In the years before and directly after the Chinese Communist Party's ascension to power in 1949, the relationship between the civilian populace and the People's Liberation Army remained supportive, appreciative, and mutually beneficial. Mao Zedong compared the army to a fish and the people to the water which is its element: the army exists immersed within the populace, and without the support and affection of the people, the army cannot succeed. During the early years of the Communist era, the People's Army did indeed enjoy the support of the civilian populace. Threatened by Guomindang and Japanese alike, residents of war-torn China recognized the vital need for military power to protect their interests. An army was necessary, and the People's Army seemed truly to represent the interests of the populace. The PLA was a tool employed by the Communist Party, which implemented egalitarian policies such as division of land and shattered the exploitative system of feudal land tenure, providing a unifying ideology behind which peasants and soldiers alike might rally. It was an army built of volunteers, so peasants did not fear conscription for themselves or their sons when the army was near. Because the PLA was a successful army, and representative of the inspirational ideology of the Communist party, it became a matter of pride to be a soldier or to have a family member enlist. The People's Army was a volunteer army, a force of men fighting for their political beliefs, their future livelihood, and their newly claimed land. For this reason, and with widespread popular support, it became a truly successful army. The Japanese soldiers found themselves engaged in battle far from their own homeland, and the starving, conscripted soldiers of the Guomindang felt little loyalty to the officers and army which abused them. The peasants inhabiting occupied areas resisted invasion by Guomindang and Japanese in covert ways, or passively endured it, awaiting the opportunity for sabotage. Such armies faced not only enemy PLA soldiers in battle but also the daily battle for existence in a land which, because of its tenants' resentment, was also bitterly hostile. The very element through which the Japanese and Guomindang armies had to move - the people and the landscape they inhabited - proved inimical. In contrast, the peasants were proud of, grateful to, and supportive of the PLA. They provided water to marching soldiers, donated grain to the army, helped soldiers' families, and transported injured soldiers homewards in stretcher-bearing relays. They encouraged eligible individuals to enlist in the army. Whereas an isolated enemy soldier lost in hostile and unknown terrain would indubitably die or be killed, members of the PLA could be self sufficient, surviving on a land they knew and among a populace which appreciated them. The PLA earned the support of the populace not only by endorsing land reform and opposing the exploitative land tenure system but also by refusing in turn to exploit peasants. The civilian population of China was in 1949 accustomed to a system of total warfare, in which a marauding army would ravage everything in its path, devastating the peasants' families and livelihoods. In an effort to support an unwieldy army half paralyzed with official corruption, the Guomindang would sieze all edible materials which it came across. It would also claim members of the population as conscripts in order to boost the numbers among its own dwindling ranks, subjecting such unwilling soldiers to starvation, abuse and likely death. The Japanese army adhered to the plan of "Kill All, Burn All, Loot All", decimating every living thing in the areas through which it marched. This effort to smash popular resistance via a regime of terror and brutality simply increased the hatred which the peasants felt for the occupying armies. The ideology of the PLA stood in amazing contrast to the Guomindang and the Japanese in that the People's Army refused to take resources even from peasants who offered them up willingly. One of the historic governing rules of the army was, "Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the people." (Fanshen, p.570) The army adhered to this philosophy; soldiers on the march would refuse everything offered up by villagers except hot water to quench their thirst. Desperately needed donations of food and other materials were processed through the proper channels rather than given into the charge of individual soldiers. This effectively discouraged activities such as looting and bribery which would anger and alienate the populace, and preserved the reputation of the People's Army as a military body meant to protect rather than prey off of the people. During the decisive years of Communist consolidation, the People's Liberation Army was respected and its actions were supported by the populace of revolutionary China. The army, though initially lacking in numbers and weaponry, was motivated by a profound and heartening ideology. The Army fought for the interests of civilians and scrupulously avoided harming them or their livelihoods. During fourty years of unchallenged Communist rule in China, the relationship between the PLA and the civilian population shifted dramatically. By 1989 the army appeared to operate as a body alienated from the people, and its origins among the workers and peasantry of China seemed implausible. The army increasingly disregarded the interests of the citizens whom it was meant to protect. Its goals were no longer to protect the people's welfare and interests, but instead to maintain power in the hands of distanced Party officials. The PLA was responsible for the massacre of protesting civilians on June 4th, 1989. This bloodletting exemplified the growing rift between the people and the People's Army in modern China. During the spring of 1989 a movement advocating increased democratization took root in Beijing. Initiated by students at various universities, the movement was taken up by journalists and workers in the capital as well as citizens of major cities across China. Students in Beijing occupied symbolic Tiananmen Square and staged a hunger strike protesting the government's refusal to engage in dialogue with them. Confrontation between protesters and the government escalated, martial law was declared, and eventually troops of the People's Liberation Army were called in to smash civilian resistance in Beijing and evict protesters from the Square. On the night of June 3rd,1989, a massive deployment of the People's Liberation Army moved into Beijing in order to rout the occupants of Tiananmen Square. In order to reach the square, however, they had first to make their way through the city itself. The democracy protest enjoyed popular support throughout the capital, and workers and inhabitants of all areas of Beijing took as determined a part in the final stages of the movement as the student protesters in Tiananmen Square. The army encountered bitter civilian resistance as it proceeded through Beijing. Makeshift barriers built by civilians out of buses, concrete slabs, and even bicycles blocked routes leading to the Square, and crowds of angry citizens filled the streets. However, Armored Personnel Carriers proceeded despite the obstructions, smashing through or over the barricades and ignoring the fate of civilians caught in their paths. The worst bloodshed was at Muxidi, where soldiers fired automatic assault weapons into civilian crowds. Many individuals, although unarmed, fought furiously back using bricks and crowbars and branches torn off of trees. Stalled army tanks were lit on fire with gasoline and Molotov cocktails, their occupants killed or beaten. Civilians expressed their rage at the army's action through the violent murders of individual soldiers. Alhough popular resistance was determined, the civilians had no way to halt a modern army. After hours of street fighting, troops reached Tiananmen Square and proceeded to clear the area of encamped students and protesters. Most of the killing took place on city roads leading to the Square and was aimed at workers and ordinary citizens rather than at students or intellectual elite, but the civilian death toll is unknown. By battling its way against civilian resistance through the capital city and forcing protesters to clear Tiananmen Square, the People's Army negated the atmosphere of trust and mutual support which had characterized its relationship with the populace during the revolutionary years. The army attacked the very masses upon whose support its legitimacy had historically been based. Students expressed their outrage at this betrayal, shouting "Soldiers and officers, you are sons of the people! Don't point your guns at the people!" (Neither Gods nor Emperors, Craig Calhoun, p.137) as tanks surrounded the Square. Throughout the democracy movement protesters had tried to emphasize the benevolence of the army towards civilians, repeating over and over again, "The people love the People's Army, the People's Army protects the people." " (Calhoun, p.164) This slogan of the communist era embodies the mutual support and appreciation shared by the successful PLA of 1949 and the populace of revolutionary China. However, the PLA of 1989 betrayed that ideology, and betrayed the citizenry which once supported it. The violence utilized in order to suppress the democracy movement demolished the relationship of trust once present between the People's Liberation Army and the civilian population. During the revolutionary era as the Communist Party consolidated its power the relationship between the People's Liberation Army and the populace of China remained strong and supportive. In 1949, peasantry and civilians worked to maintain the fighting strength of their army, and the army fulfilled its invaluable role of protecting the people. Fourty years later, the relationship between people and People's Army had become corrupt and was ultimately characterized by violent betrayal. In June of 1989, protesting citizens of Beijing sabotaged the efforts of the PLA to move through the city. Tanks were set on fire and soldiers killed by their civilian compatriots on the streets. The PLA in turn opened fire with assault weapons on unarmed crowds and crushed civilians under its tanks. The massacre both finalized and symbolized the irrepareable rift present between the people and the People's Army in modern China. In 1949, it was true that, "The people love the People's Army, the People's Army protects the people." whereas in 1989 reality decreed that "The people resist the People's Army, the People's Army kills the People." provided a more accurate summary of events. However, such trends are not always perfectly clearly defined. Exceptions exist. For example, even during the revolutionary years the army harmed the civilian population in small ways. Graft and corruption, though minimal and strongly discouraged, did exist. Unnecessary violence was sometimes utilized during social movements, inadequately selective enlistment. Soldiers and officers of the army sometimes considered themselves above the general populace; different from, more powerful than, and therefore isolated from the people. In the words of Longbow village bully Man-hsi when asked to confess the goods he stole, "...Because I was a militiaman... I thought I could take anything I wanted." (Fanshen, p.344) The People's Liberation Army of the revolutionary years was not always a positive force. Another counter-example is provided by the People's Army of 1989. During the period of martial law before the democracy movement was actually suppressed, local troops showed admirable restraint. Martial law was declared on May 19th, but the citizens of Beijing prevented the local 28th Army corps from forcibly clearing Tiananmen Square. Makeshift blockades were spontaneoulsy erected to halt the forward motion of troops, and stranded trucks full of soldiers were subject to scolding and "reeducation" by the citizens surrounding them on the street. Says witness Craig Calhoun, "(The troops) seemed bewildered and chagrined by the popular resistance... They were greeted as friends by the crowd but denied privacy and subjected to never-ending "education" about the current situation." (p.89) Before the actuall massacre, the citizens of Beijing still regarded the People's Army as a benevolent force. They bore no animosity towards the troops, they simply intended to prevent them from suppressing the people's protests. The troops in turn did not react in a violent manner towards the citizens, and were in fact shocked to learn that the millitary action which engaged them was against the wishes of the people. While blocked by citizens' barricades and teased and lectured by the inhabitants of Beijing, the army seemed briefly to have regained historic status of being at one with people. So in 1949 although relationship mostly good, were occasions where army neglected to protect the interests of the people. In 1989, although the once-supportive relationship had degenerated, there were still instances where contact and open communication between citizens and army brought education, accord, and renewed hope. "The longer they remained in close contact with civilians the less likely they would be to take up arms against them." Peoples Army, recruited from among the ranks of the people. During the 1949 revolution soldiers were immersed in civilian life, lived and fought among the peasants. How could exist isolated from contact with the people? "Students and other protesting groups tried to turn the soldiers' loyalties from their government to their nation." (p.111)