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The international debt crisis of 1982 revealed that unrecorded private capital outflows from developing countries occurred simultaneously with borrowing from international commercial banks. Current interest in capital flight has been generated by the possibility that the resurgence of private capital inflows to these countries may be limited to the return of flight capital. A simple public finance model shows that simultaneous capital outflows and inflows can be explained as the result of private international arbitrage of domestic policies. The paper discusses the welfare consequences of gross two-way capital flows that take advantage of opportunities to avoid taxation or generate subsidy income.

In the aftermath of the 1982 international debt crisis, economists were surprised to learn that a large part of the borrowing of developing countries from international commercial banks was matched not by net imports of goods and services, but instead by unrecorded private capital outflows from developing countries. A satisfactory explanation for why residents of a country simultaneously borrow and lend on international markets clearly calls for a model that explains patterns of financial intermediation rather than conventional models for net investment opportunities in different countries.

This article focuses on a measure of "capital flight" developed in Dooley (1986) that captures unrecorded private capital outflows and on a number of theoretical models that might help understand this measure of capital flight. Interest in capital flight recently has been rekindled by the resurgence of private capital inflows to developing countries after nearly a decade of very limited capital flows. At issue is whether this reflects a "discovery" of emerging markets by residents of industrial countries or a return of capital flight by residents of the developing countries. In either case, it is a private capital inflow. But if the "home bias" of portfolios of industrial countries really is being reduced, then the potential for continued inflows seems very large; in contrast, if the "home bias" of residents of developing countries is being increased by a reduction of capital flight claims on industrial countries, the scope for continued private inflows is quite limited. The data seem more consistent with the second interpretation.

We are concerned with the sources of capital flight and with the welfare consequences of capital flight in the presence of the policy and institutional environment that gives rise to it. The next section elaborates on the definition and estimation of capital flight and reports estimates of capital flight from 1971–1991 for a sample of 84 developing countries. Section II presents a simple public finance model to discuss the effects of different tax treatments for resident and nonresident holders of claims on domestic assets. Section III analyzes capital flight using this model and emphasizes that capital income taxation that varies de facto by residence and source leads to two-way gross financial capital flows. The model incorporates a welfare-improving role for capital income taxes. The welfare consequences of capital flight in this model are due to the
restrictions its possibility imposes on the effectiveness of these taxes and, therefore, on the fiscal instruments for a social welfare-maximizing government.

Section IV discusses the welfare effects of capital flight in the presence of financial market imperfections. In this case, capital flight can lead to inefficient international allocations of physical capital stocks. In Section V, subsidies to foreign lenders and their contribution to capital flight are discussed. Section VI concludes.

I. DEFINITION AND MAGNITUDE OF CAPITAL FLIGHT

We define "flight capital" as the accumulation of residents' claims on nonresidents that escape control by domestic governments—that is, that are not subject to taxation, regulation, or, in extreme circumstances, confiscation.

The method for estimating capital flight (Dooley 1986, 1988) involves calculating the total stock of external claims: Specifically, sum recorded claims on nonresidents less direct investments abroad using balance of payments data, cumulated errors and omissions from the balance of payments accounts, and estimate of the unrecorded stock of external claims. The starting value for the cumulated balance of payments data is estimated by capitalizing investment income receipts for the initial year; errors and omissions are included because they often are associated with accumulations of financial claims on nonresidents that might include unrecorded capital flows along with many other forms of assets.

The balance of payments data are known to underestimate seriously the full stock of external debt (using the World Bank data, among other sources). If these data are correct, then some sort of balancing transactions also must be underestimated. These can include any type of foreign transaction, including imports of goods and services or purchases of financial claims on nonresidents financed by the accumulation of unrecorded external debt. Since the type of transaction cannot be discerned, we assume that all of the unrecorded debt increases are balanced by increases in private claims on nonresidents that are not reported in the balance of payments records.

Next we subtract the stock of claims implied by investment income receipts and market interest rates. Because this stock of claims represents the portion that earns income reported in the balance of payments accounts, and therefore is within the control of domestic authorities, it can be considered to result from normal portfolio diversification motives rather than from capital flight.

Dooley (1986) compares the yield implied by reported investment income to the accumulated external claims from the balance of payments data and to the estimated total of external claims for several major debtor countries. These estimates suggest that a significant share of the income earned from claims on nonresidents is not reported in the balance of payments system and therefore is attributable to the returns to flight capital. The difference between the estimate of total external claims by nonresidents excluding direct investment abroad and the estimate of assets on which interest earnings are reported is the estimate of capital flight intended to measure claims on nonresidents that are beyond the control of the home government. This procedure leads to larger estimates of capital flight than of unrecorded external debt accumulations plus errors and omissions.

Claessens and Naudé (1993) updated estimates of capital flight using this definition ("the Dooley Measure") for 84 developing countries between 1971 and 1991; their results are summarized in Figure 1, which also shows an estimate of capital flight sometimes used by the World Bank (the "World Bank Residual Measure"). The comparison of these two measures is interesting because they are conceptually identical except that the "Dooley Measure" subtracts gross claims for which interest income is reported in the balance of payments.

FIGURE 1

COMPARISON OF MEASURES OF CAPITAL FLIGHT IN ANNUAL FLOWS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>$ U.S. (billions)</th>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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Clearly, this distinction made little difference for the quantitative measure of capital flight for this group of countries until 1990 and 1991. The dramatic reversal of capital flight in 1990 and 1991 according to the "Dooley Measure" helps explain the large recorded capital inflows that have dominated recent developments in emerging markets. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this finding is the only direct evidence in support of numerous speculations that what appear to be purchases of emerging market assets by residents of industrial countries are in fact the return of flight capital.

As Claessens and Naude point out, the divergence between the two measures reflects the fact that reported investment income in 1991 was double that level for 1989, while interest rates on dollar-denominated instruments fell by about 30 percent. Our interpretation of these data is that residents of developing countries have sold off their capital flight positions in order to purchase assets denominated in their home countries' domestic currencies. This is incorrectly recorded as an increase in liabilities to nonresidents in the developing country's balance of payments. The correct entry would be a reduction of private residents' claims on nonresidents. About half of this inflow has been offset by official exchange market intervention or by an increase in official claims on nonresidents. Since the interest income on official reserves is recorded in the balance of payments, the "Dooley Measure" correctly captures the decline in the stock of private flight capital. Moreover, the magnitude of the reversal of capital flight in 1990–1991 is greater than OECD estimates of all private borrowing by non-OECD countries on international capital markets. While interesting in themselves, these data tell us nothing about the motivation behind two-way capital flows that have dominated international financial markets for the past 20 years. For that, we turn to alternative models of international financial intermediation in the following sections.

II. Public Finance Model

The analytical framework for capital flight developed in this section emphasizes the role of policies adopted by the domestic government and residents' opportunity to avoid the impact of those policies on the net income from their asset holdings. Policies often treat resident and nonresident holders of claims on domestic assets differently. As a consequence, capital flight and external capital inflows can be seen as an outcome of international arbitrage of domestic policies. In practice, the types of policies that can lead to capital flight vary by residence of the investor, and can include explicit capital income taxes, restrictions on the menu of assets available to residents different from those available to nonresidents, subsidies—including contingent ones—to investment by nonresidents, and outright confiscation.

The effective taxation of capital income frequently varies both by its source and by the residence of its recipient. In many cases, domestic investors' total tax burden on capital income exceeds that of foreign holders of domestic claims. When residents hold assets beyond the reach of their home government, they will tend to realize higher risk-adjusted post-tax returns for claims on nonresidents than for claims on domestic assets. Under these circumstances, foreign creditors can have an incentive to invest in domestic assets when residents do not. Such differences in effective rates of taxation of asset income will lead to gross capital outflows and inflows that are unrecorded in balance of payments data exceeding any net capital flow.

It is often much more difficult to avoid paying residence-based capital income taxes on income earned from domestic assets than from claims on nonresidents unreported to domestic fiscal authorities. Such taxes become both residence-based and source-based, de facto applying only to domestic capital income earned by residents. The taxes that can lead to differential burdens for residents and foreign holders of domestic claims may be anticipated rather than statutory. For example, in many cases residents can hold only deposits in the domestic banking system that are denominated in the domestic currency and are subject to a reserve requirement, while foreign investors can acquire claims on domestic intermediaries denominated in foreign currency that do not require the holding of non-interest-bearing reserves. Resident savers usually receive below-market interest rates on reserves and face potential inflation taxes on these deposits, so that nonresidents receive a higher anticipated post-tax rate of return for claims on domestic capital.

More generally, when residents do not have access to the same range of domestic financial instruments as do nonresidents, the contingent taxes imposed by and subsidies provided by domestic authorities differ for the two types of creditors. For example, external debt may be denominated in foreign currency while domestic deposits may only be available denominated in local currency. Nonresidents can purchase an asset yielding a different distribution of returns than residents can. As a consequence, the risks and returns associated with domestic claims differ by the residence of the investor. This leads to international portfolio diversification, but it does not by itself lead to capital flight. Capital flight arises when residents avoid anticipated taxation of domestic deposits (for example, through inflation) and of the gross earnings on reported foreign assets. Acquisition of assets abroad for both groups then represents international arbitrage of these tax rules or
anticipated levies. The extent to which residents take advantage of such opportunities is estimated by a measurement of the claims on nonresidents that are unreported in the balance of payments records.

One concern over capital flight is that private external debts are socialized, or the payments on these debts are subsidized by the government. These can lead to the accumulation of private claims on nonresidents by residents that do not provide foreign exchange earnings available to the public sector for debt interest payments. Such subsidies, which often are contingent liabilities for the government, provide benefits for foreign lenders and, possibly, private domestic investors.

These ideas can be addressed more formally in a stylized two-period model of a small open economy with a single composite good that can be used for private consumption, public consumption, and investment. In the first period, the country has an initial endowment of the good, and households choose a consumption and saving allocation. Domestic saving can be allocated to investment in home capital or used to purchase claims on nonresident capital earnings. External borrowing also is possible, allowing nonresidents to acquire claims on income produced by domestic capital. In the second period, output and net income from investment abroad are allocated to private and public consumption. The government provides public consumption goods and raises revenue using non-lump-sum taxes. The instruments available to the fiscal authority include taxes on labor income, source-based taxes on domestic capital income, and residence-based taxes on investment income. Taxes can be levied at positive or negative rates (subsidies).

Fiscal authorities face difficulties enforcing compliance with taxes on foreign source income. We assume that domestic residents are able to invest in foreign claims providing income that is beyond the control of national authorities and therefore untaxable in practice. The model also allows domestic capital income paid to foreign residents to be taxed at different rates from home source capital income paid to residents.

Production of output requires inputs of labor and capital using a standard concave technology, given in labor-intensive form by \( f(k) \). The household sector is represented by a single household with the utility function

\[
U = u(c_1, c_2, l) + v(g)
\]

where \( c_1, c_2, l, \) and \( g \) are first-period consumption, second-period consumption, leisure consumption, and public goods consumption, respectively. The initial endowment of leisure is \( L \). For simplicity, household preferences are additively separable between public goods and private goods consumption.

Domestic claims on nonresidents are denoted by \( B \), and foreign claims on domestic capital are denoted \( K' \). The share of the domestic capital stock owned by residents is the difference between \( K \) and \( K' \). Note that foreign claims on residents and residents’ claims on foreigners are gross. This model parallels that of Razin and Sadka (1989), but they do not allow nonresident claims on residents.

The household budget constraints in each period, respectively, are given by

\[
c_1 + B + (K - K') = y,
\]

and

\[
(2) \quad c_2 = B \left( 1 + r^*(1 - z_t) \right) + (K - K') \left( 1 + r(1 - t_s) (1 - t_p) \right) + w l (1 - t_s).
\]

The tax rate on capital income by residence is given by \( t_s \), the tax rate on domestic source capital income is given by \( t_s \), and the tax on labor income is given by \( t_p \). The rate of compliance with residence-based capital income taxes for assets held abroad is measured by \( z \), which takes values between zero and unity: When \( z = 0 \), domestic fiscal authorities are unable to tax any of the earnings from claims on nonresidents held by residents; when \( z = 1 \), evasion of investment income taxes is not possible. The initial endowment of the composite good is \( y \), the wage rate is \( w \), the domestic (pre-tax) interest rate is \( r \) and the foreign interest rate is \( r^* \) (net of any foreign source-based taxes).

Suppose that international financial capital mobility is unrestricted and that this country is small relative to the rest of the world. Then foreign savings always will flow into the domestic economy if the post-tax rate of return to foreign capital is less than the rate of return to domestic capital after source-based taxes. In equilibrium, the post-tax rate of return to foreign capital, \( r^* \), must be at least as great as the post-source-based-tax rate of return to domestic capital, \( (1 - t_s) r \). Therefore, foreign savers will hold claims on domestic capital only if these two net rates of return are equal. If \( r^* \) exceeds \( (1 - t_s) r \), then domestic residents also earn a higher return to claims on foreign capital than on domestic capital after source-based and residence-based taxes are imposed, so that the domestic capital stock would be zero.\(^1\) Therefore, assuming that the Inada conditions\(^2\)

\footnotesize
\(^1\) This holds for any \( z \) between zero and one as long as \( t_s \) is non-negative. It also holds for a residence-based subsidy (\( t_s \) negative) when \( z \) is one. When a subsidy is paid, \( z \) should be one, since rational savers would comply fully.

\(^2\) These are that \( f'(k) \) tends to infinity as \( k \) tends to zero and \( f'(k) \) tends to zero as \( k \) tends to infinity. We also assume that \( f(k) \) is strictly concave.
hold for \( f(k) \), we have in equilibrium under perfect financial
capital mobility that

\[ r^* = (1 - t_s) r. \]

If \( z \) is less than one, then we also have that

\[ r^* (1 - z t_s) > (1 - t_s) (1 - t_s) r. \]

Equilibrium demand for capital by the firm in the home
country is determined by equality of the marginal product
of capital and the pre-tax rate of interest:

\[ f'(k) = r. \]

Household optimization yields consumption demands that
depend upon the tax rates through their effects on the in-
come and the relative price of second-period consumption.

### III. Capital Flight and the Public Finance Problem

Suppose that domestic savers cannot avoid residence-based
capital income taxes by purchasing claims on nonresidents.
In this case, a small country social planner choosing to
maximize the welfare of the representative household
optimizes by financing public goods spending using a
combination of a labor income tax and a residence-based
capital income tax. In the solution, the rate of source-
based capital income taxation is zero, so that the first-order
condition for an optimum

\[ f'(k) = f^*(k^*) \]

is satisfied.

The solution for the optimal tax and public goods supply
problem when there is no issue of tax compliance is well-
known. The rates of tax imposed on labor income and on
interest income of residents are chosen so that the disutility
of the last unit of revenue raised from each is equal when
both taxes are positive. We skip elaborating this rule
analytically. It should be noted that such an equilibrium
plan is not Pareto efficient if labor supply is not perfectly
elastic, since all taxes are distortionary.

Now suppose that both source-based and residence-
based taxes are available to domestic fiscal authorities, but
that residents are able to avoid taxes on claims on foreign
capital earnings (\( z = 0 \)). In this case, any positive rate of
residence-based capital income tax implies that no domes-
tic claims are held by residents and all domestic capital
income is owed to foreign residents. In the absence of
controls on financial capital outflows, the government
collects no revenue from residence-based capital income
taxes, and all public consumption spending must be fi-
nanced by taxes on capital earnings that distort the inter-
national allocation of production activities and on labor
income that distort consumption-leisure choices and la-
bor supply. Source-based taxes are assumed to be enforce-
able, but these result in different marginal productivities
of capital at home and abroad. Again, the optimal tax rule is
found by straightforward maximization of representative
household utility subject to the necessary conditions for
private optimization by the household and firm and the
constraint that residence-based taxes raise no revenue.

Social welfare is reduced by the possibility of capital
flight in this model. This is because capital flight is a
consequence of the ability of households to avoid capital
income taxes levied on a residence basis. The effective
marginal tax rate on capital that can be achieved on a
residence basis is zero. Reducing the residence-based
capital income tax rate to zero can eliminate capital flight in
this model (for arbitrarily small transactions costs associ-
ated with the acquisition of foreign assets) and results in no
loss of tax revenue. The restriction in the set of distortionary
fiscal instruments available to the government results in
lower maximized social welfare. Capital flight is another
consequence and the channel through which residents
escape the control of national fiscal authorities.

It should be noted that both enforceable residence-based
and source-based capital income taxes affect the net exter-
nal asset position of the country. In general, an increase in a
source-based tax will lead to a net capital outflow, an
increase in a residence-based tax will cause a net capital
inflow, and with enforceable taxes of both types, the net
and gross capital outflow will be equal. However, this is not
the case when residents cannot be effectively taxed on
foreign asset earnings. In the case of this model with no
constraints on external financial capital inflows, all domes-
tic saving goes abroad if \( t_s \) is positive and all domestic
capital income is owed to foreign residents. The gross
outflow is much larger than the net capital outflow, which
may be positive or negative. This is because domestic
authorities can only effectively tax domestic capital in-
come, although at different rates for nonresident and for
resident claimants.

Given that capital flight is possible, the social welfare-
maximizing government would choose to impose controls
on financial capital outflows. Such restrictions can help to
resolve the public finance problem for the government by
reducing the ability of residents to acquire assets earning
income that cannot be taxed. Imposing a complete (assuming
enforceability) ban on the acquisition of all claims on
nonresidents leads to a domestic marginal product of
capital that is no greater than the foreign rate of interest:

\[ (1 - t_s) f'(k) = r^*, \text{ if } K' > 0, \text{ and } \]

\[ (1 - t_s) f'(k) < r^*, \text{ if } K' = 0. \]
The equilibrium domestic interest rate can be below the foreign interest rate when no residence-based and source-based capital income taxes are imposed if domestic savings are adequate to finance all domestic capital. In this case, an appropriate choice of the residence-based, or equivalently, source-based, capital income tax can be made so that the marginal productivity of capital is equal across borders.

However, even if enforceable capital controls are feasible the potential for capital flight still can pose a public finance problem. The optimal policy for a government that maximizes the household’s utility is to impose capital controls at some positive level and a residence-based capital income tax along with a positive rate of labor income tax in the general case for this model. It will never be optimal to choose capital income taxes that lead to the inequality

\[ f'(k) < r^* \]

That is, such a government will not want to impose a source-based or residence-based tax (with the caveat that this applies only to residents’ holdings of domestic financial assets) and level of capital control that results in a marginal productivity of capital below the foreign marginal productivity of capital. If it did, it could relax the quantitative restraint on capital outflows and/or the rate of taxation of domestic capital income and tax rate on labor income to reduce the home capital stock and achieve a more efficient allocation of domestic saving and global production.

The optimal tax and quantitative restriction on capital outflows can lead to an equilibrium in which domestic saving and investment are equal and the marginal productivity of domestic capital is less than the foreign interest rate. The reason is simply that the optimal level of public goods spending and distortionary effect of a labor income tax with no capital outflow imply a higher rate of taxation on domestic capital than allowed by the restriction that \( f'(k) \) equal \( r^* \), where \( k \) equals equilibrium domestic saving per unit of labor. Capital controls are a second-best fiscal policy instrument to enforceable taxes on capital income from all sources for residents in such cases. When the optimum allows the equality

\[ f'(k) = f^{**}(k^*) \]

to be satisfied, then full tax compliance and perfect capital controls are substitutes.\(^3\)

IV. Preferences of Intermediaries for Investing at Home or Abroad

In addition to the problem of efficient revenue collection to finance public spending programs, other welfare costs can be associated with capital flight induced by domestic taxes. One such cost may be due to intermediaries' preferences to invest in projects in their home country. For example, it is reasonable to think that intermediaries face lower costs of acquiring information about a borrower's actions and appealing to the power of the state to ensure contractual compliance when they lend within their home country. When information is imperfect, so that monitoring is costly, intermediaries may not invest abroad, even if the otherwise risk-adjusted expected rate of return is higher.

In the presence of such intermediation bias, claims on nonresidents will tend to increase foreign capital stocks and reduce domestic capital stocks, ceteris paribus. A simple model illustrates the point. Suppose that foreign intermediaries require a premium for investment returns in the small country over the interest they are able to earn at home. In an equilibrium with positive external inflows of financial capital,

\[ r^* + p = r \]

where \( p \) is this premium.

Consider a special case in which domestic saving and investment are equal and the rates of interest at home and abroad are equal in the absence of any capital income taxes in the home country. Suppose that the domestic government now imposes a residence-based capital income tax such that

\[ r^* > (1 - t_e) (r^* + p), \]

and (10) holds. This implies that capital flight occurs according to the definition used in this paper. Imposition of the tax reduces the domestic capital stock per worker, raising \( f'(k) \) from \( r^* \) to \( r^* + p \). If a tax rate low enough to reverse the inequality in (11) is imposed, then we have

\[ r^* = (1 - t_e) r \]

controls are set so that the equilibrium capital stock exceeds that which is optimal if all capital income of residents can be taxed. This is due to a distortion caused by the tax on domestic capital income and the production distortion (marginal reduction in national income) caused by capital controls.

This result does not follow in our model since the domestic capital stock is determined by the marginal conditions for foreign investors. For a given source-based capital income tax, binding controls on capital outflows lead to a one-for-one substitution of nonresident for resident ownership of capital. The optimal source-based tax does not depend on whether or not foreign capital earnings of domestic residents can be taxed at the same rate as their domestic capital income.

3. Razin and Sadka derive the optimal restriction on capital outflows for their model in which domestic capital cannot be purchased by foreign residents. When residents' foreign capital income cannot be taxed at the same rate as their income from domestic capital, optimal capital
in equilibrium, and there are no capital inflows, although there is a net capital outflow as residents acquire claims on nonresidents.

The presence of financial market imperfections of this type implies that capital flight—defined as a consequence of domestic policies and access to opportunities to avoid their impact on private net asset income—has welfare implications. It leads to an inefficient allocation of capital across countries and welfare losses for the home country. These welfare losses arise because domestic savers are induced to place their assets abroad to avoid taxation by the home country. The preferences of intermediaries abroad over claims in the two countries differ from those of domestic intermediaries. This means that the supply of capital abroad rises with capital flight while the stock of capital at home declines. This contrasts with the case of perfect international capital mobility in which foreign lenders simply took over the task of intermediating between domestic savers and domestic investors.

One policy remedy when capital income taxation is desirable is to impose capital controls as before. Again, in contrast with the analysis of the previous section, imposition of a residence-based capital income tax does not leave the domestic rate of interest equal to the foreign rate of interest. Foreign intermediaries will not purchase domestic claims until the domestic pre-tax rate of interest has risen sufficiently to overcome the additional costs of monitoring investments in another country.

An interesting extension of this result is the case in which domestic intermediaries do a very poor job of credit selection, perhaps because of government controls on lending decisions. In this case, moving funds offshore might increase the effective level of domestic investment assuming foreign intermediaries can overcome information costs and make better investment decisions.

V. Subsidization of Foreign Lenders

Capital flight often is linked to the socialization of private external debt or the subsidization of payments on these debts. This issue was raised by Diaz Alejandro (1984), who argued that the foreign exchange earnings accruing to private assets placed abroad were unavailable to the government that is obliged to make interest payments to nonresidents. Private external debt appears to have financed the accumulation of claims on nonresidents that are placed outside the reach of domestic governments. When these debts are subsidized, the government bears a burden while foreign investors and the private domestic claimant receive the benefits.

Subsidies to foreign capital inflows often take the form of contingent subsidies, providing insurance to nonresidents that is unavailable to residents. Private intermediaries frequently have been able to borrow from abroad under explicit or implicit government guarantees of the debts to the forigem creditors. These guarantees can have adverse incentive effects for investment choices by the intermediaries, thus leading to the standard arguments for public monitoring of investment actions by publicly insured intermediaries. Domestic intermediaries have an incentive to invest in risky projects since they receive returns only in the upper tail of the distribution for returns. In the absence of adequate monitoring of the actions of domestic investors, domestic savers may anticipate that domestic external borrowing will lead to higher tax rates in the future because, as domestic intermediaries maximize their expected returns by selecting risky projects, the value of the contingent liability of the government rises. Anticipated future capital income taxes will induce capital flight if it is possible to place assets beyond the reach of domestic authorities. Eaton (1987) presents a model based on these notions in which there are multiple equilibria, one of which involves no capital flight and private debt repayment and another which involves capital flight and private default.

The role of subsidies to foreign investors for capital flight can be discussed in the model used to analyze the effects of taxes on capital income accruing to residents. Subsidies available to nonresident asset holders but not to resident investors under perfect international financial capital mobility will lead to an increase in the domestic capital stock and cause all domestic savings to be placed abroad, since equilibrium requires that

\[ r^* = (1 + s) f'(k), \]

where \( s \) is the subsidy rate. By itself, this is not sufficient to cause capital flight as defined here. Domestic residents have an incentive only to purchase claims on nonresidents, but not to place these outside the control of the domestic government.

Subsidies differ from capital income taxes in that the limits on the magnitude of the gross flows are different. The gross capital outflow under perfect international capital mobility when a capital income tax is levied only on residents is given by the total of domestic savings. The opportunity return on domestic assets held by residents is less than the return to flight capital, but the opportunity interest cost of borrowing externally is the same as the interest received by relending. If foreign borrowing is subsidized, then the limit on resources that might be available for investing abroad at a net gain is the extent to which the subsidy will be offered, that is, the extent to which the government will subsidize borrowing from abroad to purchase claims on nonresidents that it cannot tax. This might be called the “extent of the government’s stupidity.”
Policies that subsidize nonresident holders of domestic assets lead to capital flight if the subsidies allow external debt to finance residents' purchases of claims on nonresidents that generate income untaxable by the government. Such subsidies may occur through contingent liabilities for the government. In this case, the social cost of the subsidies is the utility reduction due to a loss of national income equal to the total subsidy paid to foreign lenders. There also can be domestic distributional effects that may be of concern to policymakers in a world with heterogeneous households (Alesina and Tabellini 1989). It should be noted that this process also could concern foreign investors. As the tax base for raising the revenue needed for repayment erodes and the likelihood that the government will realize large contingent liabilities rises, foreign holders of domestic claims enjoying public guarantees may anticipate renegotiation by the government. That is, foreign investors may realize the ability and willingness of the government to honor these explicit or implicit contingent commitments. Anticipating the possibility of such capital levies, nonresidents should behave in a time-consistent fashion.

The possibility that subsidies and guarantees generated lending to developing countries that led up to the 1982 debt crisis suggests that recent large private capital inflows to developing countries also might be a cause for concern. It seems likely to us that once again private capital inflows are being sustained not only by the more favorable investment climate, but also by opportunities generated by the governments of developing countries. The form of the incentive is a little different from the external debt-capital flight pattern that led up to the 1982 debt crisis.

But in one important respect the recent private capital inflows are similar in that they are sustained by a contingent claim on the government. The distinguishing feature this time is that recent private capital inflows to developing countries have taken the form of domestic-currency-denominated instruments including equities, corporate bonds, bank deposits, and government securities (Gooptu 1993). This is certainly different from the dollar-denominated, government-guaranteed, syndicated credits that comprised the debt buildup before 1982.

In the current pattern of capital flows it is less obvious that the government of the borrowing country has provided a guarantee. However an implicit guarantee is provided by the increasingly popular use of the exchange rate as an anchor for inflationary expectations. In basing its credibility on the maintenance of a fixed or managed exchange rate, the government, in effect, provides an exchange rate guarantee for the investor in domestic-currency-denominated instruments.

This, of course, seems to leave the investor with a credit risk. But in most emerging markets the government is very likely to provide a credit guarantee as well as the exchange rate guarantee. In cases where international investors buy government securities, the guarantee is explicit. Commercial bank deposits also are guaranteed, especially where the deposit is denominated in domestic currency.

Finally, even the liabilities of domestic nonfinancial corporations carry a strong government backup. This is because such firms are heavily indebted to the domestic banking system. If nonresident creditors want out, these firms can be expected to ask for and receive credit from the domestic banks. To refuse would depress the market value of the banks' existing claims on the domestic firms and call into question the solvency of the domestic banking system.

What limits this process? As long as the developing country's central bank maintains domestic nominal interest rates at levels above those available on similar foreign assets then, in principle, there is no limit to the private capital inflows generated. Of course, in reality the government's resources are limited. At some point the market will begin to doubt the government's ability to maintain the exchange rate peg and the negative carry resulting from the low return earned on reserves relative to that paid on the domestic liabilities issued in sterilized exchange market intervention. But the scale of private capital inflows necessary to exhaust the central bank's expected net worth can be very large indeed.

VI. Conclusion

We define flight capital as the accumulation of claims on nonresidents by residents that escape control of the domestic government. Capital flight by this definition is estimated by a calculation of gross external claims that generate income that is not reported in the balance of payments data.

Our approach emphasizes the importance of public policies and anticipated policies for the domestic government in the presence of international capital mobility and possible evasion of taxation or appropriation by the home government by domestic savers. Capital flight represents an arbitrage of the different treatment of resident and nonresident investors by domestic authorities.

The policies that give rise to capital flight are distortionary in the model presented here, but they are not necessarily simply undesirable. In the case of optimal public goods supply without lump-sum taxes, a residence-based capital income tax is part of the efficient policy, if tax compliance is perfect. The problem of social welfare losses arises because tax avoidance (or evasion) is possible. The second-best solution with capital controls includes residence-based taxes. Without feasible capital controls, the residence-based capital income tax is entirely ineffective for raising revenue under perfect international capital mobility. In this
case, the social cost of capital flight is the welfare cost of losing a useful instrument of fiscal policy. Capital flight also can result from the adoption of distortionary policies that are not welfare-improving. In these instances, it can exacerbate the welfare losses.

REFERENCES


