the image of "racial purity" as stressed by Shintoism (Morishima, 1982). Related to these attempts is the general avoidance (in school materials) of materials discussing Chinese and Koreans living in Japan. By ignoring the elements of racial dissension, social inequality, and discrimination against minority groups in Japan, such textbooks promote the *illusion* of mono-cultural and monoracial society.

In most Japanese textbooks, the histories of the minorities living in Japan have been either ignored or presented in such a way that Japanese oppression and discrimination were played down or justified. Most teachers consider issues about national minorities as taboo topics. Even as late as 1985, textbooks, class instructions, teachers' attitudes, and general school policies remained biased against the Koreans and other minorities in Japan (Cho, 1985). By assuming that ethnic discrimination does not exist, teachers in effect help preserve the structure of inequality (Lee and De Vos, 1981). Minority children attending Japanese schools are thus deprived of their history and made to feel negatively about their ethnic identities (Cho, 1987).

Contrary to the government's effort to portray Japan as "mono-racial society," Japanese society remains a multi-cultural and ethnic one (see Table 1). While today Koreans constitute less than 1% of the Japanese population, Koreans are Japan's largest "foreign" national minority group and represent approximately 80% of minorities in Japan. During World War II, however, there were more than 2 million Koreans who were brought to Japan to work in mines and war-related factories (Lee and De

TABLE 1 :Foreign Nationals Living in Japan, 1980, 1985, and 1986*

Country	1980	1985	1986
	Total Percent	Total Percent	Total Percent
Korea	664,536 (84.8%)!	636,313 (80.3%)	677,959 (78.1%)
China	52,892 (6.7)	74,924 (8.8)	84,397 (9.7)
U.S.A	22,401 (2.8)	29,044 (3.4)	30,695 (3.5)
Philippine	5,947 (0.7)	12,261 (1.4)	18,897 (2.1)
England	4,956 (0.6)	6,792 (0.7)	7,426 (0.8)
West Germany	2,716 (0.3)	3,017 (0.3)	3,193 (0.3)
Total	782,910 (0.6)*	850,612 (0.7)	867,237 (0.7)

Source: Table 14, *Statistics Handbook of Japan*, Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, 1988.

* : The figure is based on the Japanese Nationality Act for foreign citizens. Burakumin are not considered to be aliens by the Japanese government and therefore are not included in the figure.

! : The figure shows the proportion to the total foreign citizens for the same year.

+ : The figure shows the proportion of the total foreigners for the total Japanese population for the same year.

Vos, 1981). The majority of today's residence of Korean descent are not Japanese citizens, even though more than 80% of the current total Korean minority population was born in Japan. The vast majority of these "born-in-Japan" Koreans are second, third, and fourth generations (Cho, 1987).

Another "invisible" minority group is the Burakumin. While the Burakumin *are* Japanese citizens and racially indistinguishable from the majority, Burakumin have been discriminated against because of the history of their traditionally-held occupations dealing with dead animals. Today, Burakumin comprise approximately 1.5% of the Japanese population (*Buraku Kenkyu Kaiho-Sha*, 1988; Theodore, 1968). The group forms a caste, in that non-Burakumin refuse to intermarry into the group.

Another form of discrimination is the fact that corporations do not hire Burakumin as permanent, lifetime employees. The Burakumin are therefore blocked from achieving economic security and occupational mobility. This group has not taken part in the Japanese post-war "economic miracle." As an example of the social discrimination against Burakumin, prospective employers and in-laws often hire detectives to trace the lineages of potential employees and marriage mates to ensure that they are not Burakumin (De Vos, 1973; Donoghue, 1978). Illiteracy rates among Burakumin still remain high because of persistent discrimination in the current Japanese educational system (*Buraku Kaiho Kenkyu-sha*, 1988).

Yet, the myth of mono-ethnicity and mono-culture has been the cornerstone of the government's stance towards the problem of race/ethnic inequality in Japan. Former Prime Minister Nakasone's recent remarks, for example, portray Japan as a mono-ethnic nation with implications of racial "purity" and superiority over other races.¹ They further reflect a social and political process which ignores modern Japan's ethnic conflicts and racial problems.² Despite pressures toward political conformity and its strong association with Shinto religion, the actual potential source of collective movements and social change come from the "impure" national race/ethnic populations, i.e., ethnic and population heterogeneity exists in spite of official inattention.

In sum, the Ministry of Education and its officially sanctioned textbooks remain oblivious to the problem of minorities in Japan. There has been no major reform as yet in regard to the inclusion of materials dealing with various minorities. They are still "invisible" within the context of textbooks and lecture topics. Except for research conducted at the Institute of Social Problems at the Osaka City University, the Ministry of Education and Japanese social scientists have largely neglected minority issues and ethnic problems in Japan.

The second general set of events indicating a re-emergence of Japanese neo-nationalism deals with a growing interest in reestablishing the Emperor as a major national symbol. The Ministry of Education has issued a directive requiring schools to sing the Japanese national anthem and salute the national flag during the annual graduation ceremony. The Ministry has also issued a directive ordering that school children be taught respect for the Emperor. The Japanese national flag represents the

symbol of the state. By the same token, the national anthem represents the permanence of the imperial reign and the Shinto principles of state supremacy, based in part on racial superiority and purity (Morishima, 1982).

The events surrounding the Emperor's death and burial ceremonies suggest that the Emperor remains a national symbol linking the Japanese people to a nation which is considered unique and sacred (Buruma, 1989). Political events and religious ceremonies related to the former Emperor's death and the reinstatement of his son as his successor indicate that the distance between the state and the Shinto religion has been significantly reduced in recent years. This has resulted in the emergence of a form of neo-nationalism prevalent during the 1920s and 1930s (Wolferen, 1989).

During Emperor Hirohito's death watch, the Japanese media ran special programs in Tennoism (the divinity of Imperial families) and personal histories of Hirohito.³ There existed a society-wide tacit agreement to restrain the criticism of Hirohito concerning his responsibility for Japan's entry to wars. When the issue was raised, however, the person doing it was likely to be denounced and attacked, both physically and verbally. For example, Mayor of Nagasaki, Hitoshi Motoshima, during a session of the municipal assembly, remarked that the Emperor had been partly responsible for the war and thus for the ill fate of his city where an atomic bomb was dropped. Rightists issued death threats and gathered around the Mayor's house in loudspeaker-carrying trucks to bawl obscenities and threats to the Mayor and members of his family. Motoshima was later shot and seriously injured. Similar conflicts also took place in Okinawa.⁴

Educational and political pressures to promote national unity by the Ministry of Education, the myth of mono-ethnicity reflected by Nakasone's remarks, the imperial state, and its association with Shintoism, all suggest the potential re-emergence of Japanese neo-nationalism. By neo-nationalism, we refer to the recent emergence of both educational and conformist political movements and the further reduction of the distance between the state and Shintoism, the indigenous Japanese religion which contains elements of emperor worship. The recent death watch of the late Emperor and the related events following the funeral further indicate that the distance between the state and religion has been reduced to its smallest point since the end of the American occupation in 1952.

The analysis below focuses on the amount and source of nonconformity against the imperialist state and its relation with Shintoism. This is done through an analysis of the extent to which school system in Japan provides the opportunity for their students to sing the national anthem and salute the national flag during a graduation ceremony.

Methods of Analyzing Conformism

Two data sets are linked to serve as the foundation for the empirical analysis. Japanese Census data for 1985-86 are utilized to examine the relationship among the development of neo-nationalism or conformity and ethnic diversities among Japan's forty-

seven prefectures. Prefectures form the basic administrative unit below the national government. Each prefecture has officials elected by popular vote and is essentially self-governing. Prefectures are sub-autonomous political and economic units and provide social services (welfare, health, police, etc) based on special local needs demands. The Japanese prefectures are considered to be equivalent to a combination of America's state and regional socio-political units.

Prefecture boundaries were drawn during the late nineteenth century to reflect social and historical distinctiveness. Even today, Japanese prefectures exhibit a wide variation of social customs and values recognized and honored by government officials. As such, an attempt to use prefecture-level analysis reflects social and political reality.

The second kind of data came from the 1985 national survey of the Japanese educational institution. In 1985, The *Asahi* newspaper published the result of a national survey of all public and private schools below the university level. The survey noted which schools supported a policy officially sanctioning the saluting of the flag and the singing of the national anthem during the previous year's graduation ceremonies. The data are reported by prefecture.

In our explanatory model, a number of socio-political variables are selected from the 1985-1986 census and 1985 national survey and their relationship is systematically examined. All variables are based on the prefectural level.

Variables

In the present model, neo-nationalism is defined in terms of two characteristics that correspond to the pressure toward national conformity and which are represented by two phenomena: (1) hoisting and saluting the Japanese national flag and (2) singing of the Japanese national anthem in different levels of the Japanese national school system. The proportions of Japanese schools in each prefecture hoisting the national flag and singing the national anthem are used as the dependent variables. The following three school levels are included in our model: (1) elementary, (2) junior high, and (3) high schools. The conformity to the state is measured by the proportion of those three schools that hoisted and saluted the national flag during a graduation ceremony in 1984.

State Conformity:

While the flag is a secular symbol representing the state, the act of saluting Japan's flag involves a number of implicit values, in part because Japan is the only former Axis nation not to change its flag after the end of the Second World War. The act of saluting the flag can be defined by the participants as a re-affirmation of pre-war imperialistic values, a re-affirmation supported by Japan's system of public education. Thus, saluting the flag remains today a measure of imperial loyalty and reverence to the traditional imperial state system (Smith, 1983). Most teachers (esp., Nikkyoso) resist

having to support the policy of having students salute the flag as a required activity. Teachers feel that such behavior defines an act of reverence to the Emperor and the traditional imperial system which led the nation into a disastrous war.

Religious Conformity:

Conformity to the state-supporting Shinto religion is represented by the proportion of schools in each prefecture that allowed the singing of the Japanese national anthem during their graduation ceremonies. The Japanese national anthem, "Kimigayo," lauds the permanence of the imperial reign and the Shinto principle of state supremacy.⁵ Shintoism is an indigenous Japanese religion whose original roots are closely tied to the imperial family and Tennoism. Shintoism supplied a religious rationale for the loyal and patriotic sentiments of the Japanese and for the Heavenly Emperor and the Divine Land (shinkoku, i.e., the land with supernatural powers) (Morishima, 1982:38-39).

Singing the national anthem also represents Emperor-centered neo-nationalism. This image comes not in traditional religious Shinto, but only in "State Shinto," which was a politico-religious creation — really a civil religion of the 20th century (Apter and Sawa, 1984). For example, Kimigayo is explicitly about the Emperor and is reinforced by the Emperor's Shinto connections. Japanese Christians have historically argued that such symbols of reverence directed at the Emperor constitute Emperor "worship" and thus violate the separation of church and state and the religious rights of Christians (Morishima, 1982).

The measurements for conformity to both state and religion are based on the observation of the Japanese national school system in 1985. The two specific activities, hoisting and saluting of the national flag and singing the national anthem by the student are very important factors in the formation of state unity and Shinto conformism because they have far-reaching effects on behavioral and psychological patterns of Japanese students. For example, the current Japanese educational system produces one of the most literate students bodies among industrialized nations (Gibney, 1985). In comparison with the American high school student, only the top 5% of American high school students can compete against 75% of Japanese high school students in mathematics and science (Okimoto and Rohlen, 1986). Such differences are accounted for by the greater emphasis upon Japanese students' educational success in their earlier age.

While the tremendous stress on the success of earlier educational career has varying effects on the student's subsequent life career, the pre-college school experience is important in forming adult attitude and behavior. Hoisting and saluting to the national flag and singing the national anthem in the earlier school age have important subsequent life implications on Japanese students. It is not surprising that many companies also enforce similar rituals on the part of their employees (Abegglen, 1984b; Okimoto and Rohlen, 1986).

Sources of Nonconformity:

The source of non-conformity to the neo-nationalism that is being officially promoted is represented by two measures of social heterogeneity: ethnic and population heterogeneity. Ethnic heterogeneity is measured by the total number of Korean nationals and other foreigners living in Japan. The Korean population is selected for the ethnic diversity because it represents the largest minority group in Japan and because it is the most active of all minorities in terms of demands for ethnic equality. The Burakumin might be the most ideal group for the analysis, unfortunately the complete prefectural data were not available.

Korean demands for equality and cultural survival include the protest against the fingerprinting law and against the assimilation policies of the Japanese government. The movement also supports the protest against various levels of discrimination in education, jobs, marriage, and housing (Lee, 1982). Thus, the prefecture with a large number of Koreans is characterized by the greater demands for ethnic equality and enhancement of their social status and ethnic identity (Wagatsuma, 1981).

Another source of non-conformity to the neo-nationalism is population heterogeneity among the Japanese population as a whole. Population heterogeneity enhances the need for greater conformity and homogeneity because of the strong cultural emphasis on consensus and uniformity. The greater flow of population between prefectures reflects a lower level of social integration in the community and thus gives rise to mechanisms for reenforcing social conformity (Fukurai, 1991; Fukurai and Alston, 1990).


Shelton (1987), for example, suggests that community size makes possible a high level of residential mobility which in turn leads to lower levels of social integration. She contends that the community with high levels of population influx has experienced the disintegration of traditional values and cultures leading to greater social disarray and disorganization. Thus, population heterogeneity influences the level of social integration and cultural homogeneity.

The strong emphasis on cultural homogeneity and mono-ethnicity is thus affected by both race/ethnic heterogeneity and population mobility. Population heterogeneity is measured by the extent to which people move in and out of the prefectures. The total number of both in- and out-prefecture migrants during 1985 is used to reflect the extent of population heterogeneity.

In sum, the structural model for the conformity to both the state and religion is represented by the following four latent factors: (1) state conformity, (2) religious conformity, (3) ethnic heterogeneity, and (4) population heterogeneity.

We hypothesize that conformity to the imperialist state and state-supporting Shinto religion is significantly influenced by the nature of population compositions. Conformity to the state will show a negative relation with ethnic diversity because greater ethnic population in a given prefecture reduces the homogeneity of the culture and belief systems. In summary, both ethnic diversity and population heterogeneity reduce the danger of potential links between the imperialist state and its association

Figure 1. The Theoretical Model of Neo-Nationalism and Resistance in Japan



with Shintoism, the indigenous Japanese religion. The basic theoretical tenet of the neo-nationalism model is shown in Figure 1.

Data Analysis

The causal relationship among the model's variables is estimated using the covariance matrices of the measured variables as input to the LISREL VI computer program (Fukurai et al., 1991; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1985).

For each of the causal analyses, the measurement and structural models are estimated simultaneously. The relationships between the measurement variables and the latent constructs are expressed as factor loadings (or reliability coefficients). The structural model expresses the hypothesized causal relationships among the latent constructs as regression coefficients. By fitting this model to actual observed data, the model of neo-nationalism and the relationship between the conformity to the state and religion can be systematically examined.

The likelihood-ratio, chi-square statistic, and the likelihood-ratio indices (delta and rho) are employed in comparing fits in order to control for sample size (Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Bollen, 1989; Fukurai et al., 1991). While failure to reject the null hypothesis may be taken as an indication that the model is consistent with the data, it is important to bear in mind that alternative models may also be consistent with the data (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1985; Fukurai, 1991). Moreover, because the chi-square test is affected by sample size, it follows that (1) given a sufficiently large sample, an overidentified model may be rejected even when it fits the data well; and (2) when the sample size is small, one may fail to reject the null hypothesis even when the model

Table 2: Correlation Coefficients Among the Structural Variables

Variables	(X1)	(X2)	(X3)	(X4)	(Y1)	(Y2)	(Y3)	(Y4)	(Y5)	(Y6)
X1: Koreans*										
X2: Foreigners*	0.981 ²									
X3: In-Migration*	0.664 ²	0.745 ²								
X4: Out-Migration*	0.646 ²	0.764 ²	0.901 ²							
Y1: Flag in Elementary Schools +	-0.280	-0.269	-0.212	-0.103						
Y2: Flag in Junior High Schools	-0.308 ¹	-0.293 ¹	-0.209	-0.105	0.986 ²					
Y3: Flag in High Schools	-0.172	-0.226	-0.273	-0.324 ¹	0.586 ²	0.586 ²				
Y4: Song in Elementary Schools!	-0.355 ¹	-0.345 ¹	-0.305 ¹	-0.162	0.723 ²	0.734 ²	0.699 ²			
Y5: Song in Junior High Schools	-0.361 ¹	-0.351 ¹	-0.325 ¹	-0.184	0.693 ²	0.723 ²	0.692 ²	0.983 ²		
Y6: Song in High Schools	-0.324 ¹	-0.351 ¹	-0.347 ¹	-0.336 ¹	0.517 ²	0.523 ²	0.757 ²	0.762 ²	0.779 ²	
Mean	92.43	91.88	84.15	75.90	72.88	60.17	14.39	3.22	71.04	66.57
S.D.	16.94	17.09	26.64	31.62	33.34	41.33	31.43	8.31	89.46	81.02

Source: Buraku Kaiho Kenkyu-Jo. 1988. *Guraku Mondai: Shiryo To Kaisetsu*, Osaka, Japan: Kaiho Shuppan-Sha. p.339.

*: In 1,000 populations.

+: In the 1984 graduation ceremony (%).

!: "Kimigayo," the national anthem of Japan, is translated as "the Imperial reign," an emblem of Shintoism.


1: $p < .05$ 2: $p < .01$

fits the data poorly (Matsueda and Bielby, 1986). Therefore, a general null model based on modified independence among variables is also proposed to provide an additional reference point for the evaluation of neo-nationalism and the source of non-conformity in contemporary Japanese race/ethnic relations.⁶ Correlation coefficients among ten observed variables are shown in Table 2.

Figure 2 shows the Japanese neo-nationalism model with path coefficients generated from latent structural estimations. Several findings are noteworthy. First, ethnic diversity affects neo-nationalistic behavior negatively, suggesting that the greater the diversity of ethnic composition in a given prefecture, the less the conformity to the state and religion (-.482 and -.443, respectively). These two structural coefficients are significant at the .05 level.

Secondly, population fluidity and instability as measured by both in- and out-prefectural migration shows both positive and negative effects: (1) a positive effect on the extent of conformity to the state and (2) a negative effect on the religious conformity (.237 and -.113, respectively).⁷ This finding suggests that higher rates of population mobility demand a greater amount of societal conformity toward the state. The negative effect of population heterogeneity on religious conformity also suggests that mobile populations do not increase the overall level of religious conformity in the region, perhaps because Shintoist principles tend to stress more private enlightenment and emphasize greater inner cultivation among individuals. The examination of the true effect of Shintoism in forming individual ideology, however, requires further research.

Figure 2. The Empirical Model of Neo-Nationalism and Resistance in Japan



Our analysis suggests that both ethnic and population heterogeneities affect the acceptance of neo-nationalism directly and/or indirectly. Examining the decomposition of the total effects between exogenous and endogenous factors is of great importance since it shows the extent of direct and indirect effects of ethnic and population heterogeneities on state and religious conformities (see Table 3).

The examination of those effects reveals a number of unexpected but significant findings. First, the total effects of all heterogeneous indicators on conformity variables are negative. This points out that ethnic and population heterogeneity *reduces* conformist harmony and consequently the overall level of neo-nationalistic activities in Japan's school systems. That is, the prefecture with a high concentration of Koreans and ethnic minorities is more likely to demonstrate the greater resistance towards the overall consensus on saluting the national flag and singing the national anthem. This coincides with the findings reported by Cho (1985) and Krooth and Fukurai (1990).

Secondly, the direct impacts of the model's heterogeneity measures on the neo-nationalism are negative. The exception is a direct impact of population heterogeneity on the religious conformity, which remains positive. This suggests that ethnic diversity in the region reduces the attraction to neo-nationalist movements; however, population heterogeneity as measured by migration patterns increases the likelihood of neo-nationalist activities.

Third, the indirect impacts of ethnic heterogeneity are all positive (.197 and .109), suggesting that the impact of ethnic heterogeneity is mediated by population heterogeneity and positively enhances neo-nationalist activities. This is somewhat an unexpected finding and needs further elaborations. As Figure 2 indicates, ethnic and population heterogeneities are highly correlated (.726). It indicates that the greater the

ethnic minority composition in a given prefecture, the greater the population mobility and vice versa. Past research suggests that greater mobility patterns lead to the lower level of social integration but in return create the social condition that sees ethnic minorities as a threat to social stability and thus stresses the dominant ethnic and cultural ideology (See Shelton, 1987; Shoji, 1986a). For instance, while the large Korean population in Kansai Region (Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, etc) historically has been responsible for the radical movement in an effort to upgrade the social condition of minorities and eliminate ethnic and cultural inequities, ethnic minorities also encoun-

Table 3 : The Decomposition of Total Effects into Direct and Indirect Effects

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Total Effect</i>	<i>Direct Effect</i>	<i>Indirect Effect</i>
EH - ST	-.285	-.482	.197
EH - RE	-.334	-.443	.109
PH - ST	-.128	.237	-.365
PH - RE	-.229	-.113	-.116
EH - PH	.726	na	na
ST - RE	.686	na	na

Note: EH=Ethnic Heterogeneity; PH=Population Heterogeneity; ST=Conformity to the State; RE=Conformity to the Religion.

tered the greater resistance against social change. That is, while ethnic heterogeneity in the region was the direct cause of assessing and rejecting the majority's dominant religious and state ideology, ethnic heterogeneity was equally responsible for creating the greater resistance and antagonism by the majority that in turn stressed the dominant ideology and promoted the state and religious nationalistic conformity (Krooth and Fukurai, 1990).

This finding thus points out that population heterogeneity appears to mediate the negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the neo-nationalism and convert it into positive effects by enhancing the overall level of neo-nationalistic activities in the region.

Overall Effects of Heterogeneity on the Rise of Neo-nationalism

While the direct and indirect effects of both population and ethnic heterogeneity measures remain both positive and negative, it is important to note that the analysis includes the measurement of the overall effect of the source of nonconformity on neo-nationalistic activities. That is, what is the extent of the overall effect of heterogeneity on neo-nationalism in Japanese society?


Figure 3 shows a second-stage, covariance structural equation model (LISREL) to isolate two latent factors, *heterogeneity* and *neo-nationalism* and capture the causal

connection between them. In the model, two first-stage latent structural constructs, ethnic and population heterogeneities, now represent the single abstract concept of overall heterogeneity. Similarly, state and religious conformities are formed to indicate the unified factor of the neo-nationalist movement.

The effect of overall heterogeneity on neo-nationalism is negative (-.379), indicating that the presence of heterogeneous elements in the region directly reduces the likelihood of neo-nationalism activities by lowering the conformity to both the secular state and the Shinto religious principles.

The second-stage LISREL analysis further implies that the overall neo-nationalist movement might be restricted by greater demands toward ethnic equality and cultural identity among minority groups. While there still exists strong pressures to portray Japan as both mono-ethnic society and mono-cultural nation, the greater ethnic composition and population heterogeneity can lead to further reduction of pressures towards state unity and Shinto conformism.⁸

Figure 3. Overall Effects of Heterogeneity on Neo-Nationalism



In fact, recently efforts have been made toward the elimination of selected aspects of racial and ethnic discrimination in Japan. For example, a significant, though limited, step has been the hiring of Korean teachers in Japanese public schools in 1981 after many years of protest and petition. Protests against fingerprinting laws and assimilation policies of the Japanese government are also led by Koreans and other ethnic minorities. Their purpose is to promote ethnic identity and to eliminate discrimination in education, jobs, marriage, and housing (Lee, 1982; Krooth and Fukurai, 1990). In recent years, those movements became responsible for promoting Japan's image as one of a multi-ethnic and -cultural society, evaluating the entwined

relationship between the imperial family and the state, and creating the greater resistance against the neo-nationalistic movement.

Conclusion

The Japanese educational system historically reflected the government's effort to indoctrinate people with the notion of nationalism and Shinto principles, filial piety and loyalty to the government and the Emperor. This article then examined the extent and sources of non-conformity toward Japan's most sacred nationalistic images, the nation and the Emperor. The analysis was performed by examining the extent to which school system in Japan provides the opportunity for their students to sing the national anthem and salute the national flag during a graduation ceremony.

Our analyses suggest that ethnic diversity (i.e., Koreans and other foreign nationals) affects neo-nationalistic behavior negatively, indicating that the greater the diversity of ethnic composition in a given prefecture, the less the conformity to state and religion. Secondly, population influx and instability, as measured by both in- and out-prefectural migration affect positively the extent of conformity to the state. On the other hand, population heterogeneity negatively affects religious conformity. Higher rates of population mobility, then, demand a greater amount of societal conformity toward the state. The negative effect of population heterogeneity on religious conformity further suggests that mobile populations do not increase the overall level of religious conformity in the region.

Our analysis substantiated the argument that both ethnic and population heterogeneities are important determinants of neo-nationalistic movements in contemporary Japan. Our finding suggests that such heterogeneities *reduce* conformist harmony and consequently the overall level of neo-nationalistic activities.

Acknowledgement:

The research was funded by the Faculty Senate at the University of California, Santa Cruz; the College of Liberal Arts, the Center for Urban affairs, the Institute of Pacific Asia, and the Office of International Coordination at Texas A and M University. We would like to thank Drs. John Kitsuse, Dane Archer, and John Childs in the Board of Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz and Letitia Alston, Gail Thomas, Thomas Glass, Mary Zey, and Karen Wilson at the Department of Sociology in Texas A and M University for their valuable comments on the earlier draft of the paper.

Notes

1. The whole text of his speech is found in *Chuo-Koron*, November 1986, pp.146-162. Further, in response to the criticism from the United States, he replied on September 24 that "the United States is a multi-national society and in some fields, such as education, there are points that they have not reached" (*San Francisco Chronicle*, September 24, 1986 (*Washington Post*)). See also note 2 below. Later on November 21 at a Diet session, Nakasone further underemphasized the existence of racial conflicts in Japan by saying "I believe no minorities in Japan who hold Japanese citizenship are discriminated against. ... My eyebrows and beard are thick. I think there's much Ainu blood in me" (*Asahi*, October 22, 1986).

2. On September 22, 1986 at the training session for the junior members of his ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Yasuhiro Nakasone, at the time Japan's Prime Minister, stated, "Japan is now a highly educated and fairly 'intelligent' society, much more so than America, where there are many Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans" (*Asahi*, September 27, 1986). Major Japanese media, such as NHK, the *Asahi*, the *Yomiuri*, and the *Mainichi-Shinbuns*, failed to give coverage to Nakasone's remarks immediately after the speech. The press only began to criticize Nakasone after the extensive U.S. media coverage of the matter. Further, the criticism brought out by the Japanese press centered on Nakasone for having touched upon an American "taboo" during a "critical stage" in U.S.-Japan relation. Nakasone's racial remarks can be traced to Japan's long history of race/ethnic relations and conflicts. While Nakasone boasted of Japanese cultural homogeneity and mono-ethnic identity, his remarks ignored the long history of the minority problems in Japan.

For more information, see *Asahi*, September 27, 1986. See also critical comments on the Japanese media coverage by Yoshihisa Furumori in *Mainich*, September 30, 1986, Kazuaki Okabe, "Nakasone Hatugen to Taminzoku Shakai," *Sansenri*, Winter 1986, pp.147-153, and *Mikkan Gendai*, September 28, 1986.

3. Many historians claim that Prince Shotoku Taishi (574-622) coined the name, "Tenno" (Heavenly Emperor) for the Japanese emperor. Before the title had been "O-kimi" (Great King). The change had far-reaching results. The new term implies that Emperor was no longer a king but was a Manifest God (ara-hito-gami) and was thus identified with God. There could consequently be no possibility of conflict between God and Emperor and hence no revolution was admissible. The imperial throne was thus provided with divine right and established on a firm ideological and theological foundation (Morishima, 1982:22-24)
4. The Liberal Democratic Party, of which he was an advisor, tried to make him retract his remark. The Mayor stuck to his position and is no longer a party adviser. As soon as the official period of national mourning was over, he received a bullet in the mail and other death threats (Buruma, 1989, p.59). Motoshima is a devout Christian born on a small island off the coast of Kyushu, the southern Japanese island. His grandfather was tortured for his Christian faith. Motoshima himself was punished by his schoolteachers before the war for not paying enough respect to the Emperor and forced to pray at Shinto shrines.
5. The lyrics of the Japanese National Anthem, "Kimigayo," are as follows: KIMIGAYO WA CHIYONI YACHIYONI SAZARE ISHI NO MIYAO TO NARITE KOKENO MUSUMADE. The song stresses the permanence of the imperial reign in Japan
6. Delta and rho are calculated in the following equations:

$$\Delta = \frac{\text{chi-square (null)} - \text{chi-square (model)}}{\text{chi-square (null)}}$$

$$\rho = \frac{\frac{\text{chi-square (null)}}{\text{d.f. (null)}} - \frac{\text{chi-square (model)}}{\text{d.f. (model)}}}{\text{chi-square (null)} - 1.0}$$

For further reference, see Bentler and Bonett, 1980.

7. The reported coefficients are standardized estimates. Because the standard deviations of the variables are large for the indicators of both ethnic and population heterogeneities, it was not feasible to use the covariance matrix as an input matrix for LISREL runs. Thus, the interpretation of the findings is sample specific; the model's external validity may require greater caution for generalizing the findings to other samples (or populations).
8. We exclusively focused on the aggregate information to examine the causal relationship among the model's variables. We do not, however, negate the importance of micro-level factors, such as human

capital variables and their effects on the neo-nationalism movements. The major concern in using aggregate information explaining the current status of neo-nationalism reflected by the activities in the Japanese school system is that of ecological fallacy. The explanation of behavioral variations such as hoisting the flag and singing the national anthem requires certain assumptions of the linkage between behavioral and areal phenomena. We believe however, that the use of aggregate information is useful in explaining the regional variation of school activities and ethnic heterogeneity (see Fukurai, 1991 and Fukurai et al., 1990 for greater discussions on the use of aggregate data to examine behavioral assumptions of general populations).

References

- Abegglen, James. 1973. *Management and Worker: The Japanese Solution*. Tokyo, Japan: Sophia University.
- _____. 1984a. *The Japanese Factory*. Salem, N.H.: L Ayer Co.
- _____. 1984b. *The Strategy of Japanese Business*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co.
- Alston, Jon. 1986. *American Samurai*. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- _____, Hiroshi Fukurai, Yeongi Son, and Minjeong Park. 1990. "A Heuristic for Locating a Retail Business in Japan," *Journal of Global Business* 1 (Summer): 46-52
- Ames, Walter L. 1971. *Police and Community in Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Apter, David E. and Nagoya Sawa. 1984. *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan*. Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. 1989. *Structural Equations with Latent Variables*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Buraku Kaiho Kenkyu-sha. 1988. *Buraku Mondai: Shiryō to Kaisetsu*. Osaka, Japan: Kaiho Shuppan Sha.
- Buruma, Ian. 1989. "After Hirohito: What Remains Sacred," *The New York Times Magazine* May 28, 1989.
- Cho, Chang Kuk. 1987. "Ethnic Identity and Political Movement: A History of the Korean Minority in Japan." *JPRN Working Paper Series*. Berkeley, CA.
- Clifford, William. 1976. *Crime Control in Japan*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.
- De Vos, George. 1973. *Socialization for Achievement*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
- De Vos, George and Lola Romanucci-Ross. 1975. (eds.). *Ethnic Identity*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Doi, L. Takeo. 1974. "Amae: A Key Concept for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure," pp. 145-154 in Takie Sugiyama Lebra and William P. Lebra (eds.), *Japanese Culture and Behavior*. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
- Donoghue, John D. 1978. *Pariah Persistence in Changing Japan*. Washington D.C.: University Press of America.
- Earhart, H. Byron. 1982. *Japanese Religion. Unity and Diversity*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
- Fukurai, Hiroshi. 1991. "Japanese Migration in Contemporary Japan: Economic Segmentation and Interprefectural Migration," *Social Biology* in press.
- _____, and Jon Alston. 1990. "Divorce in Contemporary Japan," *Journal of Biosocial Science* (22): 453-464.
- _____, Edgar W. Butler, and Richard Krooth. 1991. "A Cross Sectional Jury Representation or Systematic Jury Representation? Simple Random and Cluster Sampling Strategies in Jury Selection," *Journal of Criminal Justice* (19): 31-48.
- Gibney, Frank. 1985. *The Fragile Superpower*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.
- Glickman, Norman. 1979. *The Growth and Management of the Japanese Urban System*, New York: Academic Press.
- Krauss, Ellis S., Thomas P. Rohlen, and Patricia G. Steinhoff (eds.). 1984. *Conflict in Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Krooth, Richard and Hiroshi Fukurai. 1990. *Common Destiny: Japan and the United States in the Global Age*, Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland.
- Lee, Changsoo. "Organizational Divisions and Conflict." in Changsoo Lee and George De Vos (eds), *Koreans in Japan*, 1981. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Lee, Changsoo and George De Vos. 1981. *Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Matsueda, Ross and William T. Bielby. 1986. "Statistical Power in Covariance Structure Models." *Sociological Methodology*, pp.120-158.
- Morishima, Michio. 1982. *Why Has Japan 'Succeeded'?* London: Cambridge University Press.
- Okimoto, Daniel I. and Thomas P. Rohlen. 1986. *Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society and Political Economy*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Ouchi, William G. 1981. *Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge*. Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Reischauer, Edwin O. 1964. *Japan, Past and Present*, New York: Kropf
- _____, 1988. *The Japanese Today: Change and Opportunity*, Mass.: Belknap Press.
- Shelton, Beth Ann. "Variations in Divorce Rates by Community Size: A Test of the Social Integration Explanation," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* (49): 827-832.
- Shoji, Kokichi. 1985. *Sekai Shakai no Kozo to Dotai (Global Society, Its Structure and Dynamism)*, Tokyo, Japan: Hosei University Press.
- _____. 1986a. *Jumin Ishiku no Kanosei. (Public Consciousness and Its Potentialities)*. Tokyo, Japan. Azusa Publishing Co.
- _____. 1986b. *Chiiki Shakai Keikaku to Jumin Jichi. (Regional Social Plannings and Public Government)*. Tokyo, Japan: Azusa Publishing Co.
- Smith, Robert J. 1983. *Japanese Society. Tradition, Self, and the Social Order*, London: Cambridge University Press.
- Sugimoto, Yoshio. 1978. "Quantitative Characteristics of Popular Disturbances in Post-Occupation Japan (1952-1960)," *Journal of Asian Studies* 37(2): 273-291.
- _____. 1980 *Popular Disturbances in Postwar Japan*, Hong Kong: Asian Research Service.
- Theodore, Brameld. 1968. *Japan: Culture, Education, and Change in Two Communities*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Tsunoda, Ryisaku, William Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene (eds.). 1958 *Sources of the Japanese Tradition*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Vogel, Ezra. 1979. *Japan as Number 1*, New York: Harper and Row.
- Wagatsuma, Hiroshi. 1981. "Problems of Self-identity in a Delinquent Korean Youth." in Changsoo Lee and George De Vos (eds), *Koreans in Japan*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wagatsuma, Hiroshi and George A. De Vos. 1984. *Heritage of Endurance*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wolferen, van Karel. 1989. *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Woronoff, Jon. 1982a. *Japan's Wasted Workers*, Tokyo, Japan: Lotus Press.
- _____. 1982b. *Japan: The Coming Crisis*, Tokyo, Japan: Lotus Press.

POWER AND POLITICS IN THAILAND

Kevin Hewison

This collection brings together Hewison's essays on various aspects of capitalist development and the role of the state in Thailand. The issues discussed range over a wide area and include theories of state and capitalism, the history and Thai capitalism, and empirical studies of ownership and control in the Thai economy.

Oct. 1989

180 pages (paperback)

US\$10.00

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA PUBLISHERS

P.O. Box 592, Manila, Philippines 1099

Models of DEMOCRATS in Island China/Mainland Relations

Peter Kien-hong Yu*

[Abstract: Six models of DEMOCRATS (in capital letters) were introduced in this paper: *democrat* (in italics); "democrat" (in quotation marks); *democrat* → "democrat;" *democrat* → "democrat" → *democrat*; "democrat" → *democrat*; and "democrat" → *democrat* → "democrat." This paper then attempts to explicate which model(s) of DEMOCRATS do Presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui belong to. It was found that Chiang could be regarded as a "democrat," and Lee, both "democrat" "and democrat" → *democrat*. Both of them have to make sure that democratization in Island China can assure its survival as well as create an impact on Mainland China].

Democracy means different things to different people. Given that China is divided, it further creates complications. If it is to have meaning, linkage must be taken into consideration. Just as there is linkage between domestic politics and international politics, there is a close relationship between the kind of democracy that is put into or has been practiced in the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan (or Island China) and that in the People's Republic of China (PRC) (or Mainland China). I will, in this article, attempt to explicate which model(s) of DEMOCRATS (in capital letters) do Island China's President Chiang Ching-kuo and President Lee Teng-hui belong to in the context of ever changing relationship between both sides of the Taiwan Strait since March 1986.

Ways of Conceiving DEMOCRATS. There are at least six ways of doing it. First, intuitively, we can conceive of a *democrat* (in italics) as someone who is willing to hear what the others have to say before arriving at a compromise or solution on all issues. But, in the process, he would engage in the war of words and resolutely oppose violence. Second, we can also conceive of a "democrat" (in quotation marks) as someone who is in between an autocrat and a *laissez-faire*.¹ On the one hand, an autocrat is the tough, demanding individual who wants to run the show himself and to control and direct all group activities. Thus, for example, an autocrat would probably say: "I'm not interested in your proposal," and he would rationalize what he says and does, so long as he achieves his objectives. On the other hand, a *laissez-faire* is someone who allows maximum participation for all by letting each person go his own way as he deems fit. Thus, for example, he would probably say: "You do whatever

*Sun Yat-sen Institute, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan