Free Choice in Romanian

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1. Introduction[1]

1.1 Preview

This paper explores the determiner corner of the 'any' land in Romanian, taking Lee and Horn 1994 and Horn 2000a as tour guides. The immediate interest of the task lies in the fact that the work done in English by the over-employed determiner *any* is carried out in Romanian by a host of more specialized (and, one fears, lower paid) morphemes, which I review in the rest of this section. My aim is to introduce the details of the Romanian facts onto the scene and to show that an 'indefinitist' view that generalizes the scalar approach advocated in Horn's work is useful in helping us understand the much more crowded Romanian field. The theory of *any* that serves as my starting point is summarized in Section 2. Section 3 proposes a generalization of the scalar view advocated by Horn in terms of an alternative-based approach in the spirit of Krifka 1995, Giannakidou 2001 and Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, based on a novel way of defining alternatives. Section 4 looks at the consequences of the proposal, Section 5 considers ways of extending it, and Section 6 is a brief conclusion. The approach suggested here falls under what Horn calls *quodlibetic* theories. Its claim is that the unifying characteristic of both existentially and universally flavored free choice-like items is that they denote a maximal set of alternatives that verify the expression in which the item occurs. The scalar view is the important special case in which these alternatives form an implicational scale with respect to verifying the relevant expression.

1.2 The Romanian workers in the *any* field

For reasons of space I deal only with determiners. The ordinary singular indefinite article, whose forms are *un* 'Masc.Sg' and *o* 'Fem.Sg', is exemplified below:

(1) A sosit *un* băiat.
has arrived a boy
A boy arrived.

NPs with these articles are least marked in that they have the widest distribution. The special determiners studied here are special in that they have limited distribution as well as special morphology. Morphologically, they are complex in that they have the ordinary singular article or an interrogative/relative pronoun as subparts, a situation that is quite common across languages. (See Haspelmath 1997 for a wealth of cases.)

(i) N-words

Romanian, like its Romance sisters, is a negative concord language with a large inventory of n-words, both pronouns and determiners. N-determiners are made up of *nici* followed by the singular form of the indefinite article, which agrees with the head N in gender:

(2) Nu am văzut *nici un* băiat.

[1] I am grateful to Cleo Condoravdi, Michela Ippolito, Gregory Ward, Lynsey Wolter, Larry Horn himself, and an anonymous reviewer for useful discussions and comments on previous drafts.

not have seen n a boy
I haven't seen any boy.

N-determiners are negative concord items in that they must be licensed by a negative element, i.e., negation in their own clause, negation in a superordinate clause under special circumstances, and negative items such as *fără* 'without'.[2]

(3) *Am văzut *nici un* băiat.
have seen n a boy

*Fiecare fată care a văzut *nici un* băiat a plecat.
every girl who has seen n a boy has left
Every girl who saw any boy left.

*Dacă vezi *nici un* băiat, spune-mi.
if see.II n a boy tell me
If you see any boy, tell me.

Nu cred că a văzut nici un băiat.
not think that has seen n a boy
I don't think he/she saw any boy.

*Nu a spus că a văzut nici un băiat.
not has said that has seen n a boy

A plecat fără nici un ban.
has left without n a penny

(ii) Existential ***any***
Lee and Horn 1994 calls 'existential' occurrences of *any* in negative and downward entailing contexts "polarity sensitive" or PS *any*. In Romanian, the work of existential *any* is done by the special determiner *vreun/vreo*: (See Farkas 2002a for discussion.) I will use the term 'existential' in order to distinguish *vreun* from its n-word sister *nici un.*

(4) Dacă vezi *vreun* student trişînd, spune-mi.
if see.II v-a student cheating tell me
If you see *any* student cheating, tell me.

Here *vreun student* can only be interpreted existentially and, just like existential *any* and unlike ordinary indefinites, can only have narrow scope relative to the conditional.
(iii) Universal ***any***
The work of the universal determiner *any,* (Free Choice *any* in standard terminology), exemplified in (5),

[2] The details of the licensing conditions of *nici* items and other n-words in Romanian have to be left for the next Horn Festschrift.

(5) *Any* owl hunts mice.

is done in Romanian by morphologically complex determiners whose first part is *ori* and whose second part is an indefinite/interrogative pronoun:

(6) *Orice* bufniță vînează şoareci.
o-any owl hunts mice
Any owl hunts mice.

Mă deranjează *orice* zgomot.
me disturbs o-any noise
Any noise disturbs me.

Within the *ori* series, there is a necessarily discourse-linked (D-linked) subset, made up of *ori* followed by the interrogative pronoun *care* 'which':

(7) *Oricare* student dintre ăştia doi poate pleca.
any-which student of these two may leave
Any student of these two may leave.

There are two more incarnations of *any* discussed in Horn's work: 'Supplementary' *any*, exemplified in (8), and 'indiscriminative' *any*, exemplified in (9) (see Horn 2000b).

(8) Caută pe cineva – pe *oricine* – cu care să se căsătorească
look Acc. somebody – Acc. anybody – with whom Subj. Ref. marry
He is looking for someone – anyone – to marry.
(9) Nu sînt un bătrîn *oarecare*; sînt domnul ţării.
not am an old man o-which am king-Def country.Pos
I am not just any old man; I am the king of the country.

Because of space and insight limitations, I leave these items outside the scope of the discussion. Partitive versions of ordinary indefinites and *vreun* indefinites will also be ignored here.

The variety of *any* words in Romanian poses a challenge to univocal treatments of English *any*. The account we seek is one that is able to capture what is common to these items, as well as to point to the joints along which to differentiate them.

2. The scalar approach for English and Romanian

2.1 The scalar approach for English

I start from the scalar indefinitist account of *any* in Lee and Horn 1994 and Horn 2000a, the latter of which should also be consulted for the kind of whirlwind tour of the great land of *any* studies that only Horn can conjure up.

The scalar indefinitist view treats *any* in all its uses as the ordinary indefinite article *a* modified by *even*. The scalar part is brought in by *even*, which contributes a presupposition requiring the existence of a pragmatic likelihood (or unilateral entailment)

scale associated with the sentence and the further requirement that the element in its scope denote its lowest rung. Assuming $\lambda x.P$ to be the predicate obtained by abstracting over the variable associated with the *any*-NP in the sentence, the presupposed scale is made up of entities *a, b, c ...* which are possible values of *x*. The ordering is determined by an entailment relation such that if *P(i)* is true of some entity *i* on the scale, *P(j)* is (likely to be) true of all entities *j* to the left of *i*. The sentence asserts that $\lambda x.P$ is true of the lowest element on this scale, the denotation of the *any*-NP, and implicates that $\lambda x.P$ holds of all the higher rungs as well. Under this analysis, it is the contribution of *even* that is responsible for the differences between ordinary indefinites and *any* indefinites, and in particular for the distributional constraints it obeys, as well as for the widening effect of *any* first discussed in Kadmon and Landman 1993.

In this approach, the dual nature of *any* follows from the fact that the ordinary indefinite article can be generic or not, combined with the fact that there are two types of scales, *quantity* and *quality* scales. With a quantity scale, the rungs are quantities chosen from the denotation of the NP, while in the case of quality scales, the rungs are kinds. If the presupposed scale is a quantity scale, the *any*-NP term is paraphrasable by *even a single/a bit;* if the presupposed scale is a quality scale the *any*-NP term is paraphrasable by *even the most Adj*, where the adjective is contextually supplied. Instances of NPI *any* are existential indefinites associated with a quantity scale. Instances of FC *any* are generic indefinites associated with a quality scale. Whether an *any* term is generic or existential depends on the presence of an Existential or Generic feature of the indefinite article subpart of *any*. In what follows I depart from Lee and Horn's terminology but not the spirit of their approach. As an umbrella term for both existential PS *any* an universal FC *any* I will use the term *undifferentiated choice item* (UCI). These items are a subclass of special indefinites, indefinites that impose special requirements on the variable they introduce. In English then, *any* is a UCI coming in two flavors, existential and universal.

The restrictions on the occurrence of *any*-NPs follow from the presence of *even* and the scales it brings in. There are two negative conditions on scale formation that Lee and Horn 1994 suggests, namely (i) no particular value or witness for *x* should be required and (ii) the sentence should not assert the existence of a witness for *x*. The non-occurrence of *any*-NPs in episodic sentences and in positive existential assertions is thus accounted for. What remains an open issue is the justification of these conditions.

2.2 The scalar approach for Romanian

I turn to the question of how well this Procrustean position works for a profligate language like Romanian. The short answer is: pretty well. Let us look at the details.

UC existentials

The existential part of the *any* spectrum in Romanian is occupied by *vreun*, and the set of n-determiners. The universal part of the spectrum is occupied by the items in the *ori* series, which I call *UC universals*. Before sketching a scalar account of these special indefinites, I state some relevant assumptions about determiners in general and about ordinary indefinite determiners in particular. I assume a representational semantics in which determiners are responsible for the introduction of variables (or discourse referents) in semantic representation. Ordinary indefinite articles (*a(n)* in English, *un/o* in Romanian) are the least marked determiners in that they do not contribute anything

else.[3] Special determiners are special in that they come with various restrictions on the variable they introduce, which are responsible for their special interpretation and distribution. These restrictions may be domain restrictions, referring to the properties of the set denoted by the descriptive content of the NP, or various types of interpretive restrictions, referring to characteristics of the way the variable is assigned values.

Ordinary indefinite NPs in Romanian, just like their English counterparts, may occur in episodic, generic and conditional sentences:

(10) Te-a căutat o studentă azi.
You-have looked for a student today
A student looked for you today.

(11) O bufniță vînează şoareci.
an owl hunts mice
An owl hunts mice.

(12) Un copil care e bolnav nu se poartă aşa.
a child who is sick not Ref. behave thus
A child who is sick does not behave this way.

(13) Dacă mă caută un coleg nu sînt acasă.
If me look for a colleague not am home
If someone/anyone looks for me, I am not home.

(a) N-determiners

As mentioned before, n-words are on the other side of the spectrum: They are most marked in the sense that they must be licensed by a negative element. Romanian n-words may occur both in explicitly negated clauses, when the predicate is negated by the clausal negation morpheme *nu*, exemplified in (2), and in implicitly negated clauses, as in (14), where the clause is within the scope of a negative adverb:

(14) A plecat fără să ne dea *nici* o scuză.
has left without Subj. us give n an excuse
He/she left without giving us any excuse.

N-items are negative concord indefinites, i.e., indefinites subject to licensing by negation (see Ladusaw 1992). In present terms, the contribution of such items is a variable subject to the relevant licensing condition , a condition encoded in the feature [Neg]. Under a scalar view of *nici* a further requirement is imposed, namely the presupposed existence of a quantity scale associated with the set denoted by the descriptive content of the NP. The indefinite would denote the item on the lowest rung of this scale.[4]

[3] I assume the treatment of number in Farkas and de Swart 2003, according to which singular forms do not come with any special requirement and get atomic interpretations by default.

[4] *Nici un/o* can only be used with individuated (count) nouns, and therefore the quantity scale has to be a cardinality scale. This is due to the presence of *un/o,* which cannot occur with mass nouns. With mass nouns a bare NP is used under negation and the quantity *ceva* 'some' is used elsewhere.

(b) *Vreun* indefinites
What is left within the existential area of the English determiner *any* is the special indefinite determiner *vreun*:

(15) Ai văzut *vreun* porc care zboară?
have.II seen v-a pig that flies
Have you seen any pig that flies?

Under the scalar analysis, the use of *vreun* comes with the requirement that there be a cardinal quantity scale whose lowest rung is one pig rendering (15) equivalent to *Have you seen even a single pig that flies?*

So far, we have seen that the existential corner of the English determiner *any* is occupied by n-determiners and *vreun*. A unified scalar treatment of these items would run as follows: N-words are existential indefinites associated with a quantity scale and the extra requirement of being negative concord items. *Vreun* NPs are existential indefinites associated with a quantity scale not subject to further requirements. They acquire their existential force from the existential closure of the VP in which they find themselves. What is special to negative concord items and *vreun* NPs is that they are associated with a presupposed quantity scale whose lowest rung they denote. What differentiates them is that the former but not the latter are negative concord items.[5]
Universal UCIs
Universal UCIs are Free Choice items in standard terminology. The switch is motivated by the attempt to bring under one terminological umbrella the universal and existential flavored *any* and its cross-linguistic relatives. In the scalar view, FC *any* NPs are generic indefinites associated with a kind scale whose lowest rung is occupied by the kind whose realizations are least likely wintesses, and it is within this kind that the *any* item denotes. As we saw above, in Romanian, the universal UCIs are those in the *ori* series. They fall into two categories: D-linked and unmarked UCIs. The former require their domain (the set from which their values are chosen) to be contextually established, while the latter do not impose this requirement. An example of a non D-linked universal UC NP is given in (16) and further examples in (17):

(16) Dacă (absolut) *orice* copil poate traversa lacul, pot şi eu.
if (absolutely) o-any child can cross lake.Def. can and I
If (absolutely) any child can cross the lake, I can too.

(17) a. *Orice* pisică poate sări peste zidul ăsta.
o-any cat can jump over wall.Def. this
Any cat can jump over this wall.
b. Bob a fugit mai repede decît *orice* copil.
Bob has run more fast than o-any child
Bob ran faster than any child.
c. Ia *orice/oricare* măr.

[5] A problem I cannot go into here is that in Romanian all three existential indefinites may occur in negated clauses, with subtle differences in interpretation. Accounting for these is a complex matter that deserves a separate paper.

take o-any/o-any.D-link apple
Take any apple.

The domain constraint that comes with D-linked UCIs is met either when the domain of the NP is contextually present or when it is defined relative to a contextually present entity. In the D-linked version of (17c), the domain must be a contextually present set of apples. If the non-D-linked version is used, the domain may be completely open or it may be implicitly restricted to a salient relevant set, as in (17b), where Bob is assumed to have had a set of competitors. Thus, non-D-linked UCIs, in both English and Romanian, are like their ordinary indefinite counterparts in allowing implicit D-linked uses: One may use the non-D-linked version of (17c) to invite the addressee to pick any apple from a basket one presents. And if one proffers such a basket, one can justifiably object if the addressee goes out and picks an apple from a tree in the orchard.[6]

The existence of explicit D-linked universally flavored UCIs is theoretically significant because it shows that the widening associated with these items cannot essentially involve a ban against implicit or explicit contextual domain restrictions: We have seen that non-D-linked universal UCIs allow the former while D-linked universal UCIs require the presence of either the former or the latter. Free choice cannot, therefore, be seen as a ban against contextual restrictions. Note now that the widening that is involved in the scalar treatment of these items proposed by Lee and Horn is compatible with contextual restrictions. In contextually restricted cases, the potential values for the relevant variable are chosen from contextually present realizations of the kind that occupies the lowest rung of the presupposed kind scale. The picture of scalar determiners in Romanian that emerges from the above discussion is given below.



Figure 1: Scalar determiners in Romanian

One question that arises at this point is the connection between type of scale and quantificational force. An attractive possibility is to connect existential force with quantity scales and universal force with quality scales. Then all that needs to be said is that *vreun* presupposes the former kind of scale and *ori* the latter, and have

[6] Interestingly, the domain of *any,* just like that of *every*, may be restricted to accommodate a presupposition in its scope further showing that a ban on contextual restrictions is not essential to FC *any*.

(i) *Every American* sold his house.
(ii) *Any American* should sell his house.

Both (i) and (ii) make statements about Americans who own houses.

quantificational flavor follow. The connection appears intuitive but deriving it is beyond what I can do at present.

A feature-based scalar analysis of Romanian, in a nutshell, would treat *nici* as a scalar existential negative concord determiner, marked by the features [Neg] and [Existential scalar], *vreun* would be marked as [Existential scalar], while *ori* determiners are marked as [Generic scalar] with a further subdivision depending on whether the feature [D-link] is present or not. Two further connections (that I leave out of the current discussion) need to be made: (1) that between being an indefinite within the immediate scope of negation and existential scalarity; and (2) that between generic scalarity and wide scope. I turn now to reasons for why a scalar approach might have to be generalized.

2.3 Limitations of the scalar approach

2.3.1 Subtrigging and modal differentiation

Subtrigging, noticed first in LeGrand 1975, and discussed in detail in Dayal 1998, is the name given to the intriguing phenomenon of acceptable universal *any* NPs within non-modal, apparently episodic clauses in the presence of explicit (or even implicit) modification, normally of the postnominal sort. I exemplify with both Romanian and English:

(18) #Ieri, Ion a vorbit cu orice student.
#Yesterday, Ion talked to any student.

(19) Ieri, Ion a vorbit cu orice student care s-a prezentat în biroul lui.
Yesterday, Ion talked to any student who came by his office.

Within the scalar approach to universal UCs, there is no immediate explanation for why this sort of modification would make a difference; it is not clear why modification would make the NP more prone to denoting an ordered set than when the NP is unmodified. The issue is, of course, crucially connected to the ban of scalar items from episodic sentences.

Dayal 1998 proposes an account of subtrigging couched, however, within an ambiguist theory of *any*. FC *any*, for Dayal, is a universal quantifier over situations and individuals within the denotation of the descriptive content of the NP. In the absence of the right type of modification, the set of situations quantified over is open-ended and therefore not appropriate as an argument of episodic predicates because such predicates denote temporally and locally bounded situations. The problem in (18) then is one of incompatibility between the open-ended nature of the argument and the necessarily bounded nature of the predicate. This, I suggest, should be treated as a category mismatch between the requirements of the predicate on the one hand, and of its arguments on the other, rather than as a problem leading to a necessarily false sentence or an ordinary presupposition failure. The situation variable of arguments of predicates must be compatible with the situation variable contributed by the predicate. The presence of an explicit post-nominal modifier that narrows down the situations involved in the interpretation of the NP rescues the sentence in (19). *Any* here quantifies over all possible situations that involve a student coming by Ion's office yesterday. Because of

the modification, this set is now bounded and may serve as an argument to a bounded predicate.[7]

Another question Dayal's universal analysis of UC *any* tackles is the differentiation between modal contexts when it comes to felicitous occurrence of FC *any*. Recall that FC *any* is acceptable with permission modals but not in necessity/command contexts:

(20) a. You may pick *any* flower.
b. #You must pick *any* flower.
c. You must pick *any* flower you see.
d. #You must pick *any* flower in this bed.

Dayal's account of the contrast between (20a) and (20b) is based on the incompatibility of commands and the open-endedness of unmodified FCIs. Her account of the contrast between (20c) and (20d) is based on a vagueness condition associated with FC *any*, given in (21).

(21) Revised Vagueness Requirement: Any (A) (Op B) is felicitous iff AOB is not contextually salient in any relevant world, where Op may be □,◊, !, ¡ or null. (Dayal 1998, p. 459, (57b))

This condition does not crucially make reference to the universal force of FC *any* and therefore could be imported into any analysis. An open question, however, is why such a condition should obtain.

The facts are parallel in Romanian:

(22) a. Ai voie să culegi *orice* floare.
have permission Subj pick o-any flower
b. #Trebuie să culegi *orice* floare.
must Subj pick o-any flower
c. Trebuie să culegi *orice* floare vezi.
must Subj pick o-any flower see.II
d. #Trebuie să culegi *orice* floare din grădina asta.
must Subj pick o-any flower from garden this

Subtrigging and modal differentiation remain puzzles under a scalar account, though of course not necessarily unsolvable puzzles. Dayal's (21), on the other hand, is somewhat *ad hoc* in that it is not connected to other nominal restrictions.

2.3.2 Non-scalar *vreun* items

[7] There is an open problem here, discussed in Giannakidou 2001, namely that of why implicit contextual restrictions cannot save (19). Giannakidou's own solution treats sentences like (20) as implicit conditionals (see Quer 2000). The fact that (19) and its ilk have a natural conditional paraphrase should, however, be part of the explanandum, and not the explanation itself.

There are occurrences of *vreun* NPs in Romanian for which a scalar approach is not intuitive. Thus, while in questions involving existence, the quantity scalar flavor of *vreun* is particularly easy to detect, in conditionals it is much less obvious. In (23),

(23) Dacă mă caută *vreun* coleg, nu sînt acasă.
if me look for v-a colleague not am home
If any colleague looks for me I am not home.

the issue of the number of colleagues who might be looking for me is immaterial. Situations in which one colleague is looking for me are not more or less likely than situations in which several are. The if-clause simply quantifies over situations in which there is such a colleague.

Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5 below, the uses of *vreun* go beyond those of English existential *any*, venturing into the territory of English *some N or other*. A scalar approach to those cases is not appropriate. It would be desirable to find a common denominator for *vreun* indefinites in Romanian and scalarity cannot be it. In the next section I outline a univocal approach to existential and universal UCIs that capitalizes on their quodlibetic nature and of which scalar *any* is a special case. The approach generalizes the basic insight of the scalar view, namely that what is at stake is a set of alternatives.

3. Undifferentiated Choice

So far, we have seen that the scalar view goes a long way in explaining the distribution and use of *any* in English and UCIs and Romanian and that there are reasons to wish to generalize it. I offer below such a generalization, in which common to all UCIs (whether existential or universal) is the fact that their interpretation involves a set of *maximal mutually exclusive verifying alternatives*. Defining what the alternatives are is crucial for any alternative-based approach. The simplest view is to take them to be a set of entities. Under this assumption, however, the essential modal nature of UCIs is lost, and the distinction between UCIs with universal force and ordinary universally quantified NPs becomes problematic as well. Alternatives are defined here as a set of assignment function/situation pairs. The alternatives are maximal in that they include all possible values of the relevant variable within the limits of salient contextual restrictions. They are mutually exclusive in that each alternative excludes the other: Each alternative contrasts with all the others with respect to the values assigned to both individual and situation variables. This condition is meant to capture the intuition that each choice involved differs from all the other choices.[8] Finally, the requirement that each alternative verify the expression α in which the UCI occurs is what makes the choices undifferentiated, i.e., free. No matter which alternative is chosen, α is verified relative to that alternative.[9] The undifferentiated nature of these alternatives with respect to

[8] The work done by this condition is done in Menéndez-Benito 2005 by the Exhaustivity operator.

[9] UC alternatives are different from the alternatives involved in the interpretation of focus in two respects: (i) for focus, the situation parameter is constant across alternatives, and (ii) one alternative, the focus value, contrasts with the others with respect to verifying the expression in question. These then, crucially, are differentiated alternatives.

verifying α is responsible for what Horn calls, following Hamilton 1858, the *quodlibetic* nature of FC *any*, and is at the basis of Vendler's 1967 characterization of FC *any* as issuing a blank warranty.[10]

In the current approach, a UCI acquires universal flavor (and thus qualifies as a FCI in standard terminology) if it has widest scope; then all the alternatives it brings along stay relevant to the interpretation of α. A UCI acquires existential force when bound by an existential quantifier within the scope of some operator. Scalar interpretations are a special case in that the alternatives are ordered along some dimension. The difference between quality and quantity scales is importable into the alternative-based view as a difference between quality and quantity alternatives.

The notion of alternatives used here is the same as the Dynamic Semantic notion of *possibilities*: it is a set of assignment function and situation pairs *f, s* such that *f(x,s)* satisfies the descriptive content of the NP, where *x* is the variable introduced by the UCI. I follow Krazter 1989 in treating worlds as maximal situations. To capture mutual exclusivity I assume that both individual and situation variable are indexed. Non-identity of index on the variable ensures distinctness of value. The index on the situation variable must be bound by a larger situation (or world) such that $s_j \leq w_j$. (In what follows I will not treat as separate the case where the binding situation is not a world but a larger situation.) The set of alternatives provides a set of pairs of entities and situations $<v_i, s_j>$. The mutual exclusivity requirement, given in (24), requires strict co-variation between entity and situation for each pair in the set.

(24) *Mutual exclusivity*
A set of alternatives *F* is mutually exclusive iff for any two pairs $<v_i, s_j>$ and $<v_{i'}, s_{j'}>$ it provides, $i' \neq i$ and $j' \neq j$.

The fact that the situation index in each alternative needs to be bound ensures that the variable contributed by the UCI must occur within the scope of an operator which ranges over a set of situations or worlds.

The distinction between quantity and quality alternatives can be maintained. Quantity alternatives are such that *x* ranges over quantities and therefore distinctness involves distinct quantities; quality alternatives are sensitive to the identity of the items involved.

The alternatives introduced by UCIs may be contextually restricted on the possible values for the individual variable. The restrictions may be implicit or explicit. An explicitly D-linked UCI such as *any of you three* brings in alternatives where the individual variable ranges over three possible choices while the situation variable remains free. Modification of the head noun may result in the internal binding of the situation variable. In the NP *any flower you find* the descriptive content contains a situation variable co-varying with the flowers. Finally, the UCI itself may be modified by *almost*, in which case the

[10] Other alternative-based analyses that are close in spirit to the one proposed here are Krifka 1995, Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002 and Giannakidou 2001, Menéndez-Benito 2005. The main difference is the way alternatives are defined. Space limitations do not permit a detailed comparison.

maximality of the set of alternatives is weakened: The alternatives that verify the expression in which the UCI occurs are a large proper subset of the alternatives introduced by the UC expression.

I assume that morphemes in the Determiner position of NPs may signal that the NP is a UCI. This information is encoded in a feature, [UC], which imposes an interpretive restriction requiring the relevant variable to be verified by a set of maximal mutually exclusive alternatives. I assume that unless a UCI has widest scope it is interpreted existentially, and that quantity alternatives are compatible only with existential interpretations.

Variables within the immediate scope of negation have in common with UCIs the fact that they involve a set of verifying alternatives. UCIs within the scope of negation introduce quantity alternatives. In Romanian, *nici* indefinites are marked by [Neg], a feature specific to negative concord items which requires them to be interpreted under (semantic) negation. *Nici* NPs therefore have the features [UC] and [Neg]. The former marks them as introducing a set of alternatives. The latter marks them as negative concord items. Existential interpretation is forced by the presence of [Neg], which renders wide scope impossible.

The contribution of *ori* in Romanian is the feature [UC]. When this morpheme is combined with the interrogative/relative pronoun *care*, 'which', the feature [D-link] is added signaling the requirement that the values of *x* be chosen from a contextually determined set. In the absence of [D-link], the domain of UCIs may be contextually restricted only if this restriction is salient in the context. Widest scope UCIs are what is known in traditional terminology as FCIs.

The determiner *vreun* signals an existentially bound UCI, and thus it is marked by [UC] and [∃]. The fact that morphemes in the *ori* series are used when the UCI is free, and therefore has universal force, need not be explicitly encoded as a requirement since the possibility of using *vreun* in the presence of existential binding can be seen as blocking the use of *ori*. The [∃] feature could be taken as requiring these items to introduce an existential quantifier, which would render them quantificational (as suggested in Farkas 2002a), or as being essentially a licensing feature amounting to the requirement that the indefinite be within the scope of an existential quantifier that binds it. I follow here Lee and Horn 1994 and Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002 in assuming the latter approach. Whether all special existential indefinites should be treated this way is an open question. Singular *some* in English is existential only but differs from *vreun* in not occurring within the scope of negation. In Farkas 2002b the existential nature of *some* was encoded in an interpretive requirement, rather than as an existential feature. Given the richness of the field of existential indefinites, we have to make theoretical room for several kinds of existential requirements.[11]

[11] Having an existential feature associated with *vreun* and other necessarily existentially interpreted indefinites is not a particularly enlightening way of accounting for their necessarily existential interpretation, however. A more attractive road might be to take the essential nature of UCIs, namely that of involving undifferentiated alternatives, as rendering them compatible exclusively with a universal or an

More concretely now, a UCI in an expression α introduces a variable $x_{\mathcal{F}}$, where the subscript marks the presence of the interpretive requirement associated with undifferentiated exclusive choice. The requirement involves the introduction of the maximal set of *x*-alternatives $\mathcal{F}$ such that for every $\langle f,s_j\rangle$ in $\mathcal{F}$, $f(x_i,s_j)$ satisfies the descriptive content of the UCI and the mutual exclusivity requirement. This set may be implicitly constrained by salient discourse factors, whose workings remain mysterious for now. In the case of scalar UCIs these alternatives are arranged along a scale. Indeed, a good reason to use a UCI is to make sure all possible values are considered, even the least likely ones.

The alternatives in $\mathcal{F}$ supply a value pool for the evaluation parameter set of $x_{\mathcal{F}}$ in α. The evaluation parameter set of a variable *x* in some expression α is the set of function/situation pairs that assign values to *x* relative to some $\langle g,w\rangle$ such that $[[\alpha]]^{g,w} = 1$. The alternatives in $\mathcal{F}$ are said to verify α in the sense that each $\langle f,s_j\rangle$ in $\mathcal{F}$ supplies an individual and a situation that may function as evaluation parameters of $x_{\mathcal{F}}$ relative to some $\langle g,w\rangle$ such that $[[\alpha]]^{g,w} = 1$. The alternatives are equal in that for any such $\langle g,w\rangle$, any $\langle f,s_j\rangle$ in $\mathcal{F}$ may supply values for the evaluation parameters of $x_{\mathcal{F}}$. (25) gives the definition of what it means for a set of *x*-alternatives to verify an expression α. $G(x,w,g)$ is the set of evaluation parameters of *x* in α relative to *g,w*.

(25) $\mathcal{F}$ verifies $[_{\alpha} \ldots x_{\mathcal{F}} \ldots]$ relative to some *g,w* such that $[[\alpha]]^{w,g} = 1$, iff for every $\langle f,s_j\rangle \in \mathcal{F}$ there is $\langle g', w_j\rangle \in G(x,w,g)$ such that $f(x) = g'(x)$ and $s_j \leq w_j$.

Intuitively, each alternative in $\mathcal{F}$ provides an individual a_i and a situation s_j such that a_i is a verifying value for *x* in α relative to some w_j that contains s_j. The subscripts are needed to ensure mutual exclusivity.

Because of the mutual exclusivity condition, $x_{\mathcal{F}}$ must be within the scope of a situation introducing operator *O*. The presence of this operator renders the situation variable brought in by the UCI relevant to the interpretation of the expression in which the UCI occurs. The two scopal possibilities that obtain are given in (26).

(26) a. $x_{\mathcal{F}} :\varphi\ [_{\alpha} Ow' \ldots x_{\mathcal{F}} \ldots]$
b. $Ow'\ [\ldots \exists x_{\mathcal{F}} :\varphi\ [_{\alpha} \ldots x_{\mathcal{F}} \ldots] \ldots]$

(26a) results in a 'widened universal' interpretation for the UCI, while (26b) gives its narrow scope existential interpretation. In the former case, every alternative in $\mathcal{F}$ must verify α; in the latter case, for every relevant w_j, there must be an alternative in $\mathcal{F}$ that verifies α.

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existential interpretation, since all other types of quantification require differentiated choices. The existential nature of *vreun* could also be derived by barring it from widest scope.

The semantic representation of (27) is given in (28), which puts together the contribution of *orice student* 'any student' and the deontic interpretation of the rest of the sentence, where D_w is the set of deontically accessible worlds to *w*.

(27) *Orice* student poate pleca.
Any student may leave.

(28) $x_{\mathcal{F}}$: student($x_{\mathcal{F}}$) [$\exists w_j \in D_w$: leave($x_{\mathcal{F}}$,w_j)]

In the absence of contextual restrictions, $\mathcal{F}$ contains all entity-situation pairs in the model that satisfy the descriptive content of the NP, i.e., all situations containing a student. The truth conditions of (28) abstracting away from the subscript F are given below:

(29) $[[x: \text{student'}(x)\ \exists w' \in D_w: \text{leave'}(x,w')]]^{w,g} = 1$ iff there is an *x* version g' of g such that $g'(x) \in I_w(\text{student'})$, and there is a $w' \in D_w$ such that $[[\text{leave'}(x)]]^{w',g'} = 1$

The $\langle f_i,s_j\rangle$ pairs that give value to *x* here are worlds w_j in D_w and *x*-versions g_i of g. (The subscript on assignment functions tracks the identity of value assigned to *x*.) The mutual exclusivity condition requires *i* and *j* to co-vary across the set of alternatives. The contribution of the subscript $\mathcal{F}$ is the requirement in (30):

(30) For every $\langle f_i,s_j\rangle$ in $\mathcal{F}$, there is an *x*-version g_i of *g*, and a world w_j in D_w such that $s_j \leq w_j$, such that w_j and g_i can substitute for *w'* and *g'* in (29).

Together, (29) and (30) require each student to be part of a different deontically permissible world in which that student leaves. In the absence of implicit or explicit contextual narrowing factors the permission is indeed wide open.
The D-linked version of (27), given in (31),

(31) *Oricare* student poate pleca.
any.Part student may leave
Any student may leave.

involves an obligatory narrowing down of alternatives such that the entities involved have to be chosen from a set of contextually given students, but the situation variable is still unrestricted.

Universal UCIs differ from universally quantified NPs with *every,* whose closest counterpart in Romanian is *fiecare*, in that the situation parameter of the latter is fixed (presumably to the topic situation) while the situation parameter of the former is open. It is this property that explains the relation of sentences involving universal FCI and conditionals. The reduced role of the situation parameter of ordinary universals explains their non-modal nature and therefore their lack of special interaction with modality. Scalarity in this approach is not part of the semantics of UCIs *per se* but rather, the most

likely pragmatic consequence of the drastic widening they effect. If all alternatives are verifying, the least likely ones are as well. Second, UCIs result in necessarily distributive interpretations, which is not the case for all universal DPs.

When a UCI has narrow scope it must be existentially bound, which, I assume here, following Diesing 1992, occurs as a result of the NP remaining in the VP. *Vreun* indefinites must be existential; in (32) then, the UCI must stay within the VP and have narrow scope relative to the conditional.

(32) Dacă pleacă *vreun* student, va fi rău.
if leaves v-a student will be bad
If a/any student leaves, it will be bad.

The conditional involves universal quantification over situations that satisfy the antecedent. For each such situation *s*, there must be an extended situation *s*′ that satisfies the consequent. The VP of the antecedent is existentially closed. The logical form of (32) is given in (33):

(33) $\forall s: [\exists x_{\mathcal{F}}: \text{student}(x_{\mathcal{F}})\ \text{leave}(x_{\mathcal{F}}, s)]\ [\ \exists s': s \leq s'\ \text{bad}(s')]$

The existential, in effect, quantifies over the alternatives in $\mathcal{F}$, requiring there to be one verifying alternative in $\mathcal{F}$ for every *s* quantified over by the universal. Given that the alternatives are required to be equal, which alternative one chooses for which situations is immaterial.

The variant of (32) with a wide scope UCI, given in (34), has the representation in (35):

(34) Dacă pleacă *orice* student, va fi rău.
if leaves o-any student will be bad
If any student leaves, it will be bad.

(35) $x_{\mathcal{F}}: \text{student}(x_{\mathcal{F}})\ [\forall s: [\text{student}(x_{\mathcal{F}})\ \&\ \text{leave}(x_{\mathcal{F}}, s)]\ \exists s': s \leq s' \text{bad}(s')]]$

Now every alternative in $\mathcal{F}$ has to verify the conditional.[12]

Under the present analysis, the account of generic sentences with *orice*, just like Dayal's, involves the *orice* NP being outside the scope of the generic quantifier. The logical form of (36) is given in (37):

(36) *Orice* bufniță zboară.
o-any owl flies
Any owl flies.

(37) $x_{\mathcal{F}}: \text{owl}'(x_{\mathcal{F}})\ [Gs\ (\text{fly}'(x_{\mathcal{F}}, s))]$

[12] I have used here representations in which the scope of the UCI is structurally marked for the sake of convenience.

The expression in the scope of the UCI requires appropriately generic situations to be ones in which *x* flies. (The implicit restriction has been left out in (37) for simplicity's sake.) This expression has to be verified relative to all the alternatives introduced by the UCI, which brings its own situational variable. Every minimal situation including an owl must be extendable to a prototypical situation in which that owl flies. In generic statements involving ordinary indefinites, as in (38), the indefinite is within the scope of G and is bound by it.

(38) O bufniță vînează şoareci.
an owl hunts mice
An owl hunts mice.

(39) Gs,x [owl'(x,s)] [fly'(x,s)]

In (39) we have quantification over typical owls in typical situations.

To sum up, the [UC] feature brings with it the requirement in (40):

(40) *UC requirement*
An item marked by [UC] occurring in an expression α introduces a variable $x_{\mathcal{F}}$ subject to the following requirements: (i) the alternatives in $\mathcal{F}$ verify α; (ii) the alternatives in $\mathcal{F}$ are mutually exclusive.

The classification of UC determiners in Romanian that we arrive at is given in Figure 2:



Figure 2: UC determiners in Romanian

In terms of features, all these determiners are marked as UC; *oricare* is further marked as D-linked, and *orice* has no other features; *vreun* is marked as existential. The English determiner filling all the slots in Figure 2 is *any,* marked simply for being UC. When existentially bound, it is equivalent to *vreun*; when it has widest scope it is equivalent to *ori*-indefinites. In this analysis, *any* and *orice* NPs are equivalent. The use of *orice* is, however, more limited than that of *any* because of the existence, in Romanian, of the other UCIs. The negative concord determiner *nici un* is similar to UCIs in that all the values that satisfy the descriptive content of an indefinite under the scope of negation must be possible witnesses. It is different from these items in not having to involve strict co-variation across situations or worlds.

4. Consequences

The present account follows Lee and Horn 1994 and Horn 2000a in that UCIs are treated as special indefinites. It differs from the scalar approach in that the UC requirement concerns their evaluation relative to a maximal set of undifferentiated mutually exclusive alternatives. The quantificational force of a UCI depends on its environment, as with other indefinites. The evaluation of such items, however, brings them close to Dayal's account – one looks at all possible situations involving an entity that satisfies the descriptive content of the NP. The scalar use of UCIs comes out as a special case, the case where the alternatives form a likelihood/unilateral entailment scale. What we have done so far is spell out the alternatives involved in a scalar account in more detail and made scalarity less central. In the spirit of Dayal, we have made heavy use of situation variables in defining the type of alternatives involved.

The consequences we arrive at combine the consequences of previous approaches. The widening effect associated with UCIs is the result of the type of alternatives they bring in, which necessarily include the least likely alternatives as well. Unlike in Lee and Horn's account, however, the inference that the other values are verifying is not a pragmatic implicature but part of the semantics of undifferentiated choice. The type of widening involved with UCIs is compatible with D-linking: The alternatives introduced may be contextually restricted. Since these alternatives are pairs consisting of an assignment function *and* a situation, the contextual restrictions may restrict the former (delimiting the values of the individual variable) or the latter (delimiting the relevant situations). D-linked UCIs limit the former. UCIs whose descriptive content involves modification by a relative clause or a modifier that is situation specific limit the latter.

The difference between possibility and necessity modals, as well as the subtle effects of subtrigging follow from the mutual exclusivity condition. A UCI cannot be in the nuclear scope of a modal with universal force, as in (41),

(41) #You must pick *any flower (in this bunch)*.

because the verifying values of $x_{\mathcal{F}}$ hold constant across permissible worlds. The mutual exclusivity condition is incompatible with the necessity operator, which requires the flowers you pick to be the same in all deontically accessible worlds

Note that, given our treatment of *vreun* and *ori* indefinites, we expect both to be sensitive to this distinction. Example (42) shows that this expectation is fulfilled:

(42) #Trebuie să culegi *vreo/orice* floare.
must Subj. pick v-a/any flower

The descriptive content of the UCI may rescue such sentences by allowing variation in verifying values, as in (43):

(43) You must pick *any flower you find*.

Here the mutually exclusivity condition is satisfied given that the relevant situations are bound internally to the NP. The alternatives involve a pairing of flowers and situations in which you find that flower. Flowers you find differ across situations of finding them and thus the flowers you must pick vary as well.

An appropriate descriptive content on an FCI may lead to its felicitous occurrence in an apparently episodic sentence, such as (44):

(44) Yesterday, John talked to *any student who came by his office*.

The alternatives supplied by the UCI here are pairs of students and co-varying situations in which that student came by John's office yesterday and therefore mutual exclusivity is satisfied within the NP. The interpretation of *John talked to x* must be such as to be true of each of these situations. The account correctly predicts that a true episodic interpretation, where a single talking situation is involved will not be possible and that therefore (45) will not be acceptable:

(45) #Yesterday at 5pm John talked to *any student who came by his office.*

Finally, a further welcome consequence of the analysis is that it explains the connection between UCIs and conditional statements noted by Quer 2000. If every $\mathcal{F}$-alternative of the UCI in (43) has to verify *You must pick* $x_{\mathcal{F}}$, if *y* is a flower you find, you must pick it.

5. Random choice indefinites: *vreun* and *some*

I turn now to two further environments where we find *vreun* indefinites that are, however, incompatible with a UC analysis. I argue that an alternative-based approach allows us to at least establish a link connecting them to UC *vreun.*

First, consider the use of *vreun* indefinites in frequentative imperfectives, exemplified below:

(46) Din cînd în cînd trenul se oprea în *vreo* haltă şi cîte un
from when in when train Refl. stopped in v-a station and each a

navetist deschidea un ochi. (Farkas 2002a, (15d), p. 137)
commuter open.Imp. an eye
From time to time, the train would stop in some station and a commuter would open an eye.

The choice of *vreun* over an ordinary indefinite here stresses the random nature of the pairing of occasions of the train stopping and the station. The *vreun* indefinite cannot, however, be a UCI because of the clash between the open-ended nature of UC and the restricted situations that are involved here. Note also that UC *any* is not acceptable in the English version of this example; *some N (or other)* is used instead, with the same effect as the use of *vreun*.

Second, consider the use of *vreun* in (47):

(47) In balta din spatele cantonului, ceva plescăi scurt,
In pond.Def. from back.the station.Gen. something splashed briefly

vreun peşte sau *vreo* raţă.
v-a fish or v-a duck
In the pond behind the station, something splashed briefly, some fish or some duck. (Farkas 2002a, (15e), p.137)

Here too there is a clash between the episodic nature of the sentence in which the *vreun* NP occurs and the type of alternatives associated with UCIs. Note again that English resorts to *some N (or other)*, and disallows *any*. The choice of *vreun* over the ordinary indefinite in (46) stresses the uncertainty of the existence of a verifying value in the world of evaluation – there might well be no duck involved, and there might well be no fish involved.

The two cases can be connected under the assumption that the non-UC use of *vreun* indefinites is subject to the requirement in (48):

(48) *Uncertain Existential Requirement (UER)*
Non-UC *vreun* indefinites are unacceptable in case the existence of a verifying value for the NP is entailed at all relevant worlds/situations.[13]

Example (46) meets (48) because of the type of quantification involved: There are several relevant occasions, and some are chosen (at random) where the train stops in a station. The domain of the adverb of quantification *from time to time* involves situations where the train doesn't stop, and therefore in which no witness for the indefinite exists. If we are on the right track, we expect universal quantification over situations to render this use of *vreun* infelicitous.[14] This indeed is the case:

(49) #De fiecare dată cînd trenul se oprea în *vreo* haltă …
of each time when train.Def. Ref. stopped in v-a station …

The use of *vreun* in cases like (47) obviously satisfies the UER since the statement is compatible with both the existence and the non-existence of a witness.

The UER renders *vreun* indefinites infelicitous within the scope of *want* under the assumption that the relevant situations here are worlds ranked relatively high according to the subject's priorities. Example (50) shows that this indeed is the case:

(50) Vreau *un/#vreun* tablou de Schiele.
want.I a/#v-a painting of Schiele

[13] Requiring these items to be scopally non-specific is not enough since they cannot occur within the scope of universal quantifiers or *want.*
[14] Similar facts are discussed for Greek in Giannakidou 1995.

I want a painting by Schiele.

As further evidence that the uses of *vreun* we are dealing with here do not fall under the UC rubric, note that *ori* indefinites are acceptable within the scope of *want*:

(51) Vreau *orice* tablou de Schiele.
want.I any painting of Schiele
I want any painting by Schiele.

Example (51) is acceptable under a scalar interpretation, according to which even the least desirable painting by Schiele is one I'd rather have than not have.

The question that arises now is how this non-UC use of *vreun* NPs relates to its UC use, on the one hand, and how it relates to the special uses of singular *some* on the other. Have we reached a univocal account of *ori* and UC *vreun* (in the footsteps of a univocal account of *any*) but an ambiguous account of UC and 'uncertain existence' *vreun*? Under the view in which various determiners impose different interpretive constraints on the variable they introduce, the question of ambiguity becomes spurious. Determiners may share some restrictions but not others. The question then is what the connection is between UC and non-UC *vreun*. To answer it, it is useful to look at the contrast between ordinary indefinites and singular *some* in English.

In earlier work (Farkas 2002b), I treated *some* indefinites as introducing an unidentified variable, i.e. a variable requiring the presence of several alternatives that are consistent with the output context and which differ only with respect to the value they assign to the variable in question. The alternatives involved are formally identical to the alternatives required by UCIs: They are assignment function/situation pairs differing in the value that the function assigns to a particular variable. The role of the two types of alternatives, however, is different. UC alternatives must verify the expression in which the UCI occurs. The alternatives at play in the case of singular *some* are the live possibilities consistent with a particular context at a particular time, which are subject to being narrowed down as further information is added. I call UC alternatives *verifying* and the latter, *contextual.* Existential items requiring contextual alternatives will be called *contextual choice* (CC) items.

The situational parameter of contextual alternatives ranges over the worlds in the context set but their individual variable does not have to exhaust the domain of the NP. Contextual alternatives are sensitive to a homogeneity parameter of their own. They are homogeneous if the actual value of the relevant variable (assigned to it by that contextual alternative which survives any amount of additional information) has no significant distinguishing characteristics that set it apart from values assigned to it by the other alternatives. Singular *some* is not sensitive to this latter distinction, but *vreun* indefinites are, requiring contextual alternatives to be homogeneous in this way. Thus, the referent of *some candidate* in (52) does not require candidates to be undifferentiated; *vreun* cannot be used in the Romanian equivalent of this example:

(52) In target of opportunity cases the department identifies some candidate they want and they offer the position without search. (from Farkas 2002b)

I call the subtype of CC items requiring this type of homogeneous alternatives *random choice (RC)* items. The common thread between UC and RC is, I suggest, the existence of alternatives that are treated as equal. The difference has to do with the nature of the alternatives and the type of equality they involve. UCIs require the existence of maximal verifying alternatives of equal contextual salience. Singular *some* and non-UC *vreun* require contextual alternatives. In addition, *vreun* is an RC item because it requires these alternatives to be non-differentiated. Common to the use of *vreun* as a UC and an RC item is the required presence of alternatives that count as equal. The proper formal treatment of this connection remains an open problem. Equally open is the connection, if any, between the types of alternatives involved and the types of extra existence or vagueness requirements imposed by particular determiners.

The properties of the determiners we have discussed here are listed in (53):

(53) a. *un:* unmarked
b. *orice:* UC
c. *vreun*: [existential UC] or [uncertain existential RC]
d. *oricare* : UC, D-linked
e. *nici un*: Neg, existential

The properties of English *any,* singular *some* and *a(n)* are given in (54):

(54) a. *a(n):* unmarked
b. *any:* UC
c. *some:* CC

6. Conclusion

There are several morals that emerge from this discussion. First, considering special types of indefinites as ordinary indefinites plus extra requirements, as proposed in Lee and Horn 1994, Horn 2000a, as well as much other work on indefinites, is a fruitful approach, which allows us to draw a complicated map of the indefinite land using simple tools. Approaching the understanding of particular NP types in a particular language from a paradigmatic perspective seems to be called for both for intralinguistic and especially for cross-linguistic semantics. The question that arises in this respect is what types of restrictions determiners may impose.

Second, looking at particular NP types as requiring the presence of alternatives is a promising way of approaching FCIs and their kin. It has allowed us to approach FC *any* in a way that is different from the two standard approaches, namely as a wide scope universal with a modal in its scope or an existential within the scope of a modal. Defining alternatives as sets of assignment functions and situations, as done here, allows us to bring under one umbrella, namely that of undifferentiated choice, both the existential and the universal uses of *any.* It also promises help in building a useful bridge

between UC and RC items. This approach opens the possibility of bringing together analyses of focus, indefinites and, possibly, questions (as discussed in Ladusaw 2004) and lexical presupposition (as discussed in Abusch 2002) by considering the role of (un)differentiated alternatives involved in their interpretation. It may also help in answering the first question raised above.

Third, factoring out quantification from the contribution of indefinites, as pioneered in Kamp 1981 and Heim 1982, is fruitful as well. While this approach is successful in analyzing the chameleonic nature of ordinary indefinites, the stubbornly existential nature of some special indefinites becomes problematic. Among the many puzzles that remain, one that seems to me particularly salient is the relative wealth of distinctions we find within the realm of existential alternative-requiring items. How the existential force of these items is imposed, and what extra conditions they come with are subject to as yet mysterious variation.

Finally, the problems involved in subtrigging, a full account of which is, to my mind, the most notable open issue in the realm of FCIs, points to the importance of the role played by the situation variable in nominal interpretation, an issue that has had a relatively low profile in nominal semantics so far and which I hope will become central in the near future.

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