

Your name: _____

Metaphysics Exercise 6/7

Hum. 11600 Sections 01 and 02.

1. According to Leibniz, which of the following is correct?
 - a. All monads are made out of the same simple substance, but they are different from each other because their perceptions are different.
 - b. Every monad is a simple substance, which differs from all the others because its perceptions are different.
 - c. Monads are made out of a simple substance, whereas bodies are made out of a more complex substance.
 - d. A monad cannot be divided into parts because it is a simple substance.
 - e. (a) and (d).
 - f. (b) and (d).

2. Suppose someone were to say, "Monads are indivisible because they are very small." According to Leibniz, what is the status of that statement?
 - a. It makes sense and is true in every sense.
 - b. In all metaphysical strictness, it is true, but, under a looser interpretation (which matches up better with the way we usually think of the world), it is false.
 - c. In all metaphysical strictness, it is false, but, under a looser interpretation (which matches up better with the way we usually think of the world), it is true.
 - d. In all metaphysical strictness, it makes no sense, but, under a looser interpretation (which matches up better with the way we usually think of the world), it makes sense and is true.
 - e. In all metaphysical strictness, it makes no sense, but, under a looser interpretation (which matches up better with the way we usually think of the world), it makes sense, but is false.

3. According to Leibniz, why does God punish rational monads?
 - a. They sometimes act in a way that goes against their own nature, so God must intervene to correct them.
 - b. To act wrongly (to sin) belongs to the nature of some rational monads, but to be punished also belongs to the nature of those same monads. (That is: although they may not be conscious of it, these monads in a sense *want* to be punished.)
 - c. Punishment is a natural consequence of sin.

- d. God creates the best possible world. But a world in which there was sin without punishment would be worse than one in which there is sin and punishment.
 - e. Although a rational monad which sins could not, according to its nature, have done otherwise, and so will not be improved by punishment, God still punishes it because this serves as a cautionary example for the other rational monads.
 - f. (b), (c) and (d).
 - g. (b), (c) and (e).
4. About which of the following statements would Leibniz and Plotinus agree, while both would *disagree* with Thomas Aquinas?
- a. Some sensible (corporeal, material) substances are images of intelligible (incorporeal, immaterial) substance(s).
 - b. All sensible (corporeal, material) substances are images of intelligible (incorporeal, immaterial) substance(s).
 - c. Sensible (corporeal, material) substances are not real substances at all, in the strictest sense of the term.
 - d. (a) and (c).
 - e. (b) and (c).
5. As far as you can tell from our reading, about which of the following statements would Leibniz and Descartes agree, while both would *disagree* with Thomas Aquinas. (Note: as usual, you should count it as “agreement” if two philosophers would assert the same words, even if they would mean different things by them. In particular, you should count Descartes and Leibniz as agreeing even if Descartes thinks something is true in all metaphysical strictness, whereas Leibniz thinks it’s true only according to a looser, but still permissible, way of speaking.)
- a. Sensible qualities (color, taste, etc.) are ideal (not really qualities of the things we perceive).
 - b. Three-dimensional extension and its concomitants (e.g. size, shape, motion) are ideal.
 - c. The human soul is an incorporeal substance, which is only virtually present in a body.
 - d. If there were no finite incorporeal substances (i.e., incorporeal substances other than God), there would be no bodies, either.
 - e. All of the above.
 - f. (a), (c) and (d).
 - g. (a) and (c).