Selected Recent Publications:

The Future of Inflation Targeting The Economic Record, Sept. 2011, 87: 23-36.

Welfare-based optimal monetary policy with unemployment and sticky prices: A linear-quadratic framework (with Federico Ravenna), American Economic Journals: Macroeconomics, 3, April 2011: 130-162. Appendix.

Bank Independence Revisited, Economic Papers, 30(1), March 2011, 18-22

Implementing Monetary Policy, prepared for the 2010 Bank of Korea International Conference, Seoul Journal of Economics, 24((4), Winter 2011. Monetary Theory and Policy, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 3rd ed, 2010.

Using Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity, in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy¸2009 Jackson Hole Symposium, 2010: 245-296.

Monetary policy under uncertainty and learning, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Carl E. Walsh, editors, 13th Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2009.

Commentary: Using models for policy analysis, International Journal of Central Banking, March 2010, 6(1).

Monetary Policy and Key Unobservables: Evidence from Large Industrial and Selected Inflation-Targeting Countries (with K. Schmidt-Hebbel), in Monetary policy under uncertainty and learning, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Carl E. Walsh, editors, 13th Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2009.

Inflation targeting: What Have We Learned? International Finance., 12:2, 2009, 195-233.

Vacancies, Unemployment, and the Phillips Curve, with Federico Ravenna, European Economic Review 52 (2008), pp. 1494-1521.

Announcements and the Role of Policy Guidance, The 32nd Annual Economic Policy Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, 90(4), July/August 2008, 421-442.

Inflation targeting and the role of real objectives, Revista de Economía, Banco Central del Uruguay, 14(2), Nov. 2007, 5-36.

Optimal Economic Transparency, International Journal of Central Banking 3(1), March 2007, 5-36.

Optimal Monetary Policy with the Cost Channel, Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2006, 199-216.

Labor Market Search, Sticky Prices, and Interest Rate Policies, Review of Economic Dynamics 8(4), Oct. 2005, 829-849.

Labor Market Search and Monetary Shocks, in Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, S. Altug, J. Chadha, and C. Nolan, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 451-486.

Endogenous objectives and the evaluation of targeting rules for monetary policy, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Papers in honor of Bennett McCallum, Nov. 2004, Journal of Monetary Economics 52(5), July 2005, 889-911.

Interest and Prices: A Review Essay, a review of Mike Woodford's Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Macroeconomic Dynamics 9, 2005, 462-468.

Robustly Optimal Instrument Rules and Robust Control: An Equivalence Result, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(6), Dec. 2004, 1105-1113.

Implications of a Changing Economic Structure for the Strategy of Monetary Policy, in Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2003, 297-348. Reprinted in The ICFAI Journal of Monetary Economics, 11(4), Nov. 2004, 45-80.

Comment on: The zero-interest-rate bound and the role of the exchange rate for monetary policy in Japan, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (5), July 2003, 1103-110.

Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35(5), October 2003, pp. 829-849.

Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy, American Economic Review, 93(1), March 2003, 265-278.

Teaching Inflation Targeting: An Analysis for Intermediate Macro," Journal of Economic Education, 33 (4), Fall 2002, 333-347.

Capital Movements: Curse or Blessing? (with Michael P. Dooley), in International Financial Markets: The Challenge of Globalization, L. Auernheimer (ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 79-102.

Commentary on “Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 84 (4), July/Aug. 2002, 37-45.

When Should Central Bankers Be Fired? Economics of Governance, 3 (1), 2002, 1-21.

Monetary Policy Design: Institutional Developments from a Contractual Perspective, International Finance, 3 (3), Nov. 2000, 375-3.

The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years: A Comment, Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 124-135.

Market Discipline and Monetary Policy, Oxford Economic Papers, 52 (2000), 249-271.

Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives, Economica, 66, 1999, 255-269.

Academic Views of Capital Flows (with Michael P. Dooley), in Capital Flows and the International Financial System, David Gruen and Luke Gower (eds.), Reserve Bank of Australia, 1999.

Disinflation in New Zealand (with Michael M. Hutchison), in Why Is It Important To Reduce Inflation And How To Do It? The International Experience and Lessons for Colombia, (in Spanish), The World Bank, forthcoming.

The Output-Inflation Tradeoff and Central Bank Reform: Evidence from New Zealand (with Michael M. Hutchison), The Economic Journal, 108, May 1998, 703-725.

Central Bank Independence, Economic Behavior and Optimal Term Lengths (with Christopher J. Waller), American Economic Review, 86 (5), Dec. 1996, 1139-1153.

Bank Credit and Economic Activity, with James A. Wilcox, in Is Bank Lending Important for the Transmission of Monetary Policy? J. Peek and E.S. Rosengren, editors, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series, No. 39, June 1995, 83-112.

Price Stability as the Objective of Monetary Policy and Recent Central Bank Reforms, B. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg (eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1995, Cambridge: MIT Press, 237-252.

Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27 (4), Nov. 1995, Part 1, 1179-1191.

Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers, American Economic Review, 85 (1), March 1995, 150-167.