

Your name: _____

Metaphysics Exercise 4

Hum. 11600 Sections 01 and 02.

1. As far as you can tell from our reading, which of the following statements would Porphyry and Avicenna *disagree* about? (As on last week's exercise: if they would both say that the statement is true, that counts as "agreeing," even if they would mean different things by it.)
 - a. When the term "heat" is used to name a kind of quality (that is: a species or genus falling under the category *quality*), it is used univocally.
 - b. The term "quality" applies univocally to the heat in hot water and to the heat in fire.
 - c. The term "quality" applies univocally to the heat in hot water and to the differentia of fire.
 - d. If something exists "in a subject," that is because its being is so deficient that it cannot exist on its own.
 - e. (c) and (d).
 - f. (b), (c) and (d).
2. Avicenna adds, to Aristotle's definition of "in a subject," the extra words: "another thing which has attained existence and species in itself." What effect do these extra words have?
 - a. They make it clear that not only accidents, but also differentiae, are "in a subject," because a species is defined by differentiae, so nothing "attains existence and species" without differentiae.
 - b. They make it clear that substantial form in matter is "in a subject," because matter is "another thing" compared to what has "attained existence and species in itself."
 - c. They make it clear that substantial form in matter is not "in a subject," because matter has not "attained existence and species in itself."
 - d. They make it clear that heat in fire is not "in a subject," because fire does not "attain existence and species" without heat.
 - e. They make it clear that three-dimensional continuous quantity in wax is not "in a subject," because wax does not "attain existence and species" without three-dimensional continuous quantity.
 - f. (c), (d) and (e).
3. When earth is lifted into the air, it feels heavy. According to Avicenna, what is the correct explanation for that?

- a. There is a greater quantity of matter in a given volume of earth than in the same volume of air. Therefore, earth is denser than air. Therefore, earth falls (sinks) in air.
- b. Weight, which is an actual inclination to move towards the center (in the absence of “impediments”) is part of the form of earth.
- c. Weight, which is an actual inclination to move towards the center (in the absence of “impediments”) is part of the nature of earth.
- d. The nature of earth is a power which causes weight—that is, an actual inclination to move towards the center—when earth is out of its natural place (in the absence of “impediments”).
- e. The form of earth is a quiddity which makes earth the kind of substance it is; weight, which is an actual inclination to move towards the center, is an accident which “befalls” earth from outside.
- f. (b) and (c).

4. As far as you can tell from our reading, about which of the following statements would Avicenna and St. Thomas Aquinas *agree* with each other, but *disagree* with John Philoponus (in the above senses of “agree” and “disagree”)?

- a. Matter, in itself, has no quantity.
- b. Suppose Socrates is five feet tall. Then the five-feet-tallness in Socrates is an accident in Socrates.
- c. Suppose this lump of wax is spherical. Then sphericity is an accident in the wax (a member of the genus of quality).
- d. The indeterminate three-dimensional continuous quantity in this wax is an accident in this wax.
- e. Sometimes, by a miracle, a human body has the shape and volume of bread.
- f. (b) and (c).

5. After the bread has been sanctified for use in the sacrament of the Eucharist, the accidents of the bread remain while (supposedly) the substance present is no longer the substance of the bread, but rather the body of Christ. According to St. Thomas, why is this *not* “deceptive”?

- a. What we call “bread” is really just the accidents of bread (the substance itself is hidden or “occult”). So when we believe our senses and think there is “bread” there, we are not deceived.
- b. The accidents of bread are not “bread” at all, but something which normally accompanies bread. Our reason normally judges, correctly, that bread is there when our senses perceive those accidents. In this case our

normal judgment would be wrong, but we are saved from deception by faith.

c. The accidents of bread are not “bread” at all, but something which normally accompanies bread. Our reason tends to jump to the conclusion that bread is there when our senses perceive those accidents, but that is a mistake: if we were more careful we would not be deceived.

d. Our senses do not perceive the bread itself (the substance of bread), but only the accidents. Since the accidents of bread actually are present, our senses are not deceived.

e. (b) and (d).

f. (c) and (d).