

# Structured Contexts for Natural Language Interpretation

## Part 1: Contextually Encoded Quantificational Dependencies

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Semantics Workshop, Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science – October 6, 2007

- the main theme of the presentation: we need a richer, structured notion of context for natural language interpretation – more structure both within and across contexts;
- we need more structure *within* contexts to capture the way in which information about quantificational dependencies is passed across sentential boundaries, for example in discourses involving quantificational subordination (this is Part 1 – Adrian);
- we need more structure *across* contexts to capture reference in discourses involving multiple agents, hence multiple contexts that share, in some sense, the same referential intention (this is Part 2 – Sam).

### The Phenomenon: Anaphora to Quantificational Dependencies

- main goal: argue that (i) quantificational subordination and (ii) exceptional wide scope are just two aspects of the same phenomenon – anaphora to quantificational dependencies;
- let us examine them in turn ...

### Quantificational Subordination

- consider the contrast between the following two discourses (from Karttunen 1976<sup>1</sup>):
  1. **a.** Harvey courts a<sup>u</sup> girl at every<sup>u'</sup> convention. **b.** She<sub>u</sub> is very pretty.
  2. **a.** Harvey courts a<sup>u</sup> girl at every<sup>u'</sup> convention. **b.** She<sub>u</sub> always<sub>u'</sub> comes to the banquet with him. [**c.** The<sub>u</sub> girl is usually<sub>u'</sub> also very pretty.]
- the initial sentence *Harvey courts a girl at every convention* is ambiguous between two quantifier scopings: *every* >> *a* (narrow-scope indefinite) and *a* >> *every* (wide-scope indefinite);
- but the first discourse as a whole allows only for the wide-scope indefinite reading: there is a girl such that Harvey courts her at every convention and this girl is very pretty;

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<sup>1</sup>For more discussion of quantificational subordination and telescoping, see Roberts (1987), Poesio & Zucchi (1992) and Wang et al. (2006) among others.

- in contrast, the second discourse also allows for the narrow-scope indefinite reading: every convention is such that Harvey courts a girl at that convention and such that the girl that Harvey courts at that convention comes to the banquet (of that convention) with him.

INDEXATION:

- superscripts - on antecedents; subscripts - on anaphors;
- indices: discourse referents (dref's) introduced / retrieved by particular lexical items;
- determiners and not whole DP's introduce new dref's because all the non-determiner elements in a DP can also be part of definite DP's, which do not (necessarily) introduce new dref's.

DISCOURSE (1) RAISES THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:

- how can we capture the fact that a *singular anaphoric pronoun* in sentence (1b) can interact with and disambiguate *quantifier scopings*<sup>2</sup> in sentence (1a)?
- the discourse in (3) below, where the plural pronoun *they* selects the narrow-scope indefinite reading, shows that number morphology on the pronoun is crucial:

3. **a.** Harvey courts a<sup>u</sup> girl at every<sup>u'</sup> convention. **b.** They<sub>u</sub> are very pretty.

DISCOURSE (2) RAISES THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

- why is it that adding an adverb of quantification, i.e. *always/usually*, makes both readings of sentence (2a) available?
- w.r.t. the newly available reading of sentence (2a) (i.e., *every convention*>>*a girl*): how can we capture the intuition that the singular pronoun *she* and the adverb *always* in (2b) elaborate on the quantificational dependency between conventions and girls introduced in (2a)?
- that is, how can we capture the intuition that we have simultaneous anaphora to: (i) the two quantifier domains and (ii) the quantificational dependency between them?

WHY GIVE A (PARTLY) SEMANTIC ACCOUNT - AND NOT AN EXCLUSIVELY PRAGMATIC ONE - FOR SUCH *cross-sentential* PHENOMENA?

- because the same kind of anaphora to dependencies occurs intra-sententially - see for example the mixed weak & strong donkey sentence in (4) below<sup>3</sup> ...

4. Every<sup>u</sup> person who buys a<sup>u'</sup> book on amazon.com and has a<sup>u''</sup> credit card uses it<sub>u''</sub> (the<sub>u''</sub> card) to pay for it<sub>u'</sub> (the<sub>u'</sub> book).

- ... and whatever is part of the recursive definition of truth and satisfaction is plausibly part of semantics (see for example the 'dual' semantic & pragmatic status of characters and utterance contexts in Kaplan 1989);

<sup>2</sup>To see that it is indeed quantifier scopings that are disambiguated, substitute *exactly one<sup>u</sup> girl* for *a<sup>u</sup> girl* in (1a); this yields two truth-conditionally independent scopings: (i) *exactly one girl*>>*every convention*, which is true in a situation in which Harvey courts more than one girl per convention, but there is exactly one (e.g. Faye Dunaway) that he never fails to court, and (ii) *every convention*>>*exactly one girl*.

<sup>3</sup>See Brasoveanu (2007) for more details.

- moreover, the phenomenon instantiated by (1) and (2) is as much intra-sentential as it is cross-sentential – there are four separate components that come together to yield the contrast between (1) and (2), namely: (i) the generalized quantifier *every convention*, (ii) the indefinite *a girl*, (iii) the singular number morphology on the pronoun *she* and (iv) the adverb of quantification *always/usually*;
- to derive the intuitively correct interpretations for (1) and (2), we have to attend to both the cross-sentential connections *a girl–she* and *every convention–always/usually* and the intra-sentential interactions *every convention–a girl* and *always–she*.

### The Proposal: Encoding Quantificational Dependencies in Plural Info States

- the cross-sentential interaction between quantifier scope and anaphora is captured by means of a new compositional dynamic system couched in classical type logic which, following van den Berg (1996) (among others) models information states as *sets* of variable assignments;
- such a plural info state can be represented as a matrix with variable assignments – i.e., sequences of individuals – as rows;
- a plural info state is two-dimensional and encodes two kinds of information: (i) values – the columns of the matrix store sets of objects, and (ii) structure – each row of the matrix encodes a correlation / dependency between the objects stored in it;

Info State $I$	...	$u$	$u'$	...
$i_1$	...	$x_1$ (i.e. $ui_1$ )	$y_1$ (i.e. $u'i_1$ )	...
$i_2$	...	$x_2$ (i.e. $ui_2$ )	$y_2$ (i.e. $u'i_2$ )	...
$i_3$	...	$x_3$ (i.e. $ui_3$ )	$y_3$ (i.e. $u'i_3$ )	...
...	...	...	...	...

  

<b>Quantifier domains</b> (sets) are stored columnwise: $\{x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots\}, \{y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots\}$	<b>Quantifier dependencies</b> (relations) are stored rowwise: $\{(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), (x_3, y_3), \dots\}$
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- the fact that information states encode both quantifier domains (i.e. values) and quantificational dependencies (i.e. structure) enables us to capture the cross-sentential interaction between quantifier scope and anaphora exhibited by the above quantificational subordination discourses – because we can now pass information about both quantifier domains and quantificational dependencies across sentential/clausal boundaries;
- given that the dynamic system is couched in classical type logic, compositionality at sub-clausal level (Montague-style) follows automatically.

## Quantificational Subordination and Plural Info States

### THE MEANING OF QUANTIFIERS:

- selective generalized determiners like *every* store two things in a plural info state: (i) the restrictor and nuclear scope sets of individuals that are introduced and related by the determiner; (ii) the quantificational dependencies between the individuals in the restrictor / nuclear scope set and any other quantifiers / indefinites in the restrictor / nuclear scope of the quantification;
- for example: between *every convention* in (1a/2a) and the indefinite *a girl* in its nuclear scope;
- for example: between *every person* in (4) and the indefinites *a book* and *a credit card* in its restrictor;
- information about both sets of individuals and dependencies between them is therefore available for subsequent anaphoric retrieval;
- for example, *always* and *she* in (2b) are simultaneously anaphoric to both the sets of conventions and girls and the dependency between these sets introduced in (2a);

### THE MEANING OF SINGULAR ANAPHORS:

- we also need a suitable meaning for singular number morphology on pronouns like *she<sub>u</sub>* in (1b/2b) above: I take singular number morphology to contribute a contextually-relativized uniqueness requirement;
- for example: *she<sub>u</sub>* in (1b/2b) requires the set of *u*-individuals introduced by the indefinite *a<sup>u</sup> girl* to be a singleton;

### CROSS-SENTENTIAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN QUANTIFIERS AND SINGULAR ANAPHORS:

- if the indefinite *a<sup>u</sup> girl* has narrow scope relative to *every convention*, the singleton requirement contributed by *she<sub>u</sub>* applies to the set of girls that are courted by Harvey at some convention or other;
- requiring this set to be a singleton boils down to removing from consideration all the plural info states that would satisfy the narrow-scope indefinite reading *every convention* >> *a<sup>u</sup> girl*, but not the wide-scope reading *a<sup>u</sup> girl* >> *every convention*;
- thus, we capture the intuition that, irrespective of which quantifier scoping we assume for sentence (1a), any plural info state obtained after a successful update with sentence (1b) is bound to satisfy the representation in which the indefinite *a<sup>u</sup> girl* takes wide scope;

### INTRA-SENTENTIAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN QUANTIFIERS AND SINGULAR ANAPHORS:

- in discourse (2), however, the adverb of quantification *always* in (2b), which is anaphoric to the nuclear scope set introduced by *every convention*, can take scope above the singular pronoun *she<sub>u</sub>* – in which case it ‘breaks’ the input plural info state storing all the conventions into smaller sub-states, each storing a particular convention;
- consequently, the singleton requirement contributed by *she<sub>u</sub>* is enforced locally, relative to each of these sub-states, and not globally, relative to the whole input info state, so we end up requiring the courted girl to be unique *per convention* and not across the board.

## Exceptional Wide Scope as Quantificational Subordination

- anaphora to quantificational dependencies enables us to provide a novel solution to the problem of exceptional scope (ES) of (in)definites, first noticed in Farkas (1981) and Fodor & Sag (1982)<sup>4</sup>;
- the ES cases we are interested in – the widest and the intermediate scope readings of sentence (5), given below in first order translations:
  5. Every <sup>$u \sqsubseteq r$</sup>  student of mine read every <sup>$u' \sqsubseteq r'$</sup>  poem that a <sup>$u'' \sqsubseteq r''$</sup>  famous Romanian poet wrote before World War II.
  6. Narrowest scope (NS) indefinite:  
 $\forall x(student.o.m(x) \rightarrow \forall y(poem(y) \wedge \exists z(r.poet(z) \wedge write(z, y)) \rightarrow read(x, y)))$
  7. **a.** Intermediate scope (IS) indefinite:  
 $\forall x(student.o.m(x) \rightarrow \exists z(r.poet(z) \wedge \forall y(poem(y) \wedge write(z, y) \rightarrow read(x, y))))$   
**b.** Context for the IS reading:  
 Every <sup>$r$</sup>  student chose a <sup>$r''$</sup>  (different <sub>$r, r''$</sub> ) poet and read every <sup>$r'$</sup>  poem written by him.
  8. **a.** Widest scope (WS) indefinite:  
 $\exists z(r.poet(z) \wedge \forall x(student.o.m(x) \rightarrow \forall y(poem(y) \wedge write(z, y) \rightarrow read(x, y))))$   
**b.** Context for the WS reading:  
 Every <sup>$r$</sup>  student chose a <sup>$r''$</sup>  poet – the same <sub>$r, r''$</sub>  poet – and read every <sup>$r'$</sup>  poem written by him.
- the main idea: the ES readings are instances of quantificational subordination – since the availability of such readings is crucially dependent on the context relative to which (5) is interpreted;
- thus, we follow Farkas (1997) in taking scope to be essentially discursal; the syntax/semantics interface underdetermines scopal relations – it only specifies “when an expression *may* be in the scope of another, but not when it *must* be in its scope” (p. 184);
- the IS reading is available when (5) is interpreted in the context provided by (7b), which, in fact, forces an IS interpretation;
- similarly, the WS reading is the only available one in the discourse context provided by (8b).

### The basic account of exceptional wide scope

- ES readings are available when sentence (5) is anaphoric to particular kinds of quantifier domains and quantificational dependencies introduced in the previous discourse (or accommodated if there is no previous discourse);
- that is, the two *every* determiners and the indefinite article in (5) further elaborate on the sets of individuals and the correlations between them introduced in (7b) and (8b);
- the account relies on the independently motivated assumption that quantifier domains are always contextually restricted;

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<sup>4</sup>This novel analysis of exceptional wide scope is the result of joint work with Donka Farkas – see Brasoveanu & Farkas (2007).

- under this analysis, (in)definites are not ambiguous between their ordinary existential meanings and choice-/Skolem-function based meanings and there is no need to resort to movement, special storage mechanisms, choice function variables or bound implicit arguments to derive the ES readings.

### Exceptional wide scope and plural info states

- unlike the tradition inaugurated in Fodor & Sag (1982) and varied upon in Reinhart (1997) and Kratzer (1998), (in)definites are not taken to be ambiguous between their ordinary existential meanings and choice-/Skolem-function based meanings;
- there is no need to resort to special scoping mechanisms (as in Abusch 1994) or to posit special choice-functional variables (as in Winter 1997);
- the account builds on the insight in Schwarzschild (2002) that contextual restrictions on quantifier domains play a crucial role in the genesis of ES readings – without, however, relying on *singleton* quantifier domain restrictions or implicit arguments (the latter are crucial for the derivation of IS readings in Schwarzschild 2002);
- the IS interpretation arises because of the presence in the input discourse context of a function pairing  $r$ -students and  $r''$ -Romanian poets that rules out the possibility of co-variation between the quantifier  $every^{u' \sqsubseteq r'}$  *poem* and the indefinite  $a^{u'' \sqsubseteq r''}$  *poet* in sentence (5);
- this function emerges (without any additional stipulation) as a result of the update contributed by sentence (7b);
- the WS reading arises because the value of the  $dref\ r''$  is constant, thereby ruling out any possibility of co-variation whatsoever;
- finally, the NS reading arises by default, when there are no special contextual restrictions on the indefinite article and the *every* determiners in sentence (5).

### Extensions: Modal Subordination and Belief Reports

- the system is straightforwardly extended to account for modal subordination (we just need to add  $dref$ 's  $p, p'$  etc. for possible worlds):

9. **a.**  $A^u$  wolf might $p$  come in. **b.**  $It_u$  would $p$  eat Harvey first.  
(based on an example in Roberts 1989<sup>5</sup>)

- thus, we capture the anaphoric and quantificational parallels between the individual and modal domains argued for in Stone (1999), Bittner (2001) and Schlenker (2005) (among others), building on Partee (1973, 1984);
- plural info states are needed to capture modal subordination across attitude reports, e.g.:

10. John thinks $p$  that he will $p$  catch a $u$  fish and he hopes $p'$  I will $p'$  grill it $u$  tonight.  
(Heim 1990)

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<sup>5</sup>For more discussion of modal subordination, see also Frank (1996), Frank & Kamp (1997), Geurts (1999), Stone (1999) and McCready & Asher (2006) among others.

- plural info states also enable us to capture modal subordination across *de se* attitude reports<sup>6</sup>, where we need to pass information about centered worlds across sentential boundaries – as in (11) below:

11. John believes <sup>$p, u^{self}$</sup>  that his <sub>$u^{self}$</sub>  pants are <sub>$p$</sub>  on fire and he hopes <sup>$p', u^{self'}$</sup>  that he <sub>$u^{self'}$</sub>  will <sub>$p'$</sub>  find a fire extinguisher some time soon.

- centered worlds: pairs / dependencies of the form  $(w, x^{self})$ , where  $w$  is an attitude internal world (a belief world, a hope world etc.) and  $x^{self}$ , the center of world  $w$ , is the individual that the attitude holder takes herself to be in  $w$ ;
- centered worlds are represented by means of a modal dref  $p$  and an individual dref  $u^{self}$  and the rows in a plural info state store the dependencies between worlds and their centers (note that we allow the same world to be associated with multiple centers, as argued for in Lewis 1979).

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<sup>6</sup>For more discussion of *de se* reports, see Lewis (1979), Cresswell & von Stechow (1982), Kaplan (1989), Chierchia (1989), Abusch (1997), Schlenker (1999) and Anand (2006) among others.

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